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Africa and the South: Forging Truly Interdependent Economic and Technical Links*

ADEBAYO ADEDEJI

IN many respects, Africa is at the heart of the Third World. Its problems are symptomatic of Third World problems. Its challenges are those of the Third World. To the African, given the total commitment to the cause of the deprived majority of mankind, Third World solidarity is a fundamental objective of policy. It is in order to strengthen this solidarity, this unity of purpose and action the Africans attach the highest priority to the need to forge truly interdependent economic and technical links among Third World countries.

Before going further let me address myself to the question: What is the Third World? Is the Third World a fact or a fiction? A related question is: What is South-South co-operation?

The term "Third World" has been coined by some French authors, the most famous of whom is Alfred Saury. To them *Tiers Monde* is analogical with *Tiers Etat*, usually translated as *Third Estate*, a term that designated before the French Revolution all those who did not belong to either of the privileged "estates": the nobility and the clergy. The concept of *Tiers Etat* was therefore applied negatively to those who had no privilege. By the same token, the term *Tiers Monde* (Third World) applies to all the nations "that did not become, during the historical process of the establishment of the present World Order, industrialized and wealthy. Obviously, it has

*Adapted from a talk delivered at India International Centre on 19 May 1979.

nothing to do either with the Chinese "theory of three worlds" where the two super-powers are a kind of first world, the other industrialized nations the second".¹ While the distinction between the Western market economies and the centrally planned economies of Eastern Europe is indeed very real, it is not for the purpose of identifying and defining the Third World particularly, relevant as that distinction is, based on political and social criteria rather than on economic ones. The Third World is composed of the countries of Asia, Latin America and Africa who are at the periphery of the present World Economic Order.

These countries share certain characteristics in common. They have been conquered, politically subjected, culturally aggressed and economically exploited. Undoubtedly, the period of political colonization varied from region to region and from country to country — from a few decades to several centuries. In this connexion, Africa, because it was the last region to be colonized, was stigmatized as the 'Dark Continent'. While a number of the countries of the Third World (particularly countries of Central and South America) achieved political independence several decades ago, for the overwhelming majority of the countries independence came after World War II, with India and Pakistan blazing the trail. Even today, the struggle for independence is still far from being over. The total liberation of Africa from colonial domination is still to be achieved. The minority and racist regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia still have to be defeated so that Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa (Azania) can take their rightful place among Third World countries. Even for many countries which had achieved independence at an early age, such independence was nominal as they were politically under the hegemony of some big power.

Secondly, almost all the countries of the Third World suffered from cultural aggression. Some suffered more than the others. And Africa as a whole suffered the most. As I said in 1975 at the Tom Mboya Memorial Lecture which I delivered in Nairobi in the memory of a great son of Africa and a remarkable citizen of the Third World:

"For over the last hundred years, the traditional cultures of Africa—the arts and customs and beliefs of the scores of diverse ethnic groups in Africa—have seldom appeared worthy of honour and respect. Indeed, as Basil Davidson puts it, so great has been the downthrusting impact of colonial rule that many Africans have come to share this denigration of their own historical achievements.² So pervasive was the

denigration that both inside and outside Africa people agreed for a long time with the dictum of a former colonial Governor of Kenya that Africans are "so primitive that for civilising purposes they are almost a clean slate".

In retrospect, it is not difficult to understand why the outside world (largely the invading world) misunderstood and misinterpreted what it found in Africa. For the multi-ethnic nature of Africa, South of the Sahara (or what the outside world derisively calls tribal society) is complex and bewildering; even with the best will in the world it is difficult for a foreigner to comprehend fully."

By far the most pervasive legacy which Third World countries share in common is economic exploitation which not only led to the drain of resources from these countries to the metropolitan countries during the colonial era but also led to the emergence of an exploitative and dependent colonial economic structure and system from which most of the countries are yet to free themselves. The result is that today these countries depend on their former colonizers not only for capital, for technology, for highly skilled manpower but also for the market for their production. This dependency breeds a sense of helplessness, erodes individual and national confidence and leads in turn to further exploitation. As I had cause to say recently during the commemoration of the twenty-first anniversary of the establishment of the Economic Commission for Africa:

"...economic dependence means political, social and psychological subservience—whatever the rhetorics to the contrary may be. We all know full well that subservience saps initiative, vitality and creativity and results in loss of self-respect. Worse still, it perpetuates the exploitation of the 'dependent' by the 'master'. A dependent economy having lost its self-respect commands no respect from the developed ones. Its people and leaders are despised at the same time as their economies are squeezed and exploited."³

Today, some twenty to thirty years after most Third World countries had become politically independent, the economic exploitation unfortunately continues—no doubt more subtly, hiding behind the opaque curtain of market forces. It has been aided and abetted and given new dimensions in depth and magnitude by the combination of the post-World War II expansion of transnational corporations

and, regrettably, by the inappropriate development strategies. .

Thanks to our intellectual subservience, there has been lack of clarity in our thinking about the purpose of development and the kind of development we should pursue and for whom and by whom. Rather we have tended to concentrate more on the 'how' of development. Until recently most social scientists and policy makers in developing countries believed that the engine of economic development could be sparked off by external stimuli and that transition from underdevelopment to development was predominantly a *technical problem*, and could be generated simply by supplying the missing ingredients; that is, through infusion of material and non-material inputs from developed countries. Under this influence we implicitly accepted holus bolus, our external dependence both for ideas and action programmes as well as for inputs required for economic transformation. This kind of thinking has necessarily led to the adoption of delphic prescriptions. And the structural dependence of the economies of our countries have resulted in massive economic logjams.

This structural dependence of our economies ties us down to a quagmire of a vicious circle of economic stagnation, the main features of which are: high import coefficients; high proportion of marketed output exported to a limited number of metropolitan markets; concentration of exports on a narrow range of products (mainly primary, semi-processed and light manufactures); reliance on external aid and foreign technology as well as skills, with the result that foreign-decision-making plays an important role in employment, output and income in our economies; transfer of a large proportion of much-needed resources abroad to owners of capital, technology and skills.

In the circumstances, is it any wonder that it has been virtually impossible to spark off self-sustained development? Like Alice in Wonderland, most Third World countries have been getting nowhere! Apart from increasing political and economic vulnerability, structural dependence produces an unbalanced structure of economic development where production and consumption patterns are geared outward and reflect more the economic characteristics of developed countries rather than responding to the needs and requirements of the masses of our people. The external demonstration effect creates a distorted production pattern which tends to respond to external assistance requirements and is generally directed towards meeting external input requirements (minerals, agricultural raw materials, semi-manufactures—all produced by cheap labour); it also creates a pattern of demand biased in favour of imported goods, a significant proportion of which are luxuries and semi-luxuries consumed by high-income

groups. The continuing unequal distribution of income combined with underemployment of domestic resources produced by imported technology (generally capital-intensive), slow down the creation of a pattern of demand which would stimulate agricultural production and the creation of an industrial structure which would focus on producing goods needed by the majority of our people. This in turn reduces domestic savings, widens the foreign exchange gap, and slows down the process of growth and development.

The fact that both production and consumption are largely externally-determined means that there is a cumulative divergence between production and the utilisation of the domestic production potential and needs. We produce mainly what is needed abroad and those of our resources which are not immediately demanded abroad are left untapped even though their exploitation would satisfy local needs. External trade instead of being an extension of home demand—as was the case in the early stages of economic development of most industrialized countries of today—is independent of it.

Third World intellectual subservience for most of the post-independence period has led many countries to the adoption of economic planning techniques and methodologies unsuited to their needs and to the borrowing of ideas from industrialized countries which have led to delphic prescriptions for the solution of the problem of underdevelopment. They diagnose lack of growth and development as being due to lack of capital, skills, absorptive capacity and appropriate institutions etc.; and accordingly prescribe that in order to encourage the importation of these inputs, our economies must be more open i.e. maintain a system of high external/domestic resources ratio.

Time it was when we believed—because that was the conventional wisdom in Europe and North America following the end of World War II which coincided with the beginning of the end of the colonial period—that massive injections of capital from the developed countries was what Africa and Asia needed to achieve economic development. The success of the Marshall Plan in reconstructing war-devastated Western Europe led to such over simplification of the processes of engineering socio-economic development that we all queued for capital assistance from industrialized countries and even made the transfer of 0.7 per cent of the GNP of industrialized countries to developing countries as an article of faith in the United Nations Second Development Decade and the foundations on which our countries' development depends. The literature was turgid on the need for developing countries to encourage foreign investment and various forms of capital assistance. We all rushed for this pana-

cea. There was no co-ordinated or collective action among us. Instead, we competed against each other for foreign capital and thus aided the intensification of the exploitation of our economies by the industrialized countries.

After a while we entered another period when emphasis shifted from capital to the need for experts and technicians to assist developing countries in absorbing capital and to teach us how to plan and use investments wisely. We imported outside experts and advisers by the legion. The result of this foreign technician syndrome was that the design, pattern and contents of development in our countries were outward oriented. They were largely determined by, and their effective implementation depended upon, external capital and technical assistance. Programmes and projects were largely not an integral part of the historical, political and socio-economic fabric of the developing countries; they remained entities grafted from outside. Hence they did not produce the desired results.

It was realised, after a while, that capital and technical assistance experts could not, by themselves, do the job; precisely because their programming and use did not take full account of the institutional, political, psychological and socio-economic structures of the countries concerned. What was required, it was argued, were the right institutions that would be compatible with development needs and facilitate the absorption of capital and technical assistance, as well as trained manpower that would carry on the job after the departure of foreign experts. It became fashionable to speak of absorptive capacity through institution building. Particular attention was given to education, investment promotion, administration and business institutions.

Unfortunately, this new ingredient in the technical equation was also outward oriented. The models used were borrowed from the successful countries of the West. For example, the educational systems established used syllabi and textbooks that were more suited to industrialised countries and not to the needs of countries that were primarily agricultural and not western oriented in culture and outlook.

Concurrently with institution building, attention was given to the so-called non-economic or extra-economic factors of development—health care, improved housing, literacy campaigns, land reform, etc. But these endeavours were soon frustrated by inadequate resources. We had to borrow more from developed countries and request for additional technical assistance.

The ever-increasing need for additional external assistance combined with our debt burden led many of us to believe that if we

could export more on favourable terms, to developed countries, we would be able to earn the foreign exchange we require for buying more inputs from the industrialised countries. The emphasis was again outward. The new slogan became "more trade with the industrialised countries—and better conditions for such trade". So we came together in UNCTAD and elsewhere to negotiate with the industrialised countries for better terms and conditions for trade and financial assistance hopefully within a framework of a New International Economic Order. We entered another tunnel out of which we have not yet emerged.

In our trade relations with the developed countries we are faced with an unfavourable competitive position. In spite of phenomenal growth in world trade at around 7 per cent per year from the 1950s, the developing countries have not benefited much. Our share, although larger in absolute terms, fell from around 34 per cent in 1950 to 22 per cent by the end of the 1960s. The basic problem is that demand for the products of developing countries in the developed world continues to fall as a result of a combination of factors: invention of substitutes, more efficient use of resources, lower growth in population, rising incomes, and of course the fact that the developed countries are now giving priority to the solution of their own problems of rising prices, inflation, unemployment and incipient depression.

As I said recently in opening the ECA/UNEP-sponsored Seminar on Alternative Pattern of Development and Life-Styles in Africa, held in Addis Ababa from 5 to 9 March, 1979:

"The time has come when the African Governments should have a very critical look at the experiences of other countries in the light of Africa's development since independence and ask themselves whether any of them provides a basis on which to model their own development strategy and the life-style of their people. For too long the impression has been created that African development strategies and life-styles are an imitation—indeed, a poor imitation—of strategies and life-styles developed elsewhere for other societies with different historical, cultural, economic and political backgrounds. Indeed, we in Africa have, over the years, become the mimic people. Although we pretend to be real, to be learning and to be preparing ourselves and our countries for self-reliant development processes and an authentically African life-style, all we really have succeeded in doing is to mimic other societies and their life-styles. In doing so, we use borrowed phrases,

jargons and terminologies which are foreign to our people and only succeed in beclouding the issues before us and in confusing our people".⁴

An increasing awareness that imitative development will spark off an internally-generated and self-sustaining development process has paved the way for fresh thinking. The common denominator of all these borrowed prescriptions is that they are completely devoid of any ingredients of self-help among developing countries. They are prescriptions, *par excellence*, for structural and intellectual dependence. Imported ideas, aid, capital, and skills will not produce miracles. On the contrary they are costly and drain our meagre resources, thus holding back capital accumulation—both material and human. Much of aid is tied, thus limiting flexibility in imports and imposing unsuitable forms of development. Aid also ends up in donor countries through payments for equipment and technical personnel provided under aid programmes. Moreover, the real value of aid is reduced by inflation.

If aid is inadequate and not free, foreign investment imposes a greater burden. A large proportion of profits from foreign investment is repatriated—in addition to transfer of dividends and profits abroad, there are payments which recipient countries incur such as management fees, payments to parent companies for research and technical services, depreciation allowances to buy spare parts, salaries where these go mainly to expatriates, etc.

No wonder our countries are perpetually in debt. We have all found that in our state of dependence, individual efforts to develop our economies through borrowing ideas and through external material assistance tie us more and more, as appendages, to the rich countries. And we remain poor, underdeveloped and in debt. The dialogue we have conducted in recent years with developed countries (North-South) in the hope of establishing a new type of economic relationship between the rich and poor countries, has brought no fundamental changes in the world economic order. We are therefore left with no choice but to come together. We have to build up Third World self-reliance. This is the *raison d'être* for forging economic and technical links among Third World countries.

Thus, given their common heritage, their common challenges and, indeed, their common poverty, there are compelling reasons why the countries of the South must do more by themselves and for themselves in the fields of economic and technical co-operation, not as a negative reaction to the frustration and disillusionment caused by the unsuccessful North-South dialogues but on the positive reali-

zation that *together* through economic and technical co-operation they can pull themselves up by their own bootstraps. And one of the inevitable by-products of such co-operation is that they will acquire greater economic leverage over the developed countries. Indeed, by taking full advantage of opportunities of mutual interdependence and complementarity of their economies, the countries of the South will sooner or later put themselves in a position to seize the initiative and assume the leadership for bringing about the establishment of the new international economic order.

However, although the objectives are common, we cannot realistically ignore the fact that there are growing divergencies in the modalities for the achievement of these objectives. These divergencies naturally reflect the heterogeneous nature of the Third World and the growing economic differentiation among its countries. These diversities are facts of life but they could easily become divisive factors and thus undermine the unity of purpose and the solidarity of the Third World.

The countries of the Third World differ markedly in their size, their population, natural resource base, level of development, their commitment to development, per capita GNP, etc. They also differ in their political and social systems and more often than not in their ideological beliefs.

These differences have been used to classify these countries. The most popular factors for such classification have been per capita GNP, export of petroleum and degree of industrialisation.

Using the first criterion—per capita GNP, — Third World countries have been divided into four categories:

- (i) *the 'wealthy' poor* with more than US \$2,000 per capita income. There are eleven countries in this category, mainly oil-producing countries, but they account for only 1.5 per cent of the population of the Third World (28.5 million out of 1,921.4 million excluding China);
- (ii) *the 'well-to-do' poor countries* with per capita income ranging from US \$1,000 to US \$2,000. The 14 countries in this category account for 13.1 of Third World population;
- (iii) *the 'less' poor countries* with per capita income ranging from US \$200 to US \$999 and accounting for 48.0 per cent of Third World population, numbering 56 out of the total of 108 countries; and
- (iv) *the 'rock-bottom' countries*—27 in all—and accounting for 37.4 per cent of Third World population, enjoy less than US \$200 per capita income.

In spite of this per capita income differentiation, the gap in per

capita income between the industrialized countries and the even so-called 'wealthy' poor is such that the developing countries still constitute a world of its own. In any case the gap in the income of the industrialised nations and the Third World is still widening.

The second criterion used in making the differentiation is in the production and export of petroleum. It is now a common practice for the Western media and spokesmen to single out OPEC countries as rich countries which should no longer be regarded as belonging to the Third World. While it is true that eight of the 'wealthy' Third World countries are OPEC members—Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Gabon, Oman and Venezuela — it is not true that all OPEC countries have high per capita incomes. For example, Nigeria and Kuwait have the same oil output (about 2.3 million barrels a day) but US \$15,190 and US \$380 per capita incomes respectively—Kuwait population being about one million while Nigeria has about 75 million people. And Indonesia has a per capita GNP of US \$220. Indeed, "of the total population of OPEC countries, 12.3 million live in 'capital surplus' States (Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Libya and Saudi Arabia), 26 million enjoy a per capita GNP superior to US \$2,000; 44.5 have per capita GNP between US \$1,000 and US \$2,000; all the rest (207 million, 71% of the total) less than US \$400."⁶

There is therefore no justification in grouping OPEC member states together and classifying them as not really belonging to the poor countries unless as a way of splitting the Third World. In any case, the infrastructures of the Arab oil producing countries are grossly inadequate and given the sparseness of their population and huge size (especially Saudi Arabia and Oman) it is extremely difficult to develop them. The climate is exceedingly harsh and the supply of skills extremely limited. Some of these countries have small populations and lack almost all other natural resources including even fresh water. They all depend on the importation of food and technology. In other words, they share all the characteristics of dependent economies and could suffer a sudden downward change in their per capita GNP if there was either a significant fall in oil supply or demand or both.

The third basis for making distinction among the Third World countries is the identification and grouping together of the so-called Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs). This is the latest factor which has been brought into use in distinguishing among Third World countries. Although no definite list exists of NICs, the term is commonly used to group together mainly countries of Latin America. There is no doubt that there has been an extraordinary

development of the productive forces of the Latin American countries since 1950. As Mr. Enrique V. Iglesias, Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Latin America stated, between 1950 and now:

“The regional product (of Latin America) more than quadrupled, reaching a volume comparable to that of Europe in 1950... The region became industrialized: heavy industry, such as the iron and steel and petrochemical industries, was set in motion, and Latin America progressed to a situation where it could supply a substantial proportion of the demand from the construction, transport and communications sectors and satisfy requirements for important lines of durable manufactures. Real growth rates amply exceeded optimistic expectations including those of ... the United Nations International Development Strategy. We find ourselves before a Latin America which by 1985, if present trends are maintained, will be generating a product similar to that of Europe in 1970.”⁶

But in spite of this spectacular industrial development (or is it because of it) the Latin American economy still exhibits some of the features of the developing Third World: the external orientation and vulnerability of the economy; its dependence on the western market economies for capital, technology and even market for its manufactures—hence the region’s excessive concern for the acceptance by the industrialized countries of access of manufactures for Third World countries to the market of the industrialized countries—and the rapidly accumulating external public debt burdens: an increase from 8.7 billion dollars in 1965 to 42 billion in 1975. Above all, the region is faced, because of the imitative type of development which it has adopted, with severe structural unemployment problems as well as a seriously skewed income distribution. Enrique Iglesias wrote⁷:

“It cannot be ignored that one-third of the population of Latin America—a hundred million people or so—is living today in a state of critical poverty.”

We can therefore see that the countries of Latin America will be making a grave mistake if they think that they no longer belong to the Third World. Indeed, not only do they have many problems in common with other Third World regions, most of these problems can only be solved within the framework of Third World co-operation. This is in no way to suggest that the region does not have its own special interests and priorities—like the other regions of Asia

and Africa—which have to be taken fully into account in any co-operative arrangements among Third World countries.

It will therefore be seen that in spite of the heterogeneity of Third World countries and the growing differentiation in their development, these countries still have basically common interests which can only be achieved through the forging of truly interdependent economic and technical links. Indeed, economic differentiation is inevitable, given the fact the countries were not starting from the same base nor are they endowed with the same resources. Even within a national economy, such differentiation occurs. What is important is the communion of interests, the perception of those interests and the will—the political will—to exploit those interests to the mutual benefit of all. But in order to forge such economic and technical co-operation arrangements there must be the spirit of give-and-take and the acceptance of the basic principles of genuine interdependence and willingness to be each other's brothers' (or sisters') keepers.

Having established the imperative need of South-South economic and technical co-operation, let us now review the progress that has been achieved, and the problems encountered. This review will focus on South-South trade as well as on joint ventures carried out in various fields, including the technical, industrial and agricultural ones, between and among developing countries belonging to different regions.

With regard to trade, the picture is a very mixed one. On the positive side, it is encouraging to note that, on the basis of a statistical analysis recently carried out by UNCTAD,⁸ while, between 1955 and 1970, the share of trade among developing countries in world trade recorded a permanent decrease from 7.2 per cent to 3.5 per cent, the share moved upward as from 1971 to reach the level of 5.9 per cent by 1976. It is also comforting to observe that developing countries' intra-trade expanded between 1970 and 1976 at the rate of 9.2 per cent annually as compared to 5.8 per cent during 1960-1970. The figures I have just quoted for the period 1970-1976 are all the more remarkable as they are significantly higher than those obtaining for trade flows among industrialized countries, namely 6 per cent, and those obtaining for total exports of all developing countries, namely 5.8 per cent.

Equally positive, at least at first sight, is the fact that, insofar as the structure of developing countries' intra-trade is concerned, a major feature noticeable during the period 1955-1975 is the decrease in the share of food and agricultural materials and a rapid increase in the share of manufactured products. While we, in ECA, welcome

this evolution to the extent that it represents a most significant departure from the traditional North-South trade pattern, we cannot but deplore the fact that the African region's exports to developing countries contained in 1975 the highest share of food items and agricultural raw materials (58.6 per cent) and the lowest share of manufactured goods (23.6 per cent). Indeed, African exports to other regions consist mainly of fuel oil to developing America, and of food and crude materials to South and South-East Asia.

In terms of interregional trade balance, what we have been witnessing for a number of years is West Asia's substantial surplus *vis-à-vis* all other developing regions, amounting to as much as US \$10 billion in 1975, due to the marked increase in petroleum prices. It is no less remarkable that this amount represented only a little less than 80 per cent of interregional trade flows.

Having said this, when one turns to non-fuel interregional trade, it is South and South-East Asia that traditionally enjoys a surplus *vis-à-vis* all other regions. As for developing America, it is noteworthy that, due to a marked increase in its food exports to West Asia and Africa, it has been able to turn its traditional deficit in non-fuel trade into an overall surplus of some US \$900 million.

There remains Africa which, at the same time as it has been exporting food to South and South-East Asia, has been importing the same from developing America as well as increasing quantities of manufactured goods from both these regions. This resulted in 1975 in a \$1.5 billion deficit *vis-à-vis* these two regions, which could not naturally be offset by the \$71 million surplus generated in our trade with West Asia.

This, therefore, is roughly the picture insofar as our intra-trade is concerned. Let us now consider other forms of co-operative arrangements.

Consider first the co-operation between African and Latin American countries. Despite the fact that some obvious complementarities exist between the economies of the two regions, and the problems they face are to a large extent similar and could attract similar solutions, economic and technical co-operation between the two regions has been minimal, and until recently virtually non-existent. Surely, the striking resemblances with respect to various aspects of the economies of the two regions, ranging from a similarity of agricultural tropical crops like sugarcane, coffee, cocoa and bananas, to similar needs in manpower training, technology and institution-building—all this ought to define a large area of potential fruitful co-operation.

Fortunately, this picture is now beginning to change. Of late,

a number of African countries have entered not only into trade but also technical co-operation agreements with certain Latin American and Caribbean countries with a view to enhancing the level of co-operation between them. For example, Brazil assists Gabon in the field of agronomic research for cocoa and soya beans development, provides manpower training experts, offers scholarships to Gabonese to train in the merchant navy, and supplies railway wagons and buses; while Argentina supplies Gabon with meat. Tanzania, Sierra Leone and Mozambique have co-operative arrangements with Cuba. Tanzania and Cuba have established a medical training programme under which Tanzania sends qualified doctors to Cuba for specialized training. This programme is especially tailored to enable Tanzanian doctors to acquire techniques in the organization and management of mass oriented medical programmes. Cuba has also built agriculture-oriented secondary schools and an artificial insemination centre and set up a large-scale sugar project. Sierra Leone, for its part, has benefited from an offer of Cuban scholarship under bilateral assistance arrangements, while Mozambique has been provided with Cuban managers for its sugar mill and plantations. Mention may also be made of assistance in the form of food aid and materials as well as scholarships given by Trinidad and Tobago to Mozambique.

These recent and growing connections are however still extremely modest: the potential for economic and technical co-operation between the two regions remains virtually untapped.

We may now take a look at Africa and Western Asia. Historically, trade links between Africa and the Arab world go back a long way, but like the trade with the West during the days of slavery and colonialism, the Afro-Arab trade contacts of the old days cannot be regarded as having formed a basis for mutual economic co-operation beneficial to both sides. Genuine economic and technical co-operation is only now beginning to emerge under the banner of Afro-Arab co-operation. A few examples may be quoted. Burundi, Chad and Gambia each has economic and technical co-operation arrangements with, among other countries, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia which provide financing for agricultural, transport and forestry projects. Iraq has assisted Mozambique through an offer of crude oil, while Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi and the United Arab Emirates have participated in the financing of a dam in Mali. The Arab League Fund has financed professors, doctors and hospital staff from Arab countries to Uganda.

Last but not least, we may turn to relations between Africa and Asia. Once again, contact between Africa and what used to be called

the Orient certainly goes back many centuries, but deliberately forged or purposeful links of economic and technical co-operation are clearly a post-war phenomenon, and more particularly since the decade of the 1960s. The philosophy, at least, of mutual co-operation among the developing countries began to take firm root with the emergence of the concept of neutrality or non-alignment expounded and practised by political leaders of certain newly emergent States in the Third World, including such towering Indian figures as Gandhi and Nehru. Thus successive summit conferences of non-aligned States starting with the Bandung Conference of 1955 through the Belgrade Conference (1964), the Lusaka Conference (1970), the Algiers Conference (1973) and the Colombo Conference (1976) have strengthened the ties between Africa and Asia. Indeed the political ties between Africa and the rest of the Third World have become stronger and stronger. The 1976 Mexico Conference on Economic Co-operation among Developing Countries added new dimensions to these ties as it provides the framework for concrete co-operative arrangements.

A few examples of economic and technical co-operation between African and Asian countries may be noted. Through the agency of such parastatal bodies as the Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation, Kenya collaborates with India in a number of joint economic ventures, including the production of paper and pulp, woollen and cotton textiles, pipe fittings, plywood, machine tools, pumps and pharmaceuticals. Tanzania has a joint commission with India through which various co-operative ventures have been negotiated and are periodically reviewed. For example, Tanzania has of recent recruited an increasing number of Indian and Pakistani experts—engineers, teachers and technicians—and relied on Indian equipment and technology in the establishment of various small-scale industries such as assembly of bicycles, oil-seed processing, water pumps etc. China has assisted Tanzania and Zambia with capital and expertise in the construction of the Tanzania-Zambia railway which provides land-locked Zambia with an alternative outlet to the sea. China and North Korea have been involved in co-operative economic and technical arrangements with a number of African countries, including Sierra Leone, Upper Volta, Niger, Benin, Togo and Burundi. Much of the assistance is in agricultural planning, cultivation and cropping, as well as public health and sports activities.

I ought to emphasize that the various examples I have quoted are merely for illustrative purposes; they are not comprehensive but only indicative of the sort of areas in which Africa is already engaged in, or economic and technical arrangements with the other regions of

the developing world. But one thing which is crystal clear is the extreme quantum and magnitude of economic and technical co-operation between Africa and the rest of the Third World and indeed among the entire Third World countries.

Why, it may be asked, has South-South economic and technical co-operation been so limited in spite of the exhortations of the Conference on Economic Co-operation among Developing Countries, held in Mexico City in 1976 under the auspices of the Group of 77 and the Summit Conference of Non-aligned States held in the same year in Colombo? It is easy to pinpoint one of the major problems, not just because it is real enough, but also because it has received a fair amount of attention. I have in mind here what is, variously called interference or adverse pressures by the developed world, or parts thereof, bent on protracting interests that would be jeopardized if such horizontal co-operation, as is being discussed here, were to succeed. Similarly, it is easy to mention obstacles or problems of an infrastructural nature such as deficiencies in transport and communications, lack of information about each other, or differences in political, ideological or cultural outlooks. But when all these contributory factors have been mentioned, important as each one of them may be, I believe we will have still omitted perhaps some of the most crucial ones.

I should like to mention, first of all, our lack of confidence in each other's abilities and skills and in our capacity to deliver goods and services of a quality comparable, let alone equal, to those of our traditional suppliers. I am not saying that this capacity always exists, since, after all, most of our countries have started or are starting from a low technological, industrial and managerial base. The tragedy, as I see it, is that not only are we not prepared, even for a limited period, to make allowances for goods or services of less than competitive quality, or to accept terms that may be less favourable, however slightly so, than those of our traditional suppliers, but even when these competitive quality and terms obtain, there is always the temptation to buy from outside the Third World.

In addition to this lack of self-confidence, one of the crucial problems hampering the rapid expansion of horizontal co-operation stems from the feeling that the benefits deriving from such co-operation are not equally shared and, worse still, that the traditional scenario that obtains in our trade with the developed world, whereby our countries supply the former with commodities and import therefrom manufactured products, including capital goods, is being reproduced, deliberately or not, in our intra-Third World trade.

Since, from the hard facts and figures I referred to earlier on, it is Africa's trade situation that seems to bear the greatest likeness to this scenario, I feel compelled to say that such a situation is totally unacceptable to us on a long or even medium-term basis. There is, in fact, no doubt that, if such a situation were allowed to continue it is not just the African region's interests that would be jeopardized. It is also the entire fabric of South-South co-operation that would be seriously damaged to the extent that less-than-optimum advantage would be taken of our region's real potential.

Thirdly, in all the tasks we seem to have set ourselves, either in the Colombo Action Programme for Co-operation among non-aligned countries or in the Manila Programme of Economic Co-operation among developing countries or in the Mexico Programme of Action on the same subject, there is an absolute lack of priorities. One important and most regrettable consequence of this state of affairs is the lack of a sense of direction and purpose in the pursuit of our common endeavours. In fact, the magnitude of the tasks ahead is such that there is a widespread feeling that, unless priorities are set pretty soon, it will be most difficult to make any progress.

A related and central problem stems from the lack of an appropriate mechanism for monitoring progress, ensuring follow-up of decisions, keeping the flow of up-to-date and relevant information going to all parties concerned, undertaking the required studies etc. As it is now, Third World Governments seem to have an opportunity to meet only in preparation for, or in conjunction with, UNCTAD meetings and those of other international agencies. So-called Action Programmes are then adopted, and it is assumed that implementation will follow, under the aegis of UNCTAD or the regional economic commissions. Pleased as we are in the UN system at being asked to help in this way, and eager as we may be to do so, it is my considered view that whatever we can do cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be regarded as an adequate substitute for the work which would need to be carried out by the Third World countries themselves or an appropriate mechanism of their own.

Lastly, while the promotion of ECDC between groups of selected countries belonging to different regions is perfectly justified, I feel there may be need for some measure of caution, if only because, over the years, each developing region has been trying to evolve various co-operative schemes of its own which, I feel, should not be ignored or by passed. There is need, indeed, to find formulae, which need not necessarily be the same in each case, to make it possible for regional and interregional co-operative efforts to reinforce each other instead of being in opposition to each other.

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Let me now at this point talk briefly about the recent endeavours of Third World countries in acting collectively to get better terms and conditions insofar as trade and development issues are concerned. I have left this matter of the so-called North-South negotiation to the last, not because it is unimportant but because to me forging the truly interdependent economic and technical links among the countries and regions of the South is not only an imperative necessity in its own right but also a *conditio sine qua non* for the achievement of any major breakthrough in the North-South negotiations. It is the absence of this muscle that has led to the ineffectiveness of the South.

North-South negotiations have been initiated and pursued mainly through the Group of 77—a group in the functioning of which, I am pleased to say, India has played a decisive role from its very start in 1964. I believe we should all be very grateful to the Group of 77 for filling what was at that time, and still is, an important need—namely, a forum where Third World countries could look together at major international economic issues being discussed mainly within the framework of UNCTAD, but also in GATT, UNIDO and other fora, work out common stands thereon, and thus attempt to speak with one voice *vis-à-vis* developed countries taken as a whole.

Thus, for UNCTAD V, which is now being held in Manila, just as was the case for the four previous sessions, the Group of 77, meeting in Arusha (Tanzania), was able to come out with the Arusha Programme for Collective Self-reliance and Framework for Negotiations which embodies the agreed views of the Third World on the major issues before the Manila Conference such as those relating to commodities, manufactures and semi-manufactures, money and finance, technology, shipping and least developed among developing countries and even economic co-operation among developing countries. There is no question that the Group should be commended for the role it played in connexion with a number of achievements such as the Generalized System of Preferences and more recently the Common Fund—even if the Common Fund that is emerging is a far cry from the one originally intended. But perhaps, more than anything else, the actual functioning of the Group has made it possible for its constituent elements to develop an awareness of, if not of each other's exact needs, at least of each other's economic existence as distinct from the mutual awareness of our political existence, which was fostered by the non-aligned movement.

Having said this, let us not conceal the fact that much more, indeed a great deal more, needs to be done, by way of the develop-

ing countries enhancing their collective bargaining strength and exercising their countervailing power, thereby creating the compulsions which would make the developed countries willy-nilly negotiate the desired changes in the international economic system.

In fact, notwithstanding the indisputable achievements of the Group of 77 so far, one may well consider that we have not even truly started to use our bargaining strength in negotiating with the developed world. Indeed, I dare say that, so far, we have not even started to "negotiate" to the extent that the very concept of negotiations implies *inter alia* the coming together across the table of parties or partners, of not necessarily equal strength, but certainly of parties with strong will to bring to bear on the negotiations whatever strength at their disposal that may be required to ensure the attainment of their objectives, which is generally not the case on our side.

This, in turn implies, not only that our objectives are defined in clear and specific terms, but also that a proper rating should be established between *primary* objectives, that is to say those which must be achieved at all costs, and *secondary* objectives, for the attainment of which we can afford to make less than an all-out effort. Above all, a serious approach to negotiations entails some knowledge of, and degree of familiarity with, the other side's own primary and secondary objectives, its strength and weaknesses, as compared to our own, and naturally its tactics.

It is my humble view that, to the extent that these conditions have generally not been met on our side, what we have been doing so far, notwithstanding whatever success we may have reaped, cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be called negotiating. We have been appealing to the goodwill, the sense of decency and fairness of the other side, and even to an enlightened perception of its own interests. To this end, we have been relying heavily on the rhetorical skills of our spokesmen for them to put across our case in the most convincing manner and, from all the indications I have, they have not been found missing. But except for the celebrated OPEC incident, whatever we may have been doing so far, whether one calls it petitioning or lobbying, definitely does not bear any likeness to what, under other circumstances, we have come to identify as negotiations.

Many reasons, of course, account for this. Apart from our so-called heterogeneity and differentiation which the other side is using as a divisive factor, there is the fact that Third World countries have generally failed to relate the requests they have been putting forward in the course of negotiations to the overall development strategies of the South at national, regional and interregional levels. Much too

frequently, there seems to be a wide gap or some kind of no-man's land between our overall national or regional strategies as reflected in our national development plans or in platforms adopted at the regional level on the one hand and the particular policies our negotiators seem to be advocating in fora such as UNCTAD, GATT, UNIDO and the like, on the other.

There are various reasons for this. One of them doubtless has to do with the fact that, with very few exceptions, our negotiators are professional diplomats far removed from their national capitals and the realities as perceived therein, and who, more often than not, find themselves compelled to write their own briefs. As a result, the extent to which the positions taken by many representatives of the Group of 77 actually fit in with the overall strategies and platforms I referred to earlier on can often be subject to conjecture.

There is, I believe, another more fundamental problem we shall need to address our minds to, sooner or later namely that of reconciling, as it were, the goals and objectives we are aiming at, through our joint economic endeavours and those we are seeking to achieve in maintaining a common front *vis-à-vis* the North. While both approaches are part and parcel of the New International Economic Order, to which all our countries subscribe, to what extent have we actually been able to integrate them at national, regional and interregional levels?

It is clear from our review of the present situation and from our analysis of the main problems and obstacles that given the will to succeed, the removal of the obstacles and the establishment of necessary mechanisms for follow-up, there are bright prospects for economic and technical co-operation among Third World countries, intra-regionally and, more particularly, inter-regionally. In this connexion let me say straightaway that we will not get very far if we are interested in the promotion of South-South co-operation merely for its own sake, or for some sentimental reasons or simply because it is a fashionable thing to do.

As I see it, the extent to which we shall be able to exploit the vast potential of South-South co-operation will depend on two basic factors. First and foremost, on the acceptance by all Third World countries, their Governments and peoples, that the cardinal principle of South-South co-operation is its genuine interdependence and mutuality. That is to say, South-South co-operation must be based on the full recognition of the principle that each country is both a donor and a recipient. We must avoid developing a class of donor countries and a group of recipient countries within the Third World. Because if we do, we will simply have succeeded in extending the

present dependence and exploitative arrangements between the North and the South to South-South co-operation. This is totally unacceptable to us in Africa. We do not wish to replace the age-long economic and technical domination of the countries of the North by any other one. To us therefore it is a fundamental principle that while we are anxious to forge economic and technical links with Asia, Latin America and Western Asia, such links must be truly interdependent with each country giving as well as receiving and with the sovereignty and independence of each country being fully respected. Indeed, there is no room for subservience and inferiority.

Secondly, for South-South co-operation to succeed, mutually acceptable guidelines have to be agreed upon. I suggest the following :

- (i) A proper understanding of the challenge posed by the nature and magnitude of the problems which we commonly face;
- (ii) A clear perception of the opportunities which exist or which may be created for the solution of such problems through economic and technical co-operation among the developing countries themselves;
- (iii) A realistic recognition of the contribution to the solution of such problems through economic and technical co-operation among developing countries; and
- (iv) The formulation of a workable programme of action that will enable us to translate our concepts and perception into the nitty-gritty of implementable projects.

In this connection, we must never forget the main enemy that Africa and the rest of the South must fight is, paradoxical as it may sound, ourselves; that is, our ideas and our attitudes.

A sense of inferiority complex, a feeling that we can do nothing unless the developed countries come to our assistance, is the single greatest obstacle to the economic emancipation of the entire Third World countries. It is an absolute condition that this mental block be removed before any effective co-operation can be forged between and among the developing countries themselves. The "new bridges" across the South will quickly collapse, the new horizontal dimension of international co-operation so eloquently applauded by the Buenos Aires TCDC Conference will fail to materialize, as long as we do not have the self-confidence to see and utilize our own capacities and capabilities to the fullest. Developed countries do not hold the key to the solution of our problems.

Once we are over the psychological hurdle which has been

preventing us from seeking our own solutions to our own problems in the context of mutual co-operation, the next logical step is to discover what, unaided, the developing countries can collectively achieve. Before seeking or even contemplating outside assistance, we must know what we can do for ourselves and proceed to do it. This is what I meant when I referred to the need to have a clear perception of the opportunities which exist for solving our common problems through economic and technical co-operation among ourselves.

Thirdly, a most urgent task (and this follows from the acceptance of the guidelines) is to agree on priority objectives in the implementation of the various programmes on ECDC that have been adopted at Colombo, Manila, Mexico and Arusha. We need to determine exactly what we would like to, and can, accomplish over the short, medium and long run. Our so-called Action Plans are neither well articulated consistent Plans, nor do they always lead to action. We tend to put too much in them without any agreed priority of priorities. The Arusha First Short Medium-Term Action Plan for Global Priorities on Economic Co-operation among Developing Countries now before UNCTAD V has no time reference, is too broad and ambitious and is not addressed to any particular group of countries, i.e. it does not say who does what.

Is it too much to expect Third World countries to select two or three programmes and concentrate on them until a breakthrough is achieved? What has happened to the Colombo Conference decisions on the establishment of a Third World Bank and a Third World countervailing currency backed by the economic potentials of developing countries? What has happened to Third World co-operation in shipping, civil aviation and insurance services?

Not only must the Third World decide on priorities but it also must ensure that such priorities are in the sectors where a meaningful impact on the development process can be made as soon as possible. Once such priorities have been agreed upon, the programme of action must be implemented with dispatch and a single purpose determination by all Third World countries. The Third World must develop the will to act decisively.

The corollary of this is, of course, the need to ensure that regional needs, regional development priorities and co-operative efforts are taken fully into account when setting up the action plan for global priorities on economic co-operation among developing countries. In particular, it will be necessary to ensure that possible imbalances in the distribution of benefits resulting from ECDC, as regards especially the least developed countries, are corrected or compensated for to the maximum extent possible.

Fourthly, there is an urgent need for the setting-up of a proper institutional framework for monitoring progress in the implementation of decisions and for ensuring that necessary follow-up actions are taken. Neither in the non-aligned movement nor in the Group of 77 is there any permanent machinery established to carry out the essential preparatory work of analysis, planning, co-ordination, monitoring and follow-up.

As Shridath S. Ramphal, Secretary-General of the Commonwealth said recently :

There is no permanent Third World machinery for exploring the collective policy options of the developing countries...the South is almost wholly unorganised in terms of negotiations with the North and even in terms of relations within the South. When to this lack of collective organised efforts are added the obvious deficiencies within the capitals of all save a few of the developing countries in terms of manpower and financial resources to service and support international negotiations, the nakedness of the South is stark in the extreme."⁸

For many years now, the proposal for a secretariat for the Group of 77 has been thrown around. It is generally accepted that such a secretariat is necessary if the Third World is to achieve meaningful economic and technical links and at the same time improve its negotiating power with the North—a North that is exceedingly well organised.

The United Nations systems—in particular, UNCTAD and the Regional Economic Commissions—have important roles to play in this co-ordination and monitoring exercise. But in addition to them, there is an urgent need for a Third World institution, established and financed by the Third World and controlled by it, which would provide such services. It would be of crucial importance to make sure from the very start that such a secretariat is not under the influence of a particular country or group of countries so that it can enjoy the full confidence of all. Close co-operation between such a mechanism and relevant organizations both within and outside the UN system, would naturally be required, but it goes without saying that this mechanism should be absolutely free to chart its own independent path, and would be responsible only to the Heads of State and Governments of the countries concerned.

In addition to the setting up of a Third World secretariat, there is also the need to set up appropriate political intergovernmental

Third World institutional framework under which the Heads of State and Government, Ministers and senior officials of the Third World can meet periodically to review and monitor progress in the implementation of priority programmes and to map out new areas of co-operation. At present the Ministers and officials are doing this on an *ad hoc* basis and, with all due respect, very hastily on the occasions of, or in conjunction with, say UNCTAD, GATT or UNIDO sessions.

Fifthly and finally, each of the Third World regions must learn to make the fullest use of their Regional Economic Commissions since these organisations, with their strong regional viewpoint on most issues, can be the fora not only for ensuring the emergence of regional consensus but also for harmonising these viewpoints with other Third World regions. In addition, the Regional Economic Commissions can also implement specific interregional projects designed to bring about greater economic and technical links.

For example, the Economic Commission for Africa has, in collaboration with the sister Regional Commissions, embarked on a number of interregional projects. Accordingly, ECA and ECLA are co-operating in the fields of trade, manpower development, and science and technology. ECA and ECWA are co-operating in the establishment of an interregional documentation centre, the preparation of a statistical abstract for North Africa and the Middle East and the joint study of the magnitude and scope of brain drain in North Africa and Middle East, and how to reverse it. ECA and ESCAP are involved in three co-operative endeavours :

- (i) a study of linkages between payments unions of the two regions;
- (ii) a study on the establishment and operations of inter-regional state trading organisations, and
- (iii) trade promotion between the two regions.

While it is too early to estimate the impact of these projects since they were only recently launched, or in some cases are still in the process of being launched, the initiative of the Regional Economic Commissions underlines their potentialities as a major instrument in the hands of the Governments for promoting South-South technical co-operation.

I began by stating that Africa is at the heart of the Third World, its problems and its challenges. As such, it is a barometer by which progress in South-South co-operation is to be measured. Africa's commitment to such co-operation is not merely a political gesture. And it goes beyond the mere calculation of gains. To us it is an integral part of the historical process of forging unity among the peoples of the world. There is no Third World region with which

the people of Africa have not got ethnic and cultural ties and affinities of longstanding—not to mention similarities in geographical and ecological conditions and a common colonial heritage.

Thus, Latin America and the Caribbean have a large and rapidly growing population of people of African origin and thanks to colonialism there are countries such as Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde, Sao Tome and the Principe who speak a common language—Portuguese—with some of the countries of Latin America. Africa's links with Western Asia are even stronger. The Arbas of North Africa, Mauritania (in West Africa) and Somalia and Djibouti (in East Africa) account for more than three quarters of total Arab population—the predominant ethnic group in Western Asia. As far as South-Eastern and Southern Asia is concerned, some of our Indian Ocean island countries have strong ethnic and cultural affinities with the continent. In addition, there are today millions of Africans of Asian descent. Thus, forging closer economic and technical ties in addition to developing intimate political and cultural relations with the rest of the Third World is to us in Africa an imperative of our time. All we ask for is that such economic and technical ties must be developed on a truly interdependent basis.

- 1 Ismaila-Sabri Abdalla, *Heterogeneity and Differentiation: The End for the Third World?* A paper presented at the *South-South Dialogue* organized by the Third World Foundation in Arusha, Tanzania, December 14-17, 1978.
- 2 Basil Davidson, "The African Personality" in Colin Legum *African Handbook* (Penguin, 1969), p. 535.
- 3 Statement by the Executive Secretary of ECA, Dr. Adebayo Adedeji, on the occasion of the celebration of the 21st anniversary of the Commission on 28 April 1979 at Addis Ababa.
- 4 Quoted in *West Africa* No. 3223, 23 April 1979; p. 708.
- 5 Ismaila-Sabri Abdalla, op. cit. 5.
- 6 Enrique V. Iglesias, *Latin America in the World Economy: The Perspectives of CEFAL*. A paper presented at the *South-South Dialogue* organised by the Third World Foundation in Arusha, Tanzania, December 14-17, 1978.
- 7 *Ibid*, p. 12.
- 8 See: Trade among Developing Countries by main SITC Group and by Regions. Statistical note by the UNCTAD secretariat TD/B/C. 7/21.
- 9 S.S. Ramphal: *Third World Unity: Mirage or Mandate? The Case for better organisation of the South*. A paper presented at the *South-South Dialogue* organised by the Third World Foundation in Arusha, Tanzania, December 14-17, 1978.

Science and Technology in African Perspective

ATMA RAM

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Teilhard de Chardin, a great thinker and expert on anthropology said at the International Symposium on Anthropology held in New York in 1952, "It is apparently in the depths of Africa, not on the shores of the Mediterranean or on the Asiatic Plateau, that the primeval centre of human expansion and dispersion must have been located, long before this centre shifted in much later times, towards (or even split between) Eurasia and America".

In the context of this statement it is an irony of history that the popular impression, and the impression even among intellectual classes, is that human race and the subsequent developments of early human civilizations started in one or the other of the well publicised locations around Mediterranean, West Asia and Central Asia and branched out or migrated in various directions. Even the early civilizations found in North and South America are supposed to owe their origin to the wandering tribes from Central Asia across the narrow sea gap between the Asian continent and the North American continent. But recent discoveries establish that early man existed in tropical Africa. Proconsul remains have been discovered here which establish human ancestry right upto 25 million years ago. Many subsequent evolution processes through *Australopithecus* leading to development of man are now firmly established by the discovery of remains in Bechuanaland and Transvaal. The famous definition of Benjamin Franklin that man is a tool making animal if applied with reference to the earliest tools discovered in locations in Uganda and Tanganyika, namely crudely shaped pebbles and subsequently more

advanced forms of shaped rough tools, establishes clearly the earliest phase in the process of evolution of man and the growth of intelligent technical skills of early man in Africa between 500,000 years to 100,000 years back.

It so happens that much of the evolution of African cultures and civilizations South of Sahara, the blossoming forth of such civilization and their decay have not left their imprints on the sands of time unlike those civilizations which flourished on the Mediterranean coast of Africa, West Asia, Greece and Rome. There may be several reasons for this. One may venture to suggest that the relative absence of growth of written languages in the southern part of Africa and the materials of construction used which were mostly wood and the general feature of the more ancient civilizations not to record historical events, either personal or those of the community, may be responsible for this. On the contrary, Pharaohs of Egypt, Greek, Carthage and West Asian cultures of Babylon, Persians and others left considerable evidence of what they did, in the enormous structures they built of stone and other lasting materials of construction. The existence of one or more scripts by which they could record events and the abilities they possessed to write and communicate knowledge have been responsible for a better record of history of development of the later cultures.

Much of human history as written during the last 2-3 centuries has been written essentially by European authors in European languages on the basis of anthropological, archaeological and other scientific work carried out by European scientists and scholars. Therefore, much of the published history available today is what and how European eyes have looked at the genesis and growth of various civilizations and cultures. Two distinct aspects are discernible in all their studies; what they considered as inferior to their own cultural levels they always wrote in derogatory terms and whenever they met with something equal to or more advanced than their concepts or levels of intellectual advancement, they generally commented on it with an air of condescension and patronisingly.

Comparative scarcity of evidence of early cultures south of Sahara gives one the impression that this part of the world was primitive. Work of European explorers like Mungo Park, Stanley and Livingstone in Tropical Africa and their publication spread the overall impression that Africa was a "Dark continent". It suited these explorers and helped the European nations at that time in exploiting the resources of the African continent and parcelling out various parts of Africa and establishing their spheres of domination, politically and economically. The Industrial Revolution and the

growth of science and technology in Europe gave these European nations a tremendous advantage over the rest of the world. They could establish means of production faster and cheaper than what peoples in other parts of the world could do and sell the products to them. Development of modern weapons of war provided them with the means to conquer and subjugate other countries. But it should be remembered that domination by European nations is comparatively recent history, not more than 3-4 centuries which is a tiny fragment of time in the evolution of human race including the past and future. The word "Scientist" as understood now entered the vocabulary only about 1840.

Recounting briefly these historical developments of early cultures and civilizations is necessary as we believe that each culture and each civilization grows up with the strength provided by some technological skills developed by that civilization but subsequently becomes stagnant and gets superseded, surpassed and swamped by another civilization, that may come up with superior technological skills and abilities. These technological skills generally include such abilities as making more advanced tools, agriculture, animal husbandry, irrigation, construction of living tenements and habitat; organization of community requirements, weapons to deal with animals and natural enemies, means of transportation, organized ability to fight and overcome enemy tribes and to put it in a nutshell improved abilities to master the environment. History of human race shows that no one culture or civilization has been permanent and everyone of them is succeeded by a more advanced one; advanced, as we said, technologically and organizationally. In this sum total of growth and evolution of human race to the present day levels, Africa has also made its contribution in a most significant manner much earlier than Europe did. We have relatively less evidence of this as far as Africa south of Sahara is concerned but we have more evidence of this contribution from areas north of Sahara.

Thanks to the enormous evidence left behind by the Pharaohs, we have been able to reconstruct in great detail the history of ancient Egypt during a period of over 5000 years. Archaeologists and other scientific investigators and scholars have done considerable amount of work on Nile Valley civilizations revealing astounding technological feats. Menes, the first Pharaoh dammed the Nile River not only to control the flood waters but also, on the basis of exact measurement of the ebb and flow of the waters of the Nile, organised a scientific system of basin irrigation. Dykes and canals were dug and it is said that they had monitored flood heights and organized aid during flood disasters. In the adjoining desert areas they had

built rock cisterns as underground reservoirs for storage of water.

Even at the very dawn of history, Egypt practised alcoholic fermentation. The great pyramids and the other enormous stone constructions like colossus reveal a high degree of architectural and engineering skills. Structures like a pyramid could not have been built without proper construction drawings and scientific and mathematical instruments. Haulage of huge blocks of stone and other construction materials would have needed strong ropes and therefore manufacture of ropes must have been well developed. Many ancient quarries worked in those days have been discovered now. A giant obelisk cut out from stone about 150' feet in length and weighing about 1200 tonnes still lies unremoved from the place where it was cut out from solid rock near Aswan. Therefore, in the years even before 2000 B.C., the ancient Egyptians knew how to work on stone and they must have developed the implements and abrasives for cutting and shaping stone blocks and worked out methods of transportation and erection of such enormous construction members. They must have had sufficient knowledge of geometry to fix proper alignments. All these show that remarkable scientific and technological capabilities four to five thousand years back existed in the northern part of Africa. When Menes established the city of Memphis in about 3200 B.C., Egyptians already had the knowledge of copper metallurgy, and during construction of pyramids, the tombs of the Pharaohs, gold extraction also must have been mastered as whole coffins of gold were fabricated. Many artifacts, food vessels, wine jars, hunting implements and other necessities of life of those days were buried along with the Pharaohs in the tombs. The process of mummification itself should be considered, even by today's standard, a great scientific achievement. There must have been many who knew the properties of the flora, minerals and other chemicals with which they could develop techniques for preservation of human body through the centuries. Imhotap, the person to whom great miracles were attributed should be considered as a great versatile scientist. He was not only a doctor but also an architect, engineer, mathematician and astronomer.

Apart from the knowledge we have acquired about ancient Egyptian civilization and the high degree of technological knowledge and skills then existing in the well known areas of the Nile Valley, another flourishing civilization existed in Carthage which we now know as Tunisia and the area round about it. Carthage was known particularly as a mercantile empire and they traded across the Mediterranean with Roman and Greek peoples. They were subsequently destroyed by Romans for economic reasons. Carthaginians had also a highly developed culture and attained mastery in several

areas of science and technology just as the earlier Egyptians did. Phoenicians who founded Carthage had built several cities like Utica and Lixus. It is said that these cities were grand with huge temples and magnificent public buildings.

The recent discoveries of rock paintings in Sahara, Zimbabwe, and in other parts of southern Africa dating back to 3200 B.C. show that civilizations of northern Africa could not have had abrupt limits but must have continued across Sahara to the southern part of Africa as well. There are many missing links which may yet be discovered and these may bring to light what could be ancient civilizations in southern parts of Africa. Climatic and ecological conditions prevailing in the south, perhaps, were not conducive to the development of cultures and communities as happened around and similar to the Mediterranean and other river valleys of Nile, Euphrates-Tigris, Indus and the Yellow river in China. But collective community life which European explorers describe as tribal, did exist.

The term "tribal" has been used by European explorers and historians when applied to African communities in a derisive manner. Which part of the world including the most advanced communities does not have populations with, what could be described basically in tribal or clanish attributes? Composition, motivation and characteristics of tribes may vary from place to place. But the fact is that human race both in the past and in the present has had the tendencies to divide itself into sections and sub-sections with basically tribal instincts. But this does not mean that people of the ancient tribal cultures of Africa did not have their accumulated fund of knowledge of natural events and did not acquire skills to master the environment in which they lived for their personal comforts. Out of such knowledge and mastery evolved scientific and technological skills which in the context of the then living conditions might have been sufficient. Much of their knowledge of nature, their environment and the technological skills they possessed was based on experience and observation and was empirical. The analytical approach which is the basis of modern scientific methodology might not have been evolved. For that matter scientific knowledge and technological skills of all the earlier civilizations including even the early Greek and Roman civilizations were basically empirical. Even the great Pythagoras is said to have kept to himself inconvenient facts when he discovered them. He did not like the square root of two as it was not a convenient number and kept back the information for many years. Einstein was rather averse to Planck's Quantum Theory to which he was supposed to have reacted with the remark, "God does not play dice".

The subject of early civilizations and cultures in trans-Saharan Africa should provide excellent field for African explorers, archaeologists, anthropologists, scientists, historians and other scholars to take a careful, detailed and deep look through scientific investigations at the levels of knowledge and skills their forefathers possessed. The present European view of Africa's past could then be corrected. It may be mentioned here that recently some of the multinational drug companies sent teams of scientists to Africa to scan through the age old medical practices and remedies used there with a view to identifying the ones which they could possibly exploit. Earlier, they were all summarily branded as witchcraft practised by witch doctors.

This brief narrative of the ancient cultural heritage of Africa, we feel, is essential in order to have a proper perspective while looking forward to the future. We hope we have been able to make out in a sketchy form though, that with reference to the periods in which they existed, cultures and civilizations of many part of Africa and human achievements there were as impressive, if not more, than human achievements elsewhere in the world. It should also be remembered that when human race had registered great advances in science and technology and established flourishing centres of civilization in those parts of the world which are today considered as underdeveloped or developing including Africa, those countries which are considered today the most advanced were relatively very primitive with hardly any creative human activity worth talking about. There may be many reasons for it. One may be that early human settlements were based on food gathering rather than food growing and it was easier to gather food in tropical and sub-tropical areas of the world than in temperate and torrid zones. Subsequently also the development of techniques of agriculture along the river valleys of tropical and sub-tropical areas and flourishing human settlements including many urban cultures helped to nurture and promote many areas of science and technology relating to building construction, irrigation and agriculture and those sciences which normally grow during life of comparative ease and prosperity like mathematics and astronomy.

The fact is that many parts of Africa had their advanced civilizations with creditable achievements in many branches of science and technology centuries before the current phase of Europe-based science and technology started. This new phase is hardly a few centuries old but the Industrial Revolution and the large scale mechanization of means of production which took place side by side with the sea faring and enterprising activities of some of the European nations provided them the opportunities to subjugate

almost the entire world where earlier civilizations had stagnated and decayed.

History of human race is replete with the fact that practically every civilization had a growth phase reaching a plateau and then a period of decay yielding place to succeeding cultures or civilizations more advanced, technically and organizationally. The great Roman Empire had its rise and fall. So was the Ottoman Empire. The mighty British Empire today does not exist. What was once a mere colony of Great Britain is now the strongest power on earth. A degenerate and weak Czarist Russia has become a competing super power. What could be in store for the future would be difficult to forecast for any historian of even the keenest perspicacity. During the last few decades, we have seen Japan acquiring great mastery and beating the so called European technology in its own game. During the last few years small countries like South Korea, Taiwan, Hong-Kong and Singapore have shown what could be done in science and technology by developing countries in the face of the keenest and the toughest competition. They have literally graduated into the ranks of industrialised world. There are many writers in the West like Herman Kahn who forecast that by 2000 A.D. these countries in the eastern part of Asia may play a very dominant role in determining the course of events of human race.

There is nothing which should prevent many of the African nations assuming similar roles. We are optimistic about peoples in African countries who have shown that they possess as much enterprise, tenacity and virility as any one else in the world, given the right opportunities and environmental conditions they could also record great advances. As a matter of fact in many fields of physical and intellectual activity, people of African origin have achieved the highest levels which human talent could take them. Names like Martin Luther King, Paul Robeson, Jesse Owens, Mohammed Ali are known throughout the world as great masters in their respective fields of endeavour. One can count a large number of such men in various walks of life. Carefully conducted recent experiments have established that there is no scientific basis at all for any theory of differentiation in intelligence and abilities based on race and the like.

After the last war many African countries have shown that they can throw up political and intellectual leaders as good as any other country in the world. Because of the relative economic stagnation of the local population caused by large scale exploitation by foreign rulers, most of the African countries have suffered. It is well to remember that over 100 millions of the most able bodied African young men were removed physically from Africa to toil and sweat

for others' economic benefit elsewhere.

It is, therefore, understandable that the first and foremost movement in these countries has been political rather than intellectual. They had to throw off foreign yoke and secure their independence. Even today there are pockets of foreign rule. Another unfortunate phenomenon has been the political and economic influences from outside which still play a detrimental role in many African countries. A feature of Africa has been the relatively small size of many of the countries. As a result they have had difficulties in facing these outside influences and warding them off. In this situation intellectual enterprise and academic activities, pursuit of science and the like suffer, for people are more preoccupied with political and related activities. Certain amount of peaceful settled national life is needed for academic growth and various forms of intellectual pursuits including scientific research.

It is a matter of historical significance that politically speaking most parts of Africa are under a churning process and a large number of African states are characterised by political upheavals and disturbances, external influences and power politics and internal ideological confrontations. All this means a certain amount of instability in which well-thought out coherent long-term developmental policies, academic pursuits, establishment and support of scientific and technological infrastructural institutions might receive a somewhat secondary treatment in the hands of the rulers. Adequate financial support and development of institutional infrastructure essential for all these activities might not take place with the rapidity with which they ought to. Whom does this help? Obviously the very countries who have pulled out of Africa after years of political domination and economic exploitation and the very interests which African states and other developing nations want to become independent of economically and in other respects.

It is most essential for African leaders to realise that without the attainment of a high level of education and intellectual endeavour leading to excellence in areas of science and technology and other equally important areas, national advancement—socially, politically and most of all economically—would be difficult. Exploitation by others in various forms would only continue. Economic independence is the one thing by which a nation can keep its head high and economic independence can come only from a good industrial infrastructure, a versatile agricultural base and optimum exploitation of mineral and other natural resources of the country. To achieve this, a high degree of scientific and broad-based technological knowledge are essential.

It is distressing that in many of the developing countries people are far too preoccupied in considering, debating and discussing, and often times quarreling leading to disturbances and upheavals within the countries, about the merits and demerits of differing political and economic systems and the many theories of political isms. Is it not possible somehow in the developing countries to declare a moratorium on all such rivalries among their leaders and the people adopt just one ism as their motto namely pragmatism till they attain certain levels of economic growth and related concomitant growth in education, science and technology and also in the arts?

Another feature which one witnesses in many of these countries is the local stress of self-sufficiency and self-reliance. In the modern world, no country could be considered self-sufficient, not even the U.S.A. or Soviet Union which are both very large countries with enormous resources. It suits local politicians to play on these words to capture the imagination of the people, or rather their gullibility, to promise among various other things, self-reliance. What this term means is important. On the face of it, it could be interpreted to mean complete independence of the outside world in the developmental process. It could mean, which may be the better way of looking at it, acquisition and development of knowledge, skills and capabilities whether within the country and/or from outside with which the nation can build up an infrastructure of industrial and economic strength. As for instance, Japan. Did the Japanese, at any time, use this term 'self-reliance'? Neither the South Koreans, Taiwan, or the Singaporeans use this word now and yet they have built economically powerful infrastructures based on the latest developments in science and technology.

Therefore, it would be worthwhile for the leadership in African countries to sit up and think as to what should be their policies, their strategy and tactics for their economic development. We have no locus standi to give any gratuitous advice. It is for these countries to think what they should do. But a few thoughts may be expressed in a general way in regard to this question. Apart from a good educational system with the twin aims of universal education and excellence in selected areas, quality should be the stress in the pursuit of scientific research. In the later case, money is of secondary importance relative to dedication and devotion. A recent UNESCO survey covering over a thousand research institutions in 26 countries has substantiated this. In the immediate future, gigantism and giantism in science and technology should be eschewed. Appropriate technology is a much misused term and is being given up. We would suggest scale down technology without in any way compromising

technical features, efficiency of operations and economics with a view to making it less capital intensive. In many African countries, immediate attention may be needed in the triple areas of food, drink and shelter with scientific methods to solve problems. Local agricultural commodities would require intensive R & D to derive maximum advantage.

There is today a general awareness in the African States on the need of organisation of modern scientific research and technological growth. First and foremost would be an educational programme incorporating training not only in a variety of skills needed for a modern technological society but also education for attainment of excellence in various branches of science. The educational pattern will have to be determined carefully more with reference to their relevance to national needs of individual states than what is in fashion lately. Similarly, industrialisation programmes will have to be carefully thought of and drawn up for each individual state depending upon its natural resources and other endowments including manpower aptitudes and capabilities. Educational programmes must be correlated to the various developmental needs of the country which may convert a diverse spectrum such as agriculture and animal husbandry, exploration and exploitation of mineral resources, survey of flora and fauna and their optimum use, forestry, fisheries, survey and exploitation of hydro-electric potential and other forms of energy resources. Depending upon natural aptitudes which people may possess in particular branches of science or technology and natural geographical advantages or drawbacks, each state will have to draw up its own blue prints for education and development.

There are some advantages in starting late in the developmental process as many other countries have gone through the process with the accompanying pangs of growth, with successes and failures and there is a vast storehouse of experience and knowledge available which could be studied and adapted to suit individual requirements of each state. While scientific knowledge is universal and available in published literature, technology is essentially a commercial commodity and no altruistic motive can be expected in the transfer of technological knowledge from any of the developed countries to developing countries.

The whole subject of transfer of technology with a view to industrialisation is a sensitive subject and also a tricky one. Developing countries will have to go through an arduous process for the acquisition of technological skills and knowledge and there is no easy short cut. Each country will have to adopt its own methods

for it and such methods may also vary from case to case and time to time. International agencies and Regional Commissions like the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa have all discussed in various conferences questions relating to transfer of technology. None of them seem to have led to any fruitful, concrete or tangible results which could make any great difference to the economic well-being of developing countries.

Similarly, UNESCO and various other specialised agencies have arranged several conferences and meetings to deal with subjects such as education and training, conservation and utilisation of natural resources, economic planning, science policy and resource management, utilisation of science and technology for development both at the technical level of specialists and at the higher political level on inter-governmental and interministerial basis. Some of these conferences did focus the attention of political and other leaders responsible for public policies in African countries, economists, scientists, technologists, educationists and others on the problems of development. Very useful material has been compiled by each individual State in national statements giving an account of each country's level of growth in science and technology and its infrastructural facilities and some indication of its plans.

In 1964, a major conference was held in Lagos on the Organisation of Research and Training in Africa in Relation to the Study, Conservation and Utilisation of Natural Resources. The Conference resulted in drawing up of what was later known as the Lagos Plans for Scientific Research and Training in Africa. It spelt out a number of general recommendations to assist African Governments in taking steps for advancement of scientific research without which balanced economic and social development could not be achieved. In 1967 a Symposium on Science Policy and Research Administration in Africa was convened by UNESCO in Cameroon. In October 1970, a Regional Symposium on the Utilization of Science and Technology for development in Africa was held in Addis Ababa. Similar conferences have been held on the development of education in Africa, many of them at the level of Ministers. These led to the well known Addis Ababa Plan. To cap all these was the larger conference of CASTAFRICA held in Dakar, Senegal in June 1974. Considerable amount of preparation and voluminous amount of documentary exercise done to help the conference provides us with a fairly good idea of the scientific and technological levels attained by various African countries. Economic data and other related statistics, demographic information and other growth indicators, the number of scientific and technical personnel employed in these countries, expenditure involved

in scientific and technological research, educational statistics and information on infrastructure of policy making and R & D organisations in most of the African countries are given as on 1973. Those who are interested may refer to the relevant UNESCO publications. In many of the countries lot more progress must have taken place since.

Director-General of UNESCO at the inaugural session of the Conference summarised briefly the progress made in the African continent in scientific and technological activities. 24 States had a Ministry of Science or a body to direct national science policy. The survey on scientific and technical potential of Africa showed that there were over 700 establishments conducting research and developmental work employing over 6000 full-time research workers, scientists and engineers, 5000 others on part-time basis and about 20,000 technicians. All of them were spending about 270 million dollars a year. However, this was hardly 0.5% of the total world expenditure on research and development. Since the conference was at the ministerial level it did help to focus the attention of leaders of participating states on the importance of developing institutional structures and the steps that should be adopted for growth of science and technology, necessity to build up scientific and technical potential and in a general way the problem of transfer of technology.

The Conference also recommended that UNESCO should establish a special fund for launching and strengthening of research and development activities in Africa. Regional workshops were held in Cairo in 1974, Nairobi in 1975, Yaounde in 1975, Dakar in 1979. It is proposed to follow up with more regional workshops to identify projects which could be financed.

In July 1979 an African regional symposium was held in Nairobi on Science, Technology and the Future, which resulted in the 'Nairobi Declaration'. This Declaration calls for complete elimination of Africa's scientific and technological dependence by 2000 AD and demands that all policies, strategies and programmes be directed towards that objective. It is an important and forthright declaration and calls for the most dedicated, determined hard work on the part of African States. After the CASTAFRICA Conference, a number of symposia, regional meetings and conferences have been held in different parts of Africa to consider one or more aspects of scientific and technological policies and developments. This is a good sign and if the follow-up action is equally active one may hope that the goals set by the Nairobi Declaration would be realised.

It is also a good sign that many of the States have now established professional and learned societies for science both on national

and regional basis, as for example Kenya National Academy for the Advancement of Arts and Sciences, West African Science Association, Geological Society of Africa, African Association of Insect Scientists. There have been also special research missions or projects such as (a) Rift Valley Research Mission, (b) Water Resources Management, Cameroon. Another welcome feature is the interest African universities are taking in scientific and technical development of the countries at both international level as well as on a cooperative basis involving other African States. The Association of Faculties of Sciences of African Universities is engaged in desirable cooperative endeavours. University of Science & Technology, Kumasi, Ghana has established a Technology Consultancy Centre and has done some useful work both in the field of agriculture as well as industry. These are but some examples to show the very desirable directions in which scientific and technical activities are growing in Africa.

It substantiates our view that scientific and technological activities of a country directed towards its economic development must be rooted in the soil of that country. Technology, in particular, cannot be easily transferred, in the sense knowledge can be. There is no method other than hard and determined efforts for development. If developing countries expect that technology from developed countries can be obtained by any means other than on a commercial basis, it is time that such thinking is given up. The recent conference of UNCTAD V held in Manila, UNCSTD held in Vienna, and UNIDO III held in New Delhi and the lack of success on the part of developing countries to get any commitment from developed countries in regard to transfer of technology and assistance in the scientific and technological fields, particularly towards technological progress of developing countries shows very clearly that developing countries are chasing a chimera. All other discussions such as North-South Dialogue and Conferences for a New Economic Order so far have brought no results and it may sound cynical, sceptical or pessimistic if it is said that any number of conferences and discussions is just not likely to yield the results which developing countries think they can obtain. Probably the Japanese Prime Minister articulated most tellingly at the 5th UNCTAD Conference held in Manila in May 1979 when he said "The North-South problem can never be solved unless the developing countries themselves are prepared to devote the requisite will and efforts to their own development." As against this, Dr. Chagula of Tanzania speaking for the developing countries said "Why has it not been possible to move rapidly toward the implementation of a New International Economic Order? It is largely because most of the rich industrialised countries have not developed

the necessary political will". May we add to these two pronouncements by saying, if developing countries themselves do not devote requisite will and effort to their own development, why should they expect developed countries to show the necessary political will? In a nutshell, this is the dilemma facing the developing world. All this talk of 1500 million dollars a day being spent on armaments and that development aid is an insignificant fraction of this figure, that United States with only 5% of world's population consumes 30% of energy, that brain-drain is reverse aid by developing countries to developed countries and that the present aid from developed world to the developing part is only a repayment of the debts developed countries owe to developing countries in return for the years of exploitation, etc., are all rhetoric which are not likely to carry developing countries very far. All these may be true but they seem to make little impact.

Let us take the latest and spectacular U.N. Conference for Science and Technology for Development held in Vienna in August 1979. Look at the enormous preparations which were made for this Conference. At national level, regional level and then at international level so many Preparatory Conferences were held throughout the world over a period of about two years. Developing countries particularly put in a lot of effort to arrive at some consensus in their approach to the issues of the Conference. The Group of 77 held a special session at Bucharest to determine their common approach. U.N. Committee on Science & Technology held a Conference in Kuala Lumpur in April 1979. The Conference itself spent about 12 days discussing three critical areas namely (a) transfer of technology, (b) institutional mechanisms and (c) financial problems. 4000 delegates consisting of ministers and policy makers from all countries attended, discussed and debated. In regard to the transfer of technology problem, excepting to discuss in a general way the issues involved, nothing concrete could be achieved in terms of firm commitments or any major policy change over from developed countries. Working of the transnational corporations was discussed as also many other difficulties faced by developing countries. These were mostly in the nature of diagnosis but no remedy could be found.

Perhaps, what is claimed as the most substantial part of the results of the Conference is the recommendations relating to constitution of an intergovernmental committee and creation of a fund consisting of 250 million dollars for development of science and technology in developing countries. This is considered to be an interim arrangement till some long term arrangements are made from

January 1982 onwards. The interim arrangement would mean that 250 million dollars contributed on a voluntary basis particularly from the richer countries would be available during 1980-81 and this fund will be placed at the disposal of UNDP in addition to their normal fund. Could this be considered as a great success? The fund itself is far too small to make any substantial impact on a large number of developing countries which are many more than 100. Many African delegations expressed this quite frankly at the conference itself. It has been estimated that the total expenditure by all participating countries, U.N. and other organisations in the preparations for conference during a two year period and on the conference itself exceeded 250 million dollars. Secondly, UNDP itself has spent this amount of money during its operations during the last 5 years or so; and has any assessment been made of UNDP's operations to show that the results have been substantial if not spectacular? Thirdly, UNDP itself is supposed to spend another 200 million dollars during the next quinquennial programme. Fourthly, how can one be sure that the availability of 250 million dollars additional fund will not psychologically deter the contributing nations from augmenting the normal UNDP programmes. This would be the normal reaction for any bureaucracy in such situations. Lastly, the countries whose contributions are expected, have yet to pledge their quantum. If the news which has appeared recently is correct, the USA, the UK and some of the other countries which are to provide the funds, seem to be having second thoughts and even cuts have been indicated in their aid programmes. Is there also any definite pledging by the affluent developing countries to contribute any substantial sums? In 1980 alone OPEC nations, most of whom are in the developing group, are expected to accumulate a surplus of 100,000 million dollars. 250 million dollars is just 0.25% of this figure. The moral of all this is very clear.

International specialist agencies have contributed to economic and social development of developing countries but in relation to the tasks, their impact have been rather marginal. There may be many reasons for this. In order that these agencies are more effective they should really function in locations where their assistance and guidance are most needed. Most of these agencies are, perhaps, wrongly located, as for instance UNDP in New York, UNESCO in Paris, UNIDO in Vienna, FAO in Rome, WHO in Geneva. Each one of these organisations could have been better headquartered in one of the developing countries and not in the USA and Europe. It is said that their tasks are essentially catalytic. Well, we are not aware of any catalyst which functions from a long distance without intimate con-

tact with the reactants. We heartily welcome the location of the headquarters of the Disarmament Conference and the political organs of the United Nations in the USA and Europe because they most need them. But serious thought should be given to examine if all the others could not be relocated if they are to function usefully and meaningfully for developing countries.

A disturbing feature of many of the speeches made in various conferences and writings is that people use such terms as "implantation" and "transplantation" of technology. The subtle implication in all such pronouncements is that science and technology is European in origin and content and that developing countries whether in Asia or Africa are foreign soil where implantation is a difficult process. There should be very strong objection to this view which we know exists among many people even in developing countries. This myth propagated by interested people has no basis whatsoever. We have tried to indicate in the earlier paragraphs with reference to the African perspective that science and technology in Africa has a much older history than in Europe and there is nothing foreign about it. Most of the earlier scientific discoveries and technical inventions during the progress of human race took place outside Europe. Science is science and there is nothing European or African about it. Technology is also basically science and is based on scientific principles dealing with raw materials which may vary from place to place but physical processes and chemical reactions which transform raw materials into industrial products do not vary geographically. Therefore, there is no such thing as implantation of a technology from a foreign source to an inhospitable native soil. The term "western" and "westernisation" are also frequently used in referring to the current developmental phase in Africa and Asia. "Modern" and "Modernisation" would be the appropriate terms. Policy makers in developing countries and particularly in Africa should take courage from the shining examples of Japan and some of the other recent successful countries and go ahead.

Ecowas: The Economic Community of West African States

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On 28 May 1975, the Treaty establishing the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was signed in Lagos, Nigeria, at the end of a two-day summit conference attended by Heads of State or Plenipotentiaries from fifteen countries in the region. Subsequently, Cape Verde joined the ECOWAS to unite for the first time in the checkered history of West Africa all the former French, British, and Portuguese colonies with independent Liberia into an economic community.

The rationale of the ECOWAS is that it would promote, through cooperation, development in all fields of activity. "In Particular, they (the signatories) emphasized the need for cooperation in the fields of industry, transportation, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural resources, commerce, monetary and financial matters, also in social and cultural matters."¹ The participating nations believe that such cooperation is essential for raising the standard of their people, maintaining and increasing stability, forging closer ties amongst themselves, thus contributing to the progress and development of Africa. The partner states affirm through this treaty their determination to make the community a "pragmatic, dynamic and effective institution which will take into account the realities prevailing in the member states."²

West Africa, stretching from 4° N to 27° 30'N latitude and 17°W to 15°E longitude, spans several climatic, vegetation, and soil belts ranging from tropical evergreen forests to hot deserts. During colonial times the region was divided into a number of British, French, and Portuguese colonies, which became economically inter-

TABLE I : THE ECOWAS : SOME GEOGRAPHICAL AND
ECONOMIC INDICATORS

Country	Area km ²	Population in thousands 1975	Density per km ²	GNP at market prices 1974 Total (US \$ million)	GNP per Capita (US \$ 1)	GNP per unit area US \$ thousand per km ²
Benin	112,622	3,112	28	370	120	3.29
Cape Verde	4,033	294	73	140	470	34.71
Gambia	11,295	524	46	90	170	7.91
Ghana	238,537	9,866	41	4130	430	17.31
Guinea	245,957	4,416	18	630	120	2.56
Guinea-Bissau	36,125	525	15	210	390	5.81
Ivory Coast	322,463	6,673	21	2930	460	9.09
Liberia	111,369	1,708	15	580	390	5.21
Mali	1,240,000	5,697	5	450	80	0.36
Mauritania	1,030,700	1,318	1	380	290	0.39
Niger	1,267,000	4,600	4	540	120	0.43
Nigeria	923,768	62,925	68	20810	280	22.53
Senegal	196,192	5,085	26	1590	330	8.10
Sierra Leone	71,740	2,729	38	540	190	7.53
Togo	56,000	2,222	40	550	250	9.82
Upper Volta	274,200	6,032	22	520	90	1.84

Source : Renninger (1979), pp. 5 and 7. Last column computed.

grated to their respective metropolitan powers. The colonial rule covering a period of more than sixty years has left a legacy of diverse administrative, economic, financial, and infrastructural systems, which pose formidable problems of unified development of West Africa.

West Africa is well endowed with agricultural, mineral, forest, and water resources, but their development has lagged behind because of political fragmentation, poor infrastructure, and economic limitations of the territories concerned.

In recent years there has been a wide acceptance of the idea of economic cooperation or regional integration as the most effective method of economic development in the less-developed countries. In West Africa, it has been recognized that there is an urgent need to consolidate the small and fragmented economies (Table I) into more viable economic units through some form of economic integration so that the economic development process can be hastened by taking advantage of the principles of economies of large-scale production, comparative advantage and specialization, and trade creation through an enlargement of the market for locally-produced goods. A structural change in the economy can follow.

Economic cooperation is an essential element in reducing the vulnerability of West African countries to external influences, and in lessening their dependence on the industrialized countries. In time, West African nations, it is hoped, would thus be able to build collective self-reliance.

In the North-South dialogue, it is the aim of the less-developed countries to usher in an era of a New International Economic Order. One strategy that can bring about such a change in world economic relationships is considered to be economic cooperation among the less developed nations :

“Collective self-reliance, as a means for the achievement of the fundamental objectives of the developing countries in relation to the establishment of the New International Economic Order, is an imperative of history to which all developing countries have committed themselves. Its basic premises is the determination of the developing countries to develop their economies in accordance with their needs and problems and on the basis of their national aspirations and experiences. Its main vehicle is the fostering of economic cooperation among themselves, aimed at reinforcing their political and economic independence and their collective economic strength, in fulfilment of the objectives of the New International Economic Order.”³

It is not merely the gain from inter-territorial trade that the West African countries are working for, but an expanded market that economic integration would bring about

“would mean enhanced opportunities for investment, a better utilization and allocation of resources, informal and external economies of scale and increased efficiency resulting from specialization, the development of new industries, greater diversification of the domestic and the export sectors and a reduction in economic dependence and vulnerability, a stronger bargaining position, and the industrial transformation of the economies of the member nations.”⁴

This point is further explicated by Pentland :

“In the Third World, free-trade areas, common markets, resource cartels, and other groupings are based on the belief that in some form of unity there is strength to resist exploitation and manipulation by major economic powers and multinational corporations, to resolve regionally shared economic and social problems, and to force structural reform of the international economy.”⁵

If the need for and the potential benefits of economic integration are well recognized in West Africa, the obstacles to bringing the nations to work towards some form of economic cooperation are many. As Seidman has pointed out :

“First, there are those which stem from narrow political jealousies and nationalism fostered by specific governing groups. Secondly, there are the objections which grow out of genuine concern as to whether specific approaches will ensure that economic independence and higher living standards are extended in all states and citizens concerned.”⁶

The disparate sizes, resources, and levels of economic development of nations naturally create fears of inequity and unequal shares of benefit from economic cooperation. Differing political ideologies, ambivalent bilateral relationships with extra-regional powers, economic nationalism, loss of revenue in a customs union are other factors which militate against economic integration efforts.⁷

In the case of West Africa, Francophone and Anglophone nations have been divided by language, administrative system, pattern of trade, and orientation and closeness to their erstwhile metropolitan powers. When many Francophone West African territories became associate members of the EEC, the gap with Anglo-

TABLE II. SOME WEST AFRICAN SUBREGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
CLASSIFIED BY SIZE AND LEVEL

Level	Sectoral Cooperation	Multi-Sectoral Cooperation	Laissez-Faire Integration	Integration Equalize Benefits	Integration Reduce Dependence
Size					
Bilateral	Electrical Community of Benin	Senegambia Permanent Secretariat	Mano River Union		
Medium-Size	Banque Ouest- Africaine de development	Organization for the Development of the Senegal River		West African Economic Community	
Large	West African Clearing House				Economic Community of West African States.
Subregional	West African Rice Develop- ment Associa- tion				

Source : Renninger (1979), p. 59.

phone nations increased, and the question of economic integration receded, to a certain extent, to the background.

There are currently thirty organizations for cooperation which have either exclusive or predominant membership from West African nations. However, eighteen of these were established in 1970 or after.

It is not intended to enumerate here these cooperation organizations. But the range in the size and level of cooperation may be illustrated from the table drawn by Renninger (Table II).⁸

Of the many regional organizations, the one which calls for a special mention is the CEAO, established in 1973, which has brought together Benin, Ivory Coast, Mali Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Upper Volta. CEAO is the successor body of UDEAO, which was established in the early sixties, providing for free movement of goods within the Union, and having a common external tariff. The present objectives of the Community include joint development, especially with regard to the improvement of infra-structure for marketing, the harmonization of industrial development, and the expansion of trade in domestically-produced agricultural and industrial commodities.

The need for economic cooperation in West Africa, as in Africa, had been felt long before the movement of political independence become a reality for most African countries. A Pan-African Congress, held in Manchester, England, in 1945, recommended the establishment of a West African Economic Union as a means for combating the exploitation of the economic resources of the West African territories and for ensuring the participation of the indigenous people in the industrial development of their countries. Raising the standard of living of the people was another goal for establishing this union of the people. Similarly, meetings were held in Tunis in January 1960 and Cairo in March 1961, emphasizing the need for economic cooperation among African countries. Recommendations were made for the removal of customs duties and other trade restrictions among African countries, the conclusion of payments agreements in order to increase intra-African trade and ultimately for setting up an African common market. The Conference also recommended the creation of an African Investment Bank and an African Institute for Research Training.

In Addis Ababa, in June 1960, an ECA conference emphasized the need for economic cooperation and broadened the field to include exchange of technical, scientific, and educational information with special regard to industrial planning and agricultural development. It recommended the establishment of a Joint Economic Research Committee to find measures whereby trade among African countries

could be increased, to make a detailed investigation of the possibility of coordinating economic planning towards the achievement of all-African cooperation, to find ways and means for adopting common industrial planning procedures and to examine the possibility for joint development of the mineral and other resources of the African States. The second conference, also held in Addis Ababa, stressed the need for creating an African Council of Economic Cooperation, and recommended the establishment of an African Development Bank and an African Commercial Bank. All these were proposals, but, no doubt, they inspired action.

There were, indeed, some forms of economic cooperation in West Africa during the colonial period. Cooperation in the British West African territories, which were all separated from one another by French West Africa, was limited to common services for research and to airways, as well as to common currency issued by the West African Currency Board. In French West Africa, the colonies, geographically contiguous as they were, grouped themselves into a Federation with a stronger link to France, and had a single monetary system.

The colonial systems of cooperation were thus centered largely on currency and common services, where possible. Customs unions were mainly for administrative reasons rather than for the promotion of economic development. It was no wonder then, that the systems met with difficulties on the achievement of independence by the territories concerned. The common services in British West Africa broke up. The French African countries retained the currency union, but Guinea, and later Mali, broke off from the system, and established their own currency.

Independence also brought into focus the ideas of Pan-African unity and economic integration which gained greater currency. Several attempts were made by West African territories to set up economic and/or political unions. But most of these have had very limited success. Up until the early 1970s, three main types of co-operation were organized by West African nations :⁹

1. organizations with political goals (e. g. OCAM) ;
2. organizations for trade and financial cooperation (e. g. UDAO) ; and
3. functional and specialized cooperation (e. g. OMVS).

These were established mostly in Francophone West Africa. This created an interest among Anglophone nations to cooperate, and they became involved in examining the possibility of forging an economic union encompassing all the countries of West Africa. In these deliberations ECA took a leading role in preparing the background

studies.

In 1963 a meeting in Lagos examined the possibility of industrial coordination and drew up a plan for the location of two iron and steel plants to serve entire West Africa. This was followed, two years later, by another conference which took a broader view of economic cooperation. In 1966 the Niamey meeting explored the possible forms of cooperation.

In 1967, twelve countries (all except Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea, and Guinea-Bissau) signed the Articles of Agreement for the establishment of an Economic Community of West Africa, and an interim Council of Ministers for the Community was established. Subsequently, a preliminary draft treaty was drawn up.

Further progress was made in 1968, when a meeting of Heads of State at Monrovia formed the West Africa Regional Group. Only nine states (Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, and Upper Volta) signed the protocol.

Unfortunately, things came to a standstill with the escalation of the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970), and it is not until 1972 that one notices any further activity towards cooperation. In that year Nigeria signed with her neighbor Togo an agreement of economic cooperation and these two countries took the initiative to revive support for an economic community of West African States. In 1973, a Ministerial meeting at Lome came to an accord to have the proposals scrutinized by a team of experts, which did take place at Accra in the following year.

Parallel to these deliberations, another significant process was operating in West Africa, which was bringing the countries to a greater understanding with one another. This was the preparatory work which culminated in the Lome Convention early in 1975. The West African nations now became Associate members of the EEC. The success of the Lome Convention acted as a catalyst in hastening the process of ECOWAS formation.

So, a preparatory meeting in Monrovia in 1975 laid the stage for the 1975 May meeting at Lagos, which brought into existence the ECOWAS.

The Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States lists its objectives as: elimination of customs and similar duties between member-States, abolition of other restrictions on trade among members, and the establishment of a common customs tariff and commercial policy towards countries outside the Community. Members undertook to abolish obstacles to free movement of people, services, and capital within the Community. Harmonization of agricultural policies and promotion of joint projects in agricultural marketing,

research, and agro-industry are intended. Joint development of transport, communication, energy and other infrastructure is envisaged as is the harmonization of monetary policies. Members agreed to make every effort to achieve these aims, including enactment of legislation.

The institutions of the Community are

- (1) the Authority of Heads of State and Government ;
- (2) the Council of Ministers ;
- (3) the Executive Secretariat ;
- (4) the Tribunal of the Community ; and
- (5) several Technical and Specialized Commissions on trade, industry, transport, social and cultural affairs.

The Authority, comprising the Heads of partner State and Government, is the supreme governing institution, which formulates policies and directs the development of the Community in accordance with its stated aims.

The Council of Ministers, responsible to the Authority, is required to implement the policies laid out by the Authority and to direct all subordinate institutions.

The Executive Secretariat, headed by an Executive Secretary, is responsible for the day to day functioning and administration of the Community affairs.

The Technical and Specialized Commissions are responsible for reporting and recommending on their areas of responsibility.

The Tribunal of the Community will ensure that the law of the Community is being upheld and will interpret the Community laws and resolve any disputes that may arise within the Community.

A transitional period of 15 years from the coming into force of the Treaty is allowed for the establishment of the customs unions.

To begin industrial harmonization, members will furnish each other with major feasibility and similar reports on projects within their territories. Wherever possible, they will undertake joint industrial studies and projects and finance research into transfer of technology and development of new products based on raw materials found inside the Community. They will attempt to ensure a uniform 'industrial climate' to avoid rivalry and waste of resources. There will be the maximum exchange of experts and training facilities and 'division of labor' for projects. Disparity in the levels of industrial development among members, as well as the Community's economic dependence on the industrialized world, will be eliminated as far as possible. The Industry, Agriculture, and Natural Resources Commission will make recommendations about harmonization in the utilization of natural resources.

Constant attention will be given by the Trade, Customs, Immigration, Monetary and Payments Commission to the maintenance of a balance of payments equilibrium among members and to the harmonization of economic and fiscal policies.

The Treaty defines rules of origin of goods to be subject to common tariff treatment by members. For example, they must have been produced wholly by enterprises whose headquarters are located within the Community, of whose equity at least 51% is held locally, and of whose directors at least half represent member-states. Deflection of trade resulting from tariff changes under the Treaty which may injure production in a member-state is covered. No fiscal charges should be applied to imports from members different from those applied domestically, and protective duties affecting imports from other members should be abolished within three years. Duties designed to protect domestic goods will be abolished within ten years. Quotas on imports between members and similar restrictions will be progressively abolished.

To assist free flow of capital between members Capital Issues Commission (CIC) consisting of one representative each from the members, will be established. Among its functions are inter-locking of capital markets and stock exchanges. The CIC would also determine the movement of foreign capital within the Community.

Member-nations undertake to involve common transport and communications programs to assist the Community's infrastructural integration and facilitate movement of people, goods, and services.

As a first stage in harmonizing energy policies, members undertake to exchange information on research, plan joint training, and harmonize mineral policies and practices. At a second stage, members would formulate a common energy and mineral policy, especially in the fields of the production and distribution of energy and research, and production and processing of mineral resources.

A Fund for Cooperation, Compensation, and Development will be established with contributions by member states, income from Community enterprises, receipts from outside the Community, and subsidies and contributions from other sources. The fund will finance community projects in member-states, in particular the less-developed states. Compensation to members who suffer as a result of trade liberalization or of the location of Community enterprises will come from the fund. It will guarantee foreign investment made in pursuance of the Treaty's provision for harmonizing industry and facilitate mobilization of internal and external finance for members of the Community.

Provided that this does not derogate from the provisions of the Treaty, members may belong to other regional or sub-regional associations within or outside the Community. The Treaty stipulates that member states, when entering into agreement for other types of association, should take into account the fact that advantages accorded under the Treaty by each member state form an integral part of the establishment of the Community and are thus inseparably linked with the creation of common institutions, the conferring of powers upon them and the granting of the same advantages by all other member states.

From the very beginning the West African nations have adopted a deliberate policy of slow, step by step progress toward economic integration. This was well expressed by President Tolbert of Liberia as the host to the January 1975 meeting of seven English—and eight French-speaking countries, which assembled there to adopt a draft treaty for the ECOWAS :

Let us evolve a modest scheme with the accent on reality and action. A step by step approach aimed at promoting sub-regional economic cooperation through a process of evolution, without unnecessary rocking of the existing superstructure and understanding will have the best chance of success. The whole of West Africa sub-regional cooperation should be based on pragmatism and realism.¹⁰

During November 4-5, 1976 at a summit meeting of the 15 members of the ECOWAS held at Lome, a number of functional protocols effectively completed the process of ratification of the Treaty, by finalizing the details of certain key provisions of the Treaty, notably regarding budgetary matters.

The seventeen-month delay between the initial signature of the Treaty and agreement on the outstanding protocol had been in part due to an initiative by Senegal to make its ratification of the Treaty depend upon a broadening of the Community to include Franco-phone states of Central Africa. However, following intensive diplomatic activity by a majority of the ECOWAS members who maintained that it would be unrealistic to extend the initial scope of the Community beyond the West African sub-region, agreement was eventually reached to allow ECOWAS to become operational on the basis of its original membership.

The Heads of State amended the draft protocol on budgetary contributions. The formula finally adopted provided for equal weights given to a member's gross domestic product and per capita income in assessing the relative size of its contribution.

The Community headquarters is located at Lagos and the Office of the Fund for Cooperation, Compensation, and Development (FCCD) at Lome. It was agreed that the first Executive Secretary would be from Ivory Coast, and the first Managing Director from Liberia.

An important decision was taken in September 1977 to involve the ECA with the ECOWAS in the development of road transport and telecommunication. The present state of those two in West Africa is inadequate for the level of movement of people, goods and services desired. The road transport network has serious gaps, has not evolved to become complementary to the railway system and the quality of roads is also not up to the standard. Many rural areas are not served by roads, and they remain remote and isolated from the market economy.

The railway system is not integrated either. The railways were built piecemeal to serve colonial interests of tapping the raw material sources to evacuate them overseas. The gauges are different from one state to another. The railways run from port cities to the interior and hardly interconnect.

Even the air routes are not without their problems. There are insufficient aircraft, airports, and equipment, and also inadequate manpower. Many of the airlines servicing the ECOWAS region are foreign.

The telecommunications systems are deficient in many cases and one has to get through to a member-state via Europe. Coordination of industrialization requires efficient telecommunication services. In the area of electricity and power, there is a serious inadequacy and the resultant loss to industrial output cannot be overemphasized.

The road project, covering up to 10,000 kms. (6,250 miles) will link the main cities of the member-state of the Community, coastal and inland.

The conference held on 21-22 April, 1978 approved recommendations made by the ECOWAS Ministerial Council designed to set in full motion all the institutions of the Community. Also, 28 May 1979 was decided upon as the effective date for a freeze of custom tariffs in all states of the Community in accordance with the provisions of the ECOWAS Treaty.

The Heads of State requested the Council of Ministers to prepare and submit to the next ECOWAS meeting (to be held in 1979) a draft multilateral agreement on the free movement of people within the Community. This would remove "all obstacles to freedom of movement and residence of citizens and member-states with a view to translating their community citizenship into reality."¹¹

At the end of April 1978, the Development Fund of the Community reached the \$20 million mark, of which \$6.7 million was Nigeria's contributions.

In June 1978, the West Africa Center for Project Programming and Execution (MULPOC) created by ECA was inaugurated. The main objects of the organization is to help the Community members mobilize the resources coming from the UN system.

To sum up, the two priorities of the ECOWAS are to build up an adequate infrastructure for the Community and to forge a customs union. The infrastructural development will induce more spatial interaction among the member nations, while the creation of a customs union will enlarge the market for industrial products and thus hasten the very process of industrial growth.

Now that the euphoric stages following the creation of the ECOWAS is over, this would seem to be an appropriate time to analyze some of the problems that face the new organization in the implementation of the Treaty, and in the realization of the goals and objectives of the community.

The Treaty is very broad-based without going into the specifics of the mode of cooperation. This cautionary and conservative approach may be related to past disappointments. Wilmost justifies this approach thus :

It was felt necessary, on the basis of previous experience, to agree on broad outlines and to let the success achieved at each stage dictate the form and pace subsequent cooperation should assume.¹²

Many economic integration arrangements have fallen apart because adequate provisions were not made to take care of the problems of unequal growth and monetary incomes of partner states. The ECOWAS Treaty has not faced these issues squarely. As Sackey has said, "The ECOWAS Treaty is largely vague on income distribution issue."¹³

One of the bones of contention in an economic union is the relative degree of industrialization and the location of new industries among member nations. This is why some mechanism of industrial planning and coordination becomes necessary. But there is no institution within the ECOWAS for the allocation to appropriate states based on resource endowment and comparative advantage, nor is there any provision for the harmonization of industrial policies.

A formidable problem to resolve will be how to reconcile the divergent and contrasting political ideologies and economic policies of partner states for harmonious economic development, and free

TABLE III : INTRA-ECOWAS TRADE MATRIX 1972 (\$ 000)
IMPORTING COUNTRIES

	Benin	Cape Verde	Gambia, The	Ghana	Guinea	Guinea-Bissau	Ivory Coast	Liberia	Mali	Mauritania	Niger	Nigeria	Senegal	Sierra Leone	Togo	Upper Volta
Benin	X															
Cape Verde		X														
Gambia, The			X													
Ghana			69	X				97			190	1245	1	76	1444	672
Guinea				X	X			98				4	22	45		
Guinea-Bissau						X										
Ivory Coast							X	891			4999	619	14498	228	819	6539
Liberia					1023			X			97	42		130	19	
Mali								72	X		52		719			2671
Mauritania										X			10			
Niger											X	94			42	136
Nigeria								149			1841	X	4754	8018	603	200
Senegal								470			1239	913	X	801	647	1565
Sierra Leone								430			5002	73	128	X	X	
Togo								1			119	12	2		79	72
Upper Volta												1	1			X
Total ECOWAS	5810	7	1624	15826	4139		22808	2208		5002	9612	3445	20895	9300	4306	11855

Source : Renninger (1979), p. 51.

flow of factors. Hedrich and von der Ropp cites one such difficulty:

"...how will it be possible to adjust tax incentives for private foreign investment in the People's Republic of Benin and Guinea, which have aligned themselves with scientific socialism, and in Nigeria and the Ivory Coast, which are oriented toward capitalism, and how will it be possible to harmonize their development plans?"¹⁴

Issues like the convertibility of currency and the unrestricted flow of capital will have to be resolved soon if the Community is to function smoothly. Unless the many restrictions on inter-territorial trade, which in any case is rather limited (Table III), are removed as soon as possible, the very existence of the Community may be at stake.

Economic cooperation among West African nations is supposed to bring about collective self-reliance and reduce dependence on the industrialised world. But this cannot happen automatically. Unfortunately, no suitable institution or mechanism has been incorporated within the Treaty to accomplish this goal.

With the existence of so many regional organizations for cooperation in West Africa, the question that naturally arises is that: What will be their relation to the ECOWAS, especially that of the CEAO which has been functioning well for several years? The ECOWAS Treaty stipulates that the rights and obligations of the signatory countries from previous agreements are not affected by the Treaty, but it is also provided that preferences given to other countries by virtue of the cooperation arrangements must also be extended to all other member nations of the ECOWAS. If this is followed through, the CEAO partnership will lose its identity in time to come. Whether this is desired by CEAO countries themselves is something that remains to be seen.

A related question is, is the ECOWAS open for membership to other nations outside of West Africa? If so, under what terms and conditions? This point has not been adequately dealt with by the Treaty.

As far as the ECOWAS is concerned, the free movement of labor is enshrined in the Lagos Treaty, not only for its economic import, but also for the idea of West African unity that it underlines. But it is evident that labor mobility across the length and breadth of West Africa poses serious challenges to members of the Community. Political, social, and cultural friction is likely as the unemployed and the underemployed tend to migrate to areas where there are job opportunities. Can this be allowed to take place in West Africa

where there is such a large differential in unemployment rates?

Estimates for 1970 indicate that the unemployment rate was as high as 17 per cent in Ghana, 15 percent in Sierra Leone, and 14 percent in Nigeria. Indications are that the trend is upward. In the circumstances, the self-employed, such as craftsmen, traders and businessmen may see their markets as being curtailed in the light of the keen competition that is likely to ensue.¹⁵

Although it is true that such legislative measures as Ghana's Aliens' Compliance Order of 1971, the Nigerian Enterprises Promotions Decree of 1972, and Ghana's Investment Decree of 1975 constitute an integral part of the long process of political consolidation whereby the new African States endeavour to take their economic destiny in their own hands, their adverse effects on cooperative development schemes as envisaged in the ECOWAS Treaty cannot be over-emphasized.

The ECOWAS, after a long gestation period, has embarked upon the path of comprehensive economic cooperation for development. The institutions that have been devised for this purpose seem to be adequate, but specific details will have to be worked out to make them function smoothly. A tremendous amount of political goodwill is required to make such a diverse and disparate grouping of states work together for the common goal of "the elimination of poverty, social injustice, exploitation, marginalization, internal or external socio-political domination, and a continuous unfolding of human personality through creative self-expression."¹⁶

The success of integration will depend, among other things, on the effective mobilization of support within each country, and so a conscious attempt needs to be made to promote the ECOWAS idea in all the member-nations of the Community. This mobilization could act as a countervailing force against uninformed integration obstructionists and raise the consciousness of the nationals as to the meaning and advantages of regional integration.

A higher level of integration, as provided for in the ECOWAS Treaty, with adequate safeguards for compensation of the weaker nations against uneven growth and trade diversion, is aimed at comprehensive development, structural transformation and collective self-reliance of the West African economy. It is a great challenge and opportunity for West African collective leadership.

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Land Characteristics, Economic Policy and Rhodesian Dualism

PURNA SAMANTA

Although economic dualism can be perceived in some measure in any country of the Third World, nevertheless, it is visualised in its glaring openness, when one starts from the fact that a country was colonised by a private company, like the British South Africa Company in the case of Rhodesia, and the East India Company in India. Legislative, administrative and judicial powers were conferred by the Royal Charter as usual, but this Chartered Company (BSA) was, in reality, a representative of foreign capital originating from Britain, South Africa and Germany.¹

Towards the end of the past century, the share of the settlers in the governing council increased and that of the company reduced. Nonetheless, the social and economic organisation of pre and post UDI² settler governments owed much to the policies and activities of the BSA company. The resultant dualism permeated almost every aspect of the social and economic structure.

At first, the whole story began with the search for gold. By 1891 the BSA company started selling and leasing large areas of land to incoming settlers and companies. Equally large areas of land were kept on reserve in the hope of being occupied by prospective settlers. The same pattern is noticeable even in Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia), although the situation never reached a problematic proportion as in Rhodesia, because the number of settlers never arrived as expected³. This early process of land alienation produced a land glut among the settlers and since most of them had already valuable gold claims in comparison to farm land, land soon became a speculative asset. The company government took the initiative of

dividing the country into native reserves and areas open to European settlement.

The Matebeleland order in Council of 1894 and Southern Rhodesia Order in Council of 1896 gave legislative effect to this move. The land tenure system that eventually erupted out of this arrangement let loose forces of dualism uniquely as determinants of demand for and supply of labour, labour market imperfections, agricultural holding patterns, production and distribution trend within the whole economy.

Dualism in this context may be taken to mean the limited spread of the modern sector and its failure to cope with the rising population and labour force which cannot be productively absorbed in agriculture through the cultivation of more land⁴. As later pages will indicate, it consists in the continuous impoverishing of vast majority of the Blacks against the progressive prosperity to tiny minority of the whites on an average at a level of standard of living much higher than obtainable in their countries of origin.

The classical model can briefly be stated after Lewis (1954, 1972), where the national economy is roughly divided into one 'traditional' and one 'modern' sector. The latter is productive, exploitative and full of conspicuous consumption. It is dynamic, capital-intensive and is based upon a fully developed monetized exchange economy, whereas the former is stagnant, poor, declining labour-intensive subsistence sector, revealed in the traditional agricultural economy saturated with surplus labour in farm, petty trade and other service occupations.

Very modern writers (D Ndlela, 1979) have emphasized dualism from a distinctly different angle. It looks more into the origin and initial conditions for the creation and perpetuation of dualism. The conditions are the entry of foreign capital, land alienation policies, very low wages in mines and plantations. These forms of exploitation become soon institutionalised and a modern economy comes to co-exist and 'thrive by the maintenance of the low productivity and relatively stagnant traditional sector'.

It has been suggested that both types of economic dualism — classical and discriminatory — originate in the same necessary condition, i.e., land alienation from the African majority by the white minority. The labour market is characterized by severe monopsonistic conditions. Thus land alienation and discrimination processes have resulted in the creation of an 'unlimited' supply of labour by depressing incomes in the traditional sector.

The most important cause behind this elaborate scheme of land alienation was one of giving incentive to settlers and volunteers from

homeland. It was more so, unlike what happened to the Royal occupied colonies, in the event of a private company's possession of a colony like Rhodesia and the eventual determination of its political economy. Stigger writes, anybody taking up arms to be rewarded with a right to twenty goats claims, a free farm of 3000 morgen and a share in the loot cattle.

By March 1899, 15.8 million acres were alienated. Land soon became a speculative asset whose value would increase with the settling down of the country. Land was the most available factor in terms of relative factor prices. Capital and labour were relatively scarce. During the initial period of colonialism, land alienation from the native blacks was the only means bridging the gap between the supply and demand for labour, as also to use labour and land in place of scarce capital. In the later decades, foreign African labour recruitment and land policies were used to secure labour-supplies within the limits of a very low wage policy.

Perennial subjugation of natives certainly acted as a great motive behind the type of land tenure system that was developed in the later years and tribal disunity was a contributing factor to this objective. Coupled with this, the increased military strength of the colonial power defeated the chiefs easily and made them agents of implementation of this land policy and perpetuation of a dual economy. Thus in so far as being part of the administration, the African chiefs are a mere appendage and paid civil servants of the government.⁵

Although background and causes overlap in some measure, there are distinct processes by means of which Rhodesian dualism was secured. The first in this section is the laws. The Land Apportionment Act, 1930, the Land Tenure Act, 1969, the Native Land Husbandry Act, 1951, and later abandoned in 1962 can be traced to see how the final dualistic structure is attained.

The Land Tenure Act of 1969 superseded all other acts before and classified land into the European area (18 150 297 ha.), the African area (18 217 705 ha.), and the National area (2 760 800 ha.). This means, the aggregate land area was shared equally between Europeans (now 4% of the population) and Africans (96%). As a result, the average African farm size is only a fraction of the European land unit, and it tends to grow smaller with the pressure of population.

This heavily biased land arrangement for Europeans has not only impoverished Africans, but has actually checked the rate of growth which otherwise might have been possible with a reasonably even distribution of property rights. This is so because this distribu-

tion has effects on average and marginal products of labour and this, in turn, would reflect on higher wages and incomes all over the economy through a sort of optimism multiplier. In the case of Rhodesia, therefore, the land tenure system provides a blockage that prevents benefits being spread out and contributes to the development of inequities of all kinds. The Indian land tenure system before the Zamindari abolition is partially reminiscent of this.

Some distinct phases are noticeable in their attempt by the colonists to the dual structure. In the beginning, land was needed for the sake of land, as this was the only abundant and important factor of production either for a land-intensive activity like cattle ranching or prospecting gold. In the second phase land was needed to secure necessary supplies of labour necessitated by new diamond and gold discoveries in Southern Africa during the years, 1867-1886.

In order to satisfy this insatiable demand for labour, forced evictions were resorted to. Only few were allowed to remain in the European expropriated farmlands by virtue of labour agreements with the new owners. In South Africa, pass laws were enacted to favour labour agreements.

The Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951 did more harm than good to the African farmers. They resisted it on the ground of continuous cultivation of already poor soils. Because the Act had some punitive measures, the Land Husbandry Act practically resulted in the creation of landless people whose only option was migration into urban sector for jobs at very low wages.

The second in the section on processes consists in socio-economic measures that the settler-government undertook to secure and complete the structure of dualism. As indicated earlier, a general shortage of labour was central to policy making. The opportunity cost of going into employment sector was higher for the peasantry than that of supplying surpluses of subsistence produce to the cash economy.⁶ To counteract this situation, the Native Commissioners resorted to forced labour. The native chiefs were utilised towards this objective. If a chief could not deliver his quota of labourers, he was given fifty lashes, fined six goats and three heads of cattle, and his rifle was confiscated⁷.

A second means was taxation, i.e., the tax was used to coerce or offer an incentive for labour to contract wage employment. It led to a number of unrests. Despite this, the hut tax was raised from 10s. to £1 poll tax on each male African. Another method was the introduction of foreign labour. Labourers were recruited from

Mozambique, Northern Transvaal, Somalia and Yemen. Soon the Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau (RNLB) was formed by the government to recruit alien African labour. Van Onselen (1976) comments that there were successive reductions in wage-cost following regular flow of workers recruited by RNLB. The employers took advantage of this situation by further lowering wages of other black workers already in employment. This was the largest contribution to cost minimisation during reconstruction. Thus increasing the supply of labour between 1911 and 1951 was a necessary method of maintaining low wage levels for domestic labour as well.

The next important process developed as a result of the realisation that not enough gold was to be found in Rhodesia. Thus commercial agriculture was taken as the alternative and thus the process of land alienation started as a means of securing best land for whites in terms of fertility, transport facility and market situation. Already the country's infrastructure was built with Europeans in mind and therefore the market incentive was removed from the African farmer. There is evidence of discrimination against African farmers as regards transport system. The railway lines and road motor service network connect most European farmland.

Since 1940, owing to the growth of African trade unionism in the manufacturing industry, there has been some relaxation of discriminatory practices in recent years. Nevertheless, dualistic tendencies were maintained during the period of the UDI in 1965, by not allowing unionisation of farm workers and domestic servants.

Although these processes have undergone some apparent changes in recent years on account of increasing social and economic consciousness among Africans, pragmatic policy orientation of authorities and pressure of international opinion, nevertheless the heart of the matter remains the same. For instance, land classification as under the Land Tenure Act, 1969 into African area, European area etc. have been removed as per the Land Tenure (Repeal) Act 1979, but on the question of land redistribution and expansion of Tribal Trust Land, the status quo is retained. Hence, the root cause of the dualistic structure remains unaltered.

The net effect, however, of all these processes and policies is the creation and retention of pronounced economic dualism in Rhodesia. If one looks at the land and population distribution of Rhodesia, one can easily find a very high density of population in African area as a result of this land tenure system. There are 95% Africans, 4.48% Europeans and 0.004% Asians and people of mixed stock. There is also the fact that more than 50% of the total land resources have been allotted to only 4% Europeans who have obviously chosen the

best 50% land of the country.⁸ All other effects can be studied from this basic effect of the economic policy on land in Rhodesia.

In the first place, it had the effect of eliminating competition as between races. No African buyer is allowed to buy more than 1000 acres in the Native Purchase Area, so that no African would effectively compete with large-scale white agricultural enterprises. The Native Land Husbandry Act had the effect of reducing average African farm size to only 4 to 6 acres, which combined with soil erosion, traditional farming practices and increasing pressure of population on already tiny holdings gave rise to fast declining productivity for rural households. Thus the most notable trend in agricultural production is the output growth differential between African and European Sectors. The total value of European agricultural output increased from R \$ 147.1 million in 1967 to R \$ 393.4 million in 1976 (current prices), i.e. by 167 percent, whereas that of African agricultural output went up by 62 per cent during the same period.⁹ Despite problems of measurement on account of home consumption in subsistence farming, only in the best seasons did the percentage of African total output exceed 27% of the total agricultural output.¹⁰

Secondly, falling labour productivity in African peasant farming is caused by factors like overcrowding and soil erosion. Already overcrowding and overstocking had started by 1930s. And in recent years, one estimate indicates that Tribal Trust Land has absorbed 64% of the population growth, provides social security system for over 90%. Owing to falling productivity and population growth, TTLs have to import food into their areas. The Tribal areas are overgrazed, subject to excessive population pressures and are close to ecological collapse in many districts.¹¹ In 1976, the Natural Resources Board observes that there has been serious deterioration in fertility for over 53% of TTLs.

Overutilisation of land in African Sector and under utilisation in European sector are critical deterrents on total productivity. The former resulted in the transference of rural underemployment to open urban unemployment.

Over the last three decades, multinational capital is accelerating the income differential between African and European farmers. During 1970s, foreign companies still account for some 75% of gross profits in agriculture.¹² Hence, monopoly power of foreign capital over land and other resources provided the initial conditions for the creation and perpetuation of social and economic dualism.

Finally, the post UDI government financed irrigation and protection of farm incomes have significantly contributed to the income differential. From 1929 to 1945, African real wages in Rhodesia

appear to have fallen. And in recent years, the same tendency is perceived because of world-wide inflation.¹³

To sum up, land characteristics and economic policy on land in Rhodesia can be traced in the land tenure system of the country. Even land characteristics revealed in the division of land resources into regions of differing fertility, situation etc. have been used to accentuate dualism, in that the best land has always gone to the whites. The foregoing analysis has shown that this land tenure system, wherever practised, can actually retard economic growth by depriving the vast majority of population from participating in the economic development.

This study has shown that by means of policies of land alienation, discrimination, unequal provision of scarce inputs between European-owned farms and African-owned very small farms, differential price system for marketable produce and very low wages paid to African labour, a highly pronounced dualism is maintained. It supports recent advances of empirical knowledge that the distribution of property rights is an important variable in the whole calculus of income-differentials and in the growth prospects of an economy through its cyclical effects on production and savings. In Rhodesia economic growth has a pronounced class bias which tends to disfavour those who own little or no property.¹⁴

It is because of this reason that the land issue occupies top priority in the mind of the present leadership of Zimbabwe after it attains black majority rule following election in February, 1980. While it remains to be seen how growth and development can be balanced against the background of Rhodesian types of dualism, one way, however, would be to let growth remain unhampered, and reforming wholeheartedly the African sector to raise towards the level of the European sector.

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One morgen equals 2.1 acres.

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Lome II and ACP-EEC Relations : A Preliminary Assessment

CECIL RAJANA

Talks on the successor agreement to the Convention of Lome, which began in July 1978, were concluded in October 1979.¹ Lome II, as it is called, does not represent a radical departure from Lome I — just as Yaounde II was not significantly different from Yaounde I. There are common reasons why Yaounde I and Lome I were in their own ways both path-breaking agreements, while Lome II, like Yaounde II before it, will largely consolidate the limited achievements of its predecessor. One of these pertains to the use of power.

In the negotiations for Lome II, ACP structural power was undermined by a fundamental rift between the Francophone and the Anglophone states. This division initially surfaced in late 1978 in the Financial Cooperation Working Group over the question of aid. It later spread to other issue areas and finally was dramatically brought into the public focus by the acrimony over the place where the Treaty should be signed — Lome or Khartoum.² *Africa Confidential*, which followed the negotiations closely, blames in part the Community's machiavellian tactics for the discord. The EEC, and particularly France, created dissension among the ACP negotiators³ while maintaining their own cohesion and united approach to the negotiations. In addition, the ACP states did not exploit their bargaining powers to the full. The EEC seized the initiative from the inception of the talks and on several issues — e.g., shipping and mining — the ACP representations proved rather ill-prepared. The ineffective use of their structural and bargaining powers by the ACP states in 1979 contrasted markedly with 1974 — as outlined by Isebill Gruhn — and in part accounts for the different outcomes of Lome I

and Lome II for the Associates.

Power apart, the different outcomes of Lome I and II, like those of Yaounde I and II, must be explained in terms of the concrete international context in which the negotiations were conducted. The world situation in 1963 and 1974 favoured the Associates, whereas in 1969 and 1979 it did not. The 1963 negotiations of Yaounde I were conducted against the backdrop of rapid decolonization and mounting Sino-Soviet-American rivalry in the Third World. This placed the AAMS in a strong position to demand concessions from Europe. And the Community's concern for its vital interests in Africa compelled the EEC to respond in a meaningful way. In contrast, during the negotiations on Yaounde II in 1969, the rivalry had abated and the Community became preoccupied with post-De Gaulle internal adjustments -- which did not help the AAMS to improve significantly the terms of association.

However, the crisis precipitated by OPEC in late 1973 dramatized the growing Western dependence on Third World base materials. This set in motion a scramble between Japan, the USA and Europe for secure supplies, and also, in the EEC's case, for secure outlets for its manufacturers. This backdrop to the negotiation of Lome I in 1974, as in 1963, again inclined the Community to make concessions, which it was in an economic position to do. In contrast, the 1979 negotiations on Lome II coincided with a decline in the rivalry over raw materials. This, combined with mounting economic difficulties in Europe, which began in 1975, placed the EEC in a bind regarding across-the-board concessions in 1979. As a result, the outcome of Lome II, from the ACP standpoint, is less far-reaching than that of its predecessor.

Lome II rests squarely on the principles which underlay its predecessor. Essentially, the new Convention is the reassertion of a policy choice on inter-regional cooperation by the ACP and the EEC (and between Europe and the Third World), against the backdrop of changing North-South relations. At the same time, both groups of countries at the Free port Ministerial Meeting, in May 1979, reaffirmed their commitment to act more resolutely for global restructuring in order to establish a new international economic order (NIEO).⁴

Lome II is a comprehensive Treaty containing 11 Titles compared to 7 in Lome I. Consequently, in certain respects it both reinforces the achievements of its predecessor and contains some departures. The outstanding new features, arguably, pertain to mining, fishing, shipping, investment and agricultural cooperation.

The inclusion of a separate Title (VI) on Agriculture underscores the belief held by both the ACP and the EEC that its development

must remain central to the basic needs strategy being increasingly adopted by the Associated states. This emphasis is already reflected in the implementation of the Convention of Lome, with 40.0% of the EDF's appropriation earmarked for rural development.⁵ And it is now to be further reinforced by the establishment of a Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Cooperation (TCARC). Its functions will be similar to those of the Centre for Industrial Development (CID) under Lome I, but in addition, it will be charged with the dissemination of relevant knowledge and technology.⁶

It is to be hoped that the TCARC does not remain inactive, as the CID has done since its creation in 1975 (though measures are contemplated in Lome II to activate it). Attempts by the ACP negotiators to have the Community establish a special agricultural development fund, like their efforts to obtain an industrial development fund, were turned down, although 30 MUA have been set aside for both the CID and the TCARC. The objectives visualised in both Titles will have to be promoted mainly by funds from the EDF V and the EIB IV. Yet, one reason advanced for the limited achievements to date under industrial cooperation is the absence of a special fund to support the measures envisaged. However, Agricultural Cooperation is unlikely to suffer to the same extent, for about 42.0% of EDF V is directly and indirectly committed to a variety of agricultural ventures.

Title IV on Investment simply stresses the ACP-EEC joint recognition of both the import of direct foreign investment (DFI) flows to the Associated states, and of the need to channel such flows into the ACP designated key sectors aimed at expediting their industrial development. The Community attempts to get the ACP states to extend automatic guarantees to all European DFI was, however, rejected. But the EEC did manage to engineer the inclusion of a non-discriminatory clause in Title IV despite considerable ACP opposition. Annex IX to Article 64 obligates the ACP states to generalise their preferential investment regime.⁷ For example, if the Ivory Coast happens to maintain a financial or other regime favourable to French investment — it must extend the same treatment to the DFI of the other member states. This measure, long sought by Germany with a view to eliminating the special advantages Britain and France enjoyed in the ACP states by virtue of their traditional ties, should prove beneficial to most EEC members. The ACP opposition stemmed from specific concerns. First, they did not wish the clause to apply to old investments — but only to new ones. Secondly, they did not want to be automatically obliged to extend the same advantages to all EEC firms — fearing that this could

undermine their bargaining position. Their apprehension apart, the Associates do expect the non-discriminatory clause to increase European DFI flows to the ACP states which many of them are in need of.

Whereas under Lome I STABEX offered the agricultural primary-producing countries some insurance against lean years, the mineral-based ACP states⁸ remained at the mercy of all mishaps, in the form of sudden slumps in production and/or export prices. Lome II seeks to rectify this with a system, already termed by some as MINEX. The aim of the MINEX system is similar to that of STABEX, though the methods of achieving it differ because of the peculiarities of mineral production and markets. MINEX hinges on an 'accident insurance' fund of 280 million units of account (MUA) and covers mine minerals but operates with a much higher dependency threshold than STABEX.

The MINEX arrangement may only come into play in respect of an ACP country if :

- (a) one of the minerals accounted for, as a general rule, not less than 15.0%, on average, over the past four years, of total exports to all destinations: 10.0% in the case of the LDLIS;
- (b) production capacity or capacity for export to the EEC is liable to be reduced substantially, by 10.0% and over, in consequence of an internal disaster (natural or political), or of a drop in export earnings such as to endanger the profitability and preservation of an otherwise viable production potential, or of a fortuitous occurrence of any kind.⁹

In such cases, the ACP country affected can have the EEC contribute to the financing of projects or programmes for preserving or restoring its production or export capacity by way of special loans at a 1.0% rate of interest, redeemable over 40 years with 10-years deferment. Advances may be accorded as bridging loans. Unlike STABEX, MINEX accident insurance aid is not a direct budget transfer aimed at stabilizing projects and programmes which are aimed at countering the harmful effects of the disruption by restoring the capacity of the affected mining sectors.

This arrangement for safeguarding the mining economy of the ACP states is coupled with a set of important provisions on technical and financial assistance for mining and energy projects, including: prospecting and operating programmes; help in the form of risk capital for investment preliminary to the launching of mining and energy projects; assistance from the European Investment Bank (EIB) for mining and energy ventures of mutual interest; and the possibility

of benefit to private investment, of concluding specific investment protection agreements in the field of mining and energy with such ACP states as may desire them.

The arrangement as it stands, it is reasoned, will give the producer countries exporting to the EEC the minimum protection needed to preserve their production potential. But this applies only to that part of it connected with the market of the Nine. While the arrangement will certainly benefit those ACP states that export the bulk of their output of certain minerals, such as phosphates and tin, to the Community, it is unlikely to be of much advantage to others whose output goes mainly to the Far East, North America Eastern Europe.¹⁰ Effective immunity for their mining sector, and for that of most LDCs, from the erratic behaviour of world market forces will have to await a global solution in the North-South context. Meanwhile, the new arrangement makes the EEC a more attractive marketing outlet for mineral producers and could very well cause some trade diversion. In turn, this could later create friction between the EEC, on the one hand, and the USA and Japan, on the other.

MINEX has some other limitations. For one, it covers only nine minerals — copper, cobalt, phosphates, manganese, bauxite and aluminum, tin, iron ores and iron pyrites — all of which are of the utmost importance to Europe's industrial machinery. The ACP's demand that the arrangement should, in addition, cover eight other minerals was turned down at Brussels on the ground that they were of no substantial import to the Community. This, of course, is true, but they are of considerable importance to many ACPs. Provisions do exist for an extension of the list, but such decisions are in effect left entirely to the EEC. Similarly, the ACP's demand for the Community to set aside 500 MUA to finance the minerals arrangement was rejected, and instead 280 MUA was earmarked for this purpose. The feeling amongst most ACP spokesmen in Brussels is that this fund can hardly have a significant impact on the damage caused by the fluctuation of income from mineral exports to the EEC. For example, in 1975, earnings stood at 6 billion US dollars, but fell to 5, in 1976, then rose to 7 in 1977, and slumped to 6 in 1978. How effective can a compensatory scheme of 280 MUA spread over five years be in cushioning, for example, the impact on production of a 1 billion US dollar drop in revenues in a single year? Clearly not very. This idea may be excellent but the resources are quite inadequate.

The primary emphasis in the new arrangement is on expanding the mining and energy sector in the ACP states in keeping with the growing raw material needs of the Community. Recently, European

private investment in the extractive industries has declined sharply in the ACP states, and more generally in the LDCs. The persistence of this trend has been a cause of much alarm among high Community functionaries. In a speech delivered by the President of the EEC Commission at St. Anthony's College, Oxford, in May 1978, singular attention was paid to this issue:

At present, the level of world economic activity — and, still more, the future level of world prosperity — is seriously threatened by underinvestment in mining in developing countries. The figures for Community mining companies are particularly alarming. In 1961 exploration in Third World countries accounted for 57 percent of the total exploration expenditures of European mining countries. Today, the figure is 13.5 percent. Yet, from the geological point of view, the bulk of exploration should be taking place in the developing world.¹¹

In his address, Roy Jenkins, proposed that the above issue should be the number one item on the agenda for discussion.

At the concrete level, the EEC has, since September 1978, sought to resuscitate the Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC) to deal with this issue. More important, the Commission, in the course of the renegotiation of Lomé I, has incorporated the requisite clauses in the new Treaty to reverse the decline in European investment in mining and energy ventures. Incidentally, the principal cause of this decline has been identified by Community spokesmen as widespread uncertainty in the ACP states, caused in part by political instability there, and the fear of expropriation without satisfactory compensation.¹² Yet, this can at best only be part of the explanation for the decline, for, as the *New African* recently pointed out, US and Japanese investments in African mines have risen dramatically over the same period.¹³ The cause of the decline must surely be multifaceted. One contributing factor could perhaps be the worldwide shift in direct foreign investment (DFI) from the mining to the manufacturing sector.¹⁴ Another could be, as Christian Palloix has pointed out, the internationalization of European capital.¹⁵ Since the mid sixties French and British capital flow to their ex-colonies has shrunk, whereas their DFI, including that of the FRG to the newly industrializing and the advanced industrial states, has risen markedly.

Europe's prescription for dealing with the perceived cause of its DFI decline in ACP mining includes several measures — apart from the 280 MUA accident insurance fund which has already been mentioned. These include: financial assistance for the establishment of

national and regional mineral exploration funds in ACP states and guarantees by ACP states against harmful measures to European mining interests. In addition, the EIB has been authorized by Article 59 :

... to commit its own resources on a case by case basis beyond the amount fixed in Article 95 to mining investment projects and energy investment projects recongnized by the ACP states concerned and by the Community as being of mutual interest.¹⁶

The principal beneficiaries of this open-ended access to EIB funds for mining undertakings will, invariably, be European MNCs. There can be no doubt that the measures envisaged will effectively maintain the existing level of ACP mineral output. But they are unlikely to reverse the decline in European DFI in the ACP mining sector. Moreover, one important question arises in connection with the EEC's prescription. Given the fact that EEC members do have adequate systems of investment guarantees to cover the risk-taking international operations by their MNCs, it must be asked whether the EEC needs to demand ACP guarantees. A firm answer cannot be given to this question. But it is hard to avoid the suspicion that the demand was partly intended to block the ACP countries from attempting as the Andean Pact states have done, to regulate capital and technological flows more effectively to their own advantage.

MINEX is not what the ACP states had hoped for from Lome II. They fought for an extension of the STABEX scheme to deal with their fluctuating mineral export incomes. As expected this was flatly turned down by the EEC ostensibly on grounds of cost. The ACP states have registered their disappointment in the form of a unilateral declaration (Annexe XLII) appended to the Treaty. But some Associated states remain hopeful that they may yet succeed in persuading the Community to resume discussions on expanding the STABEX scheme.

Peter Tullock may have been correct in saying that Lome I was not designed to ensure the EEC's access to essential raw materials.¹⁷ But, I would submit that it did coincidentally link the Community with important exporters of minerals. In contrast, Lome II officially formalizes this connection. And while the ACP states stand to derive considerable benefits, in the short term, from this EEC drive, the new arrangement will doubtless leave the Community open and vulnerable to two charges by radical critics. The first is that the Community has finally succeeded in subordinating the Lome arrangement to its general scheme for alleviating its own pressing and chronic energy and mineral deficiencies. This point has

been made by a number of ACP states. They feel that the Community has succumbed to the pressure of its mining conglomerates who since 1975, have presented a number of memoranda to the Commission detailing their own investment problems in the ACP states.¹⁸ The second is that this new arrangement appears to reinforce the existing structure of production in the ACP states, in much the same way as the Convention of Lome has been doing since 1975. This will in turn deepen their external dependence — a trend which is regarded by many as the key cause of backwardness in the Third World. Moreover, the fact that the most ardent champion of MINEX (and of STABEX) has been the FRG is a matter of the utmost concern. Sidath Siri, the noted Indian scholar on Europe - Third World Affairs, has observed that Bonn, the most implacable OECD opponent of the Coreia integrated commodity arrangement,¹⁹ sees in STABEX a Community alternative to the proposed Common Fund.²⁰ In short, there is a potential danger of some EEC members using STABEX and MINEX to frustrate UNCTAD efforts to find a global solution to the commodity problem. Further, Carl Lankowski of Columbia University instances attempts by individual EEC members to employ the Lome arrangement as a whole to foil the more far reaching proposals by the Group of 77 which are aimed at the establishment of NIEO.²¹

A joint Ministerial Declaration at the Freeport Meeting in May 1979 detailed the EEC and ACP common interests in shipping. It also stated the Community's readiness to develop this sector in the ACP states when requested.²² In practice, the EEC is willing, within the framework of the new convention, to establish shipping companies, from joint enterprises, and provide technical assistance inclusive of training and management. However, the specific terms on which this cooperation is to be effected are to be decided on a case by case basis. This is unfortunate because it leaves the Community decision on individual ACP requests vulnerable to pressure from its powerful shipping lobby. It should not be forgotten that private interests in the Nine (plus Greece, schedule for EEC membership in 1981) account for between two-thirds and three-quarters of the world total shipping capacity.²³ Moreover, it does not make much sense for the EEC to undertake to establish Third World based shipping lines without stating in advance its position on freight rates, insurance charges and the extent to which it will act to see part of its imports and exports carried under the ACP flag, in all probability by State-owned lines. And for reason of technical unpreparedness, the ACP negotiators did not raise these vital issues upon which the success of any shipping venture must ultimately rest. It cannot be

over-emphasized that ocean-going commercial lines have been a major concern of both the ACP and the LDC. They have pursued this matter both at the CIEC in 1975-1977 and at UNCTAD in 1976 and 1979, but to date nothing concrete has come of these efforts.

Parallel to the establishment and management of ocean lines, another ACP-EEC declaration to be appended to the new Convention provides for cooperation in the comprehensive development of fishing resources in the ACP states.²⁴ The basis on which this is to be undertaken has been outlined in detail but no funds have been earmarked for this purpose or, for that matter, for merchant shipping.

In fact, the Commission, which in 1977 assumed collective responsibility for the external fishing policy of its members, has already started negotiations with Senegal, Mauritania, Cape Verde and Guyana on long-term fishing arrangements.²⁵ The Community's quest for such agreements has to be understood in light of the important changes occurring in sea fishing since Lome I. The cod incident in the North Sea in the seventies above all highlighted the depletion of fish stocks in European waters and brought into being far-reaching preservation measures there. These have forced the fishing industry to find new outlets. Its drive, however, has been impeded by the fact that coastal states in Africa and the Caribbean have, since 1976, declared a 200-mile fishing zone, and have since fought successfully to have their action endorsed by the current Law of the Sea Conference. Growing *de facto* acceptance by the international community of the new zonal limit, since Lome I, has obliged the EEC to move to protect its fishing interests. As a result, from the inception of the renegotiation of Lome I, the EEC sought to have incorporated in Lome II provisions conferring upon its fleet unimpeded access to the rich coastal waters of the ACP states.²⁶ This Community objective need not be to the disadvantage of the ACP states. As long as they can tie the proposed fishing agreements to the integrated development of their own offshore and onshore fishing industry, they stand to benefit. In fact, provisions do exist in Lome II for such linkages. Failure on the ACP's part to capitalize on available opportunities could, however, transform any EEC-ACP fishing arrangement into another extractive enclave and reinforce the existing pattern of dependent development in the periphery.

However, there are grounds for concern resulting primarily from a unilateral declaration by the EEC appended to the Treaty. Annexe XXXVII states that the provisions of Lome II should be applied with respect only to the 12 nautical miles presently recog-

nised by international law.²⁷ Its presence can only be understood in the context of two ACP demands tabled initially during the negotiations of Lome II. First, they have insisted on having all catches by EEC based fleets within their newly proclaimed 200 miles jurisdiction obligatorily landed in the Associated states for the purpose of processing. Secondly, they have been pressing for the processed products to be granted originating status or duty free entry to the EEC. The Community has firmly opposed both quests and had the declaration appended to the Treaty as a kind of safeguard. In consequence of the latter, the Community has argued that the twin ACP demands are purely academic. That, they may or may not be—certainly they are far reaching. On the one hand, the implementation of such demands could cause serious short term adjustment problems for the troubled European fishing industry. On the other hand, the outright rejection of them raises two serious questions. The first pertains to the EEC's insistence on the 'right' to deplete the rich fish stocks of the poor Third World states — considering the individual European states are themselves proclaiming 200 miles fishing zones — in order to maintain arbitrarily high consumption standards. The second concerns the fostering of economic restructuring between the EEC and the ACP. The fishing industry is arguably a logical candidate for industrial restructuring and an attempt should have been made. The Community's refusal to do so — as indeed its rejection of originating status to ACP processed rice,²⁸ which blocks agricultural restructuring in the Associated states calls into question the EECs commitment to global economic relocation.

STABEX, which aroused great interest at the international level throughout Lome I, is extended and improved in the new Convention. The products covered will be increased from 33 to 44, and rubber will be included for the first time. In addition, both the dependence and the trigger thresholds that bring the system into play will be lowered from 7.5% to 6.5%. The corresponding decrease for the 47 (of the 58 ACP states) least developed, land locked and island states (LDLLIS) will be from 2.5% to 2.0%. While these changes could prove advantageous to some ACP states — it should be stressed that the financial provision for STABEX is in real terms substantially less than in Lome I. While the funds has risen 44.0%, from 382 MUA to 550 MUA²⁹, it is hardly sufficient to offset the cumulative inflation over the quinquennia in question — estimated conservatively — at 48.0%; not to mention the substantial expansion in ACP membership (from 46 to 58) and in the number of products now covered by the scheme.

The new Convention should enable industrial cooperation to

assume larger proportions. However, the dramatic improvements to this Title that were expected at the start of the negotiations by the ACP states have not materialized. The Title remains ambiguous even where it appears to make important departures from Lome I. For instance, it is stated that this Title :

...is aimed at facilitating the overall industrial development of the ACP countries, in particular their production of manufactures, by taking due account of their specific needs in the formulation of policies designed to adjust the industrial structures of the Community to changes occurring at the world level.³⁰

The adjustment of industrial structure is a measure which not only the ACP, but also the LDCs as a whole, have been seeking both at the inter-regional and global levels in the context of various North South forums. Yet, it is not made clear in the draft Industrial Cooperation Title how this is to be achieved in practice. True, both sides stress that consultation will be necessary, but no definite provisions are built into the Convention to enable the two parties to adopt measures aimed at the long overdue and necessary restructuring of the world economy. Moreover, if the reaction to date of the Nine to the manufactures of the LDCs — particularly towards textile goods, leather products and electrical items³¹ — is any indication, then one is bound to remain sceptical about the EEC's vague commitment to economic restructuring. Lome II contains no provision for lowering EEC barriers to Third World manufacturers. To date, the Community has merely undertaken a study on EEC adjustment problems in the fact of LDC's imports. So far, only the Netherlands has been pressing for specific modifications to the economic system of the Nine.³² Whatever the outcome, a reduction in protectionism will no doubt have to be a precondition to any adjustment process — if not, at the least, a concomitant of one.

So far as trade cooperation is concerned the new Convention continues very much along the lines of the old, with some improvements, of which three shall be mentioned. First, the existing preferential arrangements are to be improved, with new concessions for some products, including the controversial items, beef and rum, not to mention the inclusion of several new products, such as tomatoes, onions and carrots. Secondly, the range of trade promotion schemes is to be increased markedly and fundings doubled to 40 MUA. Thirdly, formulae have been devised for making procedures for exemption from the rules of origin more flexible, objective and effective, particularly for the least developed ACP, without risking too great a deflection in their trade flow.³³ These measures will no doubt facilitate some trade

expansion. However, it is doubtful whether they can restore the level of real preference that ACP exports initially enjoyed in the Community, or lower the growing competition that ACP products now face there. Hence, these measures are unlikely to result in any dramatic expansion in ACP-EEC trade, or for that matter to affect adversely Third World trade in general with the EEC.

Having touched upon the main features of the new Convention, it is in order to examine in some detail the Financial and Technical Cooperation Title. The entire structure of ACP-EEC relations hinges on this Title, for the volume of aid made available predetermines the scope for development in the ACP states. And rapid development is, of course, the professed goal of the Convention arrangement. There is no need to deal with the areas of agreement on this Title, for this has been done elsewhere.³⁴ However, some persistent disagreements are highlighted below. The focus is then shifted to the comparative size of EDF V and EIB IV, and to the issue of aid determination.

From the inception of Lome, the ACP states sought effective participation in the administration and control of the key Convention institutions, chiefly the EDF. The demand for representation was initially made in 1974, but to no avail.³⁵ This demand was again put forward in July 1978 in the Contact Group, but once more rejected. However, the EEC spokesman there did indicate the Community's readiness to grant the ACP states a consultative status, in general, regarding the management of the EDF, and effective participation in the EDF's reconsideration of previous unfavourable decisions on requests for project financing. And indeed provisions are included in Lome II to this effect. But what this means in fact is that the ACP states have not been conceded an effective say in the overall management of the EDF, and there is no way in which they can reverse the EEC's position.

There are a number of other issues over which disagreements appeared at the beginning of the renegotiations and which have not been resolved by Lome II.³⁶ One is the decentralization of power. The ACP group has been demanding that wider powers be conferred upon the National Authorizing Officer: powers which will enable them to recruit consultants, place orders for equipment and make on-the-spot decisions on the financing of projects not exceeding 3.5 MUA. This devolution of power, the ACP reasons, should impart needed flexibility into the aid arrangement and narrow the growing lag between commitment and disbursement of EDF assistance. The EEC, however, has strongly opposed decentralization, which it fears, with some justification, might result in a significant increase in the ACP influence over the entire technical assistance programme.

Another issue is the award of EDF contracts to third countries. The ACP have consistently pressed for complete freedom to award contracts to (non-ACP) LDCs. Their reasoning is that this would stimulate intra-Third World cooperation, and facilitate regional development — a professed aim of both the old and the new Conventions. The EEC for its part has blocked this from the start, but has stated its readiness to consider individual case; while reserving the right to veto any purchases of equipment by the ACP from non-associated LDCs.

Finally, the effects of Financial and Technical Cooperation on the population remain an unresolved issue. Given Europe's recent concern with welfare aspects of development in the LDC, the EEC has demanded the inclusion of a reference in the Aid Title to the effect that technical and financial cooperation must benefit the population as a whole in the recipient state. This has, of course, been rejected by the ACP as prejudicial to their sovereignty. Several ACP spokesmen have described the EEC move as a roundabout attempt to link the Community's aid to human rights,³⁷ an attempt which they had originally rejected. Here they may have a point. ACP agreement to the EEC's proposal would give Brussels *carte blanche* to interfere in their internal affairs, without conferring upon the ACP reciprocal rights in relation to the domestic affairs of the Nine. This is especially true with regard to policies affecting the ACP immigrant population there, a matter in which many of them have strong interests. In light of the stalemate on this issue, the EEC has let it be known that it is reserving the right to make a unilateral declaration on this matter and to have it set out in the Preamble to the new Convention. The ACP states on their part attempted to obstruct this, but were unsuccessful.

The issue of the size of the EDF V and EIB IV was resolved at the June Ministerial meeting, although not to the satisfaction of the ACP. From the inception of the negotiations in August 1978, the ACP sought consultation on the criteria to be considered for the purpose of setting the overall volume of aid. This was, however, rejected and the EEC claimed the right to determine unilaterally the size of the aid package. In practice, however, the ACP do have a marginal influence on the EEC's decision.

The ACP request to be consulted by the EEC in the determination of aid is inextricably linked to their concern with the preservation of the value of the resources allocated to financial and technical cooperation as a matter of established right. The maintenance of the volume of resource flow requires, in their judgement, periodic upwards adjustments of the overall aid package, taking into account

certain objective criteria. However, they are far from specific on what these should be. The EEC's response is that objective criteria are bound to be controversial. Jean Francois-Poncet, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, conveyed this in his Opening Address to the Brussels Ministerial Meeting in June 1979 :

No one ever agrees on criteria... According to the criteria used, according to which indices are taken as a reference — those which are put forward internationally in one place or in another — we arrive as we might well expect, at answers which do not agree with each other.³⁸

Moreover, Claude Cheysson, the Commissioner for Development Cooperation, contended in May 1979 that "...objective criteria are irrelevant...for the determination of aid is political...and to an extent must proceed from considerations of the recession in Europe and the region's balance of payments."³⁹ Of course, aid determination cannot be non-political. But need the political be entirely domestic and the sole determinant at that ? The answer is no. Yet the EEC negotiators have allowed internal Community politics to dictate the aid package of the new Convention. They have completely ignored the Nine's global political commitments to increase their overseas development assistance (ODA) to 0.7% of GNP by the end of the decade and to work for a more just world economic order. Consequently, the volume of aid for Lome II was arbitrarily set by the Community at 5,100 MUA in December 1978, while the 10,000 MUA requested by the ACP was rejected. This led to the suspension of the Conference. But later, after considerable ACP pressure, the EEC found it necessary to increase its offer marginally to 5,607 MUA, an amount which the ACP had no choice but to accept. The increase of the aid package in absolute terms, from 3,466 MUA in Lome I, to 5,607 in Lome II, is no doubt sizeable. In percentage terms, it has risen by 47.3% in MUA, or, more dramatically, by 56.2%, when measured in the devalued US dollar.

During the negotiations on aid, Community spokesmen have stressed that the size of the EEC's resource transfer should not only be measured by its direct aid flow, but must also take account of the indirect benefits derived by the ACP from certain provisions in the Convention. These include : food aid of approximately 350 MUA under Lome I, which is likely to rise to 700 MUA under Lome II; abatement of the beef and veal levy to the tune of 100 MUA in 1975—1980, which is expected to rise to 150 MUA in 1980—1985; and, the subsidy over and above the world price implicit in the price the Community pays for sugar — which, it is estimated, will yield 700 MUA by the end of Lome I. This is projected to be in the order of

1000 MUA in Lome II. Further, the Community contends that the ACP stand to gain 500 MUA from EEC co-financed ventures during Lome I. The new Convention, it is submitted, with its special provisions on investment promotion and investment protection will result in a substantial increase in the number of co-financed ventures. This is conservatively estimated to produce 1,000 MUA of investment, the bulk of which, it is hoped will be energy and mining.⁴⁰ Indirect transfers are thus estimated to be 1,650 MUA in 1975-1980, and they will rise to 2,850 in 1980-1985. Combined with direct transfers, resource flow is projected to increase from 5,116 to 8,452 MUA. The fact that the ACP have not questioned these estimates perhaps indicates agreement with the EEC's arithmetic.

Whatever the merits of the above calculation, the fact remains that neither the direct nor indirect capital flows envisaged under the new Convention will maintain the true value of the resources the EEC allocated to financial and technical cooperation under the old Convention. In real terms, there is a dramatic decline in aid allocation under Lome II. Inflation, particularly since the 1974-1975 crisis, running at a rate of at least 10.0% per annum in the EEC and 15.0% in the ACP, has cut deeply into the real value of aid. This is not being helped by the growing time lag between aid commitment and disbursement. In addition, when the price increases on capital goods (14.0% per annum)⁴¹ are considered and, given that 62.0% of all aid is used for equipment acquisition, the real value of the EEC's resource flow slumps further. Given these considerations, equipment and services costing 100 MUA in 1975 will, by ACP estimates, cost 225 MUA in 1980. On this basis, to maintain the real value of aid under Lome II, the EEC would have had to offer 7,799 MUA, which is 2,192 more than the EEC is ready to give, and 3,001 below what the ACP have demanded.⁴²

The ACP quest to have the principle of the preservation of the real value of aid reaffirmed by the Community is understandable. After all, the EEC Council of Ministers had committed itself to this in the 1963 Declaration of Intention and reaffirmed it in 1973.⁴³ In 1973 the EEC assured the AAMS that they would not lose their established rights and privileges, or levels of benefits, as a result of the expansion of the Association. At the same time, the Associates were told that they would be entitled to the same rights and privileges as the AAMS had hitherto enjoyed. And, in fact, the EEC did endeavour to abide by its commitments in the Convention of Lome in 1975. Yet, from the outset of the present negotiations, the Community has rejected the principle of preserving the established rights of the ACP. Consequently, the Nine have not felt impel-

led to consider any objective criteria in the determination of aid. The ACP, in contrast, see acceptance of these as the only possible way of ensuring that the volume of resource flow is maintained in real terms. And indeed this does make some sense. But then how does one proceed in establishing such criteria ?

Any criteria for the determination of aid must take into account three elements :

- (1) the rate of inflation in the EEC and in the ACP;
- (2) the size of the population in the ACP states; and
- (3) the principle of supporting definite growth targets in the ACP region.

The last element can easily become a matter of controversy and need not be insisted upon here. Also, reliable data on the rate of inflation in the ACP states are difficult to obtain and one need not consider it here. Relying on the rate of inflation in the EEC and on the population trends in the ACP states, both of which are accessible, the author attempts, below, an evaluation of the EDV — not the overall aid package — in keeping with the principle of established rights. In this exercise, Yaounde II is used as a point of departure.

Yaounde II comprised 19 states. At the mid-point of this Convention in 1972, they had a combined population of 87.6 million. The 46 states of the Convention of Lome had at mid-point, in December 1977, a population of 300.8 m. This amounted to 243.0% more than Yaounde II. For Lome II, with a potential membership of 58 countries, the population at mid-point, i.e. 1982, is forecast at 367.3 m. There will therefore be a 22.0% increase over 1977.⁴⁴

According to the Community's own statistics the rate of inflation between 1972 and 1977, in percentage terms, has been as follows :

1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
7.3	13.6	13.6	10.6	10.6

Cumulatively, inflation had risen by 69.38% in 1977 compared to 1972.⁴⁵ The annual per capita contribution in real terms should therefore have been :

$$\frac{900 \times 1.6983}{87.6 \times 5} = 3.47 \text{ MUA in 1977}^{46}$$

Using both factors, inflation and population, the size of the EDF IV calculated for 5 years should be:

$$3.47 \text{ MUA} \times 5 \times 300.8 \text{ m} = 5,218 \text{ MUA}$$

and not 3,000 MUA, which was the actual size.⁴⁷ On the assumption that the cumulative rate of inflation for 1980-1985 will be in the same order as that of 1973-1977, i.e., 69.38% and given the anticipated increase in ACP population, one arrives at the following size

for the EDF V :

$$3.47 \times 5 \times 1.6938 \times 367.3 = 10,823 \text{ MUA}$$

However, the amount earmarked for the EDF V is 4,542 MUA — less than half the amount required to maintain a level of resource flow between 1980 and 1985 comparable to that of Yaounde II, i.e., between 1970 and 1975.

Moreover, if one takes into account the new measures envisaged in Lome II, such as the minerals arrangement, the special aid to the LDLLIC, etc., the basic sum would have to be increased from 10,823, by about 10.2% to 12,000 MUA. This appears large in absolute terms, but it represents only 0.13% of the projected GNP of the Ten 1980–1985. Therefore, a commitment on the EEC's part to maintain the level of real resource flow will pose no serious financial problems to the member countries' economies. Moreover, it would help to arrest the widening economic gap between the ACP and the EEC and would probably result in a substantial expansion of trade between the two regions.

Unfortunately, this is unlikely to happen during Lome II, since the volume of overall aid, both EDF V and EIB IV, has already been fixed at 5,607 MUA. Not being in a position to alter this, the ACP are now seeking to coerce the EEC to absorb within the Community's administrative budget the 180 MUA earmarked for the administration of the new Convention, thereby, freeing the sum in question for productive ventures. At the moment, it is difficult to predict how this matter will be resolved.

Tables I to III⁴⁸ summarize the known characteristics of the Lome II aid package, and compare these with Lome I. The most striking feature of Table I is the dramatic increase in the role of the EIB. Its credit facilities have risen from 390 to 885 MUA. But 280 of this is earmarked under Article 18 of the Financial and Technical Cooperation Title as loans for energy and mining projects. Another element in both Tables I and II is the administrative budget or delegation cost. In Lome I it amounted to 87 MUA and, according to the Commission, was absorbed into the EC operational budget. In the new Convention, however, the whole of the administrative cost of the Lome arrangement is to be met from the aid package. The ACP states have opposed this and hope to reverse it at a later date.⁴⁹

STABEX is increased from 382 to 550 MUA. Clearly, it has not kept pace with the overall increase in the aid programme. If one takes into consideration the expansion in the range of products now coming under the stabilization scheme (from 34 to 44) and the rate of inflation, there has been a drastic cut in real terms in the resources being made available under the new Convention for the stabilization

TABLE I
THE LOME AID PACKAGE
(in mua)

	Lome II	Lome I
Aid Project	3,592	2,694
STABEX	550	382
Minerals	280	—
Total EDF	4,542	3,079
Admin. Budget	180	—
EIB	885	390
Grand Total	5,607	3,466

of export earnings. True, 280 MUA have been earmarked for MINEX; but this is not intended to stabilize export revenues.

Also, in Lome II, the ratio of grants to credits is further tilted in favour of the latter. Loans based on interest rates of 1.0 to 10.0% will account for 1,949 MUA between 1980 and 1985 compared to 890 MUA between 1975 and 1980. The switch away from outright grants to interest-bearing credits further reduces the level of real resource flow to the ACP from the EEC. However, the ACP states are hoping that the trend of decreasing concessionary terms begun with Lome I, a trend which David Wall and Michael Dolan have persuasively demonstrated,⁵⁰ can be arrested and perhaps even reversed. They are committed to seeking a transfer of EIB resources, in particular, half of its subsidized loans, 342.5 MUA, to the EDF in the course of Lome II. There is, however, little chance of this move succeeding.

The EEC's blunt refusal to recognize the principle of preservation of the value of resource-flows and its concomitant rejection of objective criteria for aid determination have meant that the Lome II aid package has been to an extent arbitrarily determined. It has certainly been overly influenced by the narrow domestic political considerations of the day in the Community, while previous EEC global political commitments have been conveniently disregarded.

As a result, the EDF V, is in real terms, less than half the value of EDF IV. This drastic reduction in the EEC's real resource flow, coupled with mounting ACP resource needs, will not help to bridge

TABLE II
THE ALLOCATION OF THE LOME AID PACKAGE
(in MUA)

	Lome II				EEC BUDGET TOTAL			Lome I		
	EDF	EIB	EIB	—	EIB	—	—	EDF	EIB	TOTAL
Project Aid	3712	685	—	—	—	—	—	2606	390	3015
Energy and Mining										
Projects	—	—	200	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
STABEX	550	—	—	—	—	—	—	382	—	382
Minerals	280	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Delegations	—	—	—	180	—	—	—	87	—	87
TOTAL	4542	685	200	180	180	—	—	3075	390	3466

TABLE III
BREAKDOWN OF THE LOME AID PACKAGE
(in MUA)

	Lome II					TOTAL
	Grants	Transfers	Special Loans	Risk Capital	EIB Subsidized Loans	EIB Loans Art. 18
Project aid	2928	—	504	280	685	—
Mining & energy	—	—	—	—	—	4397
STABEX	—	550	—	—	200	200
Mineral products	—	—	280	—	—	550
Delegations	180	—	—	—	—	280
						180
TOTAL	3108	550	784	280	685	200
						5607
Lome I						
Project Aid	2100	—	430	95	390	—
Mining & Energy	—	—	—	—	—	3015
STABEX	—	382	—	—	—	—
Mineral products	—	—	—	—	—	382
						—
TOTAL	2100	375	430	95	390	—
						3466

the increasing disparities in economic growth between the two regions, to which the World Bank has recently drawn attention. The Preamble to the new Convention nonetheless states this to be a vital aim. One way out of this predicament, if the EEC is indeed genuinely interested in putting the Association arrangement to work in the interest of Third World development, is for it to accept the principle of maintaining the real value of resource flows, based on objective criteria such as population and inflation, in the determination of its aid to the ACP. Of course, factors internal to the EEC ought and no doubt will continue to provide a backdrop to the determination of aid to the ACP. Conversely, however, one would expect the Community to give due consideration to its global commitments.

There can be no doubt that Lome II is not as generous as its predecessor, and that at best its results are mixed. There are, to an extent, mitigating reasons for this. Above all, the backdrop to the negotiations has not been as favourable as it was to Lome I. Also, despite some increase in the structural power of the ACP, the states have not been able to use their bargaining power as effectively as they had in 1974-1975. In 1978-1979 the EEC too found itself in the midst of a deepening economic crisis and could not have readily made concessions — whereas in 1974-1975, the effects of the crisis of late 1973 were yet to be felt fully. Notwithstanding these factors, Lome II does, to a degree, reinforce the achievements of its predecessor and it contains certain new elements. These include the MINEX scheme and the provisions concerning fishing and shipping. Apart from their limitations, they do provide considerable scope for short-term development in the ACP states. And it is now incumbent upon the latter to devise adequate policies, in the context of their overall developmental strategies, to realize the opportunities inherent in Lome II.

The new features of Lome II clearly point in two directions. First, the Convention evinces a certain ongoing readiness on the part of the EEC to talk with the ACP on economic issues of mutual concern and, to an extent, to act on these. The same, however, cannot be said of Japan, the USA and the USSR in relation to any grouping of states in the periphery, or to the Third World in general. And there can be no doubt that the ACP states, on balance, have been gaining more from Lome than the non-Associates from any other existing arrangements. For instance, under Lome II the Associates will obtain approximately 8.8 billion US dollars — a 56.6% increase over Lome I. Against this, US aid, both bilateral and multilateral, to the ACP is expected to rise by 28.0% to 1.9 billion, and more pertinently, to the LDCs as a whole by only 33.0%, to 19.6 billion, over the period 1980 to 1985. Worse than this, Japan's total aid commit-

ment is projected to expand by only 31.0% and that of the USSR to fall in absolute terms.⁵¹ Secondly, a major element in the breakthrough of Lome I was the emphasis placed on industrial promotion in the ACP states: the focus in Lome II has no doubt shifted to minerals, agriculture, fishing and shipping. This, combined with the EEC's failure to liberalize further in industrial trade suggests a certain similarity between Lome II and Yaounde. But it is premature to conclude from this that Lome II represents a return to a Yaounde-type relationship between the EEC and the ACP.

Some observers, such as Peter Coffey and F.A.M. Alting von Geusau,⁵² who saw Lome I as a path-breaking exercise to be followed by a succession of comparable changes leading ultimately to the establishment of a NIEO will be disappointed at the limited — though not insignificant — changes that Lome II envisages. Coffey's often repeated suggestion that the Community should concede at least joint management of the EDF as evidence of its intention to press ahead with drastic changes in ACP-EEC relations has, so far, gone unheeded. Similarly, Alting von Geusau's proposal for major modification to the Industrial Cooperation Title, aimed at further restructuring of ACP-EEC ties, has been ignored. Moreover, their conclusion that the significance of Lome I lay equally in the possibility of it being emulated by others to have been too hasty. To date, neither the US nor Japan have shown a readiness to adopt the EEC's development cooperation policy, nor have any of the non-associated LDCs pressed for such a policy. Whether observers like Coffey and Alting von Geusau will now rethink their positions, particularly on the viability of bargaining in restructuring ACP-EEC ties such as Siri and Amoa, the limited achievements of Lome II provide further confirmation of the ineffectiveness of bargaining in redressing inequitable relations between the strong and the weak. Furthermore, the failure of Lome II to make more substantial headway could weaken the position of advocates of negotiated incremental changes in North-South relations, and strengthen those espousing confrontation as the sole remaining option in the remodelling of the world economy and in the establishment of a NIEO.

Lome II certainly embodies elements of the specific demands which the ACP, and, more important, the LDCs as a whole, have been voicing since 1974, both at the CIEC and UNCTAD, as being vital in restructuring the world economy and in the establishment of a NIEO. However, there is a potential danger that certain measures which the new Convention envisages, particularly STABEX, with its emphasis on export-income stabilization, could be used by powerful EEC members to subvert the proposed integrated commodity scheme,

which stresses export-price stabilization. This scheme, which is more comprehensive than STABEX, promises a more far-reaching and global solution to the international commodity problem. It is therefore, in the ACP's vital interest to ensure that it is not undermined by any Community action. Similarly, the EEC for its part ought to guard against this possibility. Failure to do so could reinforce the widespread suspicion that it is acting entirely from narrow domestic considerations while disregarding its world commitments, thus alienating the Third World and encouraging confrontation in North-South relations. Moreover, it is ill-advised for the EEC to project the special Lome arrangement, or any facet of it, as the final answer to the Third World's quest for global reform. It should seek to maintain a balance in its development-cooperation policy between the regional and global dimensions, and strive to advance simultaneously the attendant measures that these entail.

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44. Data extracted from *World Population Trends and Policies ; 1977 Monitoring Report*, UN, N.Y., 1979, Vols. 1 and 2 (ST/ESA/SER.A/62/Add.1).
45. Extracted from "Monetary and Financial Situation," *The Economic Situation of the Community*, (CEC, Luxembourg), 1978, No. 2; 1977, No. 2; 1976, No. 2; 1975, No. 2.
46. The size of the EDF III during Yaounde II was 900 MUA.
47. This supports the contention of Michael Dolan (of Carleton University) regarding the entire Lome I aid package — namely, that in real terms it is not as advantageous to the ACP as the aid package of Yaounde II was to the AAMS. (See "The Lome Convention and Europe's Relationships with the Third World : A Critical Analysis," *Journal of European Integration*, 1978, Vol. 1, No. 3, Pp. 379-381). At the same time, it refutes the converse argument advanced by Isebill Gruhn of the University of California, (See "Lome Convention : Inching Towards Interdependence," *International Organization*, 1976, Vol. 30, No. 1, Pp. 257-259),
48. Tables I and III are taken from *Draft Texts on the Successor Arrangement to the Lome Convention*, ACP/556/79 (Secr. Reneg. FIN), Brussels, 6th July, 1979, Pp. 103-105.
49. *Assessment Report of the ACP/EEC Ministerial Conference Held on 24, 25 and 26 May 1979 in Brussels*, *op. cit.*, Pp. 27-28.
50. D. Wall, *The European Community's Lome Convention : STABEX and the Third World's Aspirations*, Guest Paper No. 4, Trade Policy Research Centre, London, 1976, p. 13; M. Dolan, *loc. cit.*, Pp. 379-381.
51. Cited from *Summary Report of the Outcome of the Presidential Contact Group*, 5th June 1979, *op. cit.*, p. 14. The bilateral and multilateral aid of the Ten is expected to rise by 40.0% to 42.7 billion U.S. dollars.
52. See F.A.M. Alting Von Geusau, (ed.), *The Lome Convention and a New International Economic Order*, Leyden, 1977.

Notes and Comments

Botswana : After Khama what?

The death of Sir Seretse Khama in July this year deprives Africa of one of its most successful and enlightened leaders. Rarely has this continent experienced such pragmatic, popular, sagacious and uninterrupted leadership which was provided by Sir Seretse for nearly 14 years since the British protectorate of Bechuanaland became independent Botswana on September 30, 1966. Since independence, he fought tenaciously to retain his political leadership — and on October 20, 1979 he took oath as the President for the fourth time — but he did so only through the ballot box. For him power did not flow from the barrel of the gun, but from the conviction in the democratic philosophy.

Botswana, which is situated in the heart of the sub-continent of Southern Africa, is surrounded by Namibia on the west, the latter's Caprivi strip on the north, by Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) on the north-east and South Africa on the South and South-east, did not have an army until three years ago, an incredible feat, for a small country sandwiched in a volatile region of racial strife and warfare. Time and again Sir Seretse had warned his countrymen of the dangers that *coups d'etat* brought to other African countries. Botswana belongs to a minority of African states which, since independence, has not changed its democratic form of government.

Under the able stewardship of Sir Seretse, Botswana progressed economically also. Though firm data are sparse, it can be safely argued that real G.D.P. has grown at 12-15 per cent annually. This is remarkable in the sense that in 1965, the year preceding independence, a severe drought was responsible for wiping off an estimated 400,000 cattle out of national herd of 1.3 million head. But the latter half of the 1970's have not been economically easy for Botswana and the target of an 8-9 per cent growth rate as set in the Development Plan for 1976—1981 has not been realized. The world-wide recession and inflation, the rise in oil prices and foot and mouth diseases are mainly responsible for this. After the Lome Convention in 1975, Botswana's exports get a privileged access to EEC markets, without telling upon its position in the Southern African Custom Union.

In this context the question that naturally crops up is, as the new President takes over will Botswana change its course? Botswana's new President, Quett Masire seems to have the appropriate qualities

to be at the helm of affairs of the landlocked state. He has a reputable image and the requisite charisma to make him the national leader. He is a successful farmer as well, which will stand him in good stead particularly when the government has undertaken programmes like the Tribal Land Grazing policy, the Arable Land Development Programme and the Accelerated Rural Development. Being an experienced former teacher, President Masire will also certainly focus his attention on the implementation of the new educational policies of the country, which gives particular emphasis on the free primary education. Because of his political acumen and brilliance, the new President is widely known as the 'brains behind the Government and Party.'

It is common knowledge that South Africa has been a constant factor in all policy decisions of Botswana government and in all probability will continue to be so in the eighties of this century. For instance, 79 per cent of the country's total imports has to come through the South African Republic. It is thus but natural that South Africa will have an impact in the decision-making process of Botswana. Just before his death Sir Seretse presided over (in April 1980) the group of countries viz. Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe which met in Lusaka for the economic summit to devise ways and means of reducing their economic dependence upon South Africa.

The independence of Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) has brought a sense of relief to Botswana as it has three-fold implications :

- (a) lessening of refugee problems,
- (b) opening up of alternative trade routes for Botswana, and
- (c) an alternate friendly trading partner

Sir Seretse had always endeavoured to lay the foundation for the development of a new economic order in Southern Africa and that should be one of the predominant aims of Botswana during the eighties.

With the present economic base and the conservative nature of the government, the primary emphasis at present will be on the rural development boosted by the wealth from the mineral sector. Though Botswana, under the new President, is having a friendly neighbour in Zimbabwe, yet the problems concomitant of a harassed South Africa as another neighbour should neither be gainsaid nor lost sight of.

Anup Ranjan Basu

India-Africa Relations

Anup Ranjan Basu

Indian Consultants for Africa

A five-member delegation of Indian consultancy organizations visited a number of African countries in April-May 1980. The delegation was sponsored by the Federation of Indian Export Organisation (FIEO) in collaboration with International Trade Centre (ITC) in Geneva and visited Tanzania, Zambia and Kenya.

The countries visited were in the process of development in the fields of infrastructure industry and agriculture. Since India was eager to share these technologies with other countries, a co-operation package could be built which would be mutually advantageous to both sides.

Dr. Kaunda's visit to India

On a two-day visit to India in the middle of April, Dr. Kenneth Kaunda, President of Zambia, paid glowing tributes to the Indian government and people for their "unswerving support in the struggle of the oppressed people in Southern Africa." He characterized the victory of the people of Zimbabwe as a victory for India as well.

On April 15, Dr. Kaunda called on President Sanjeeva Reddy. At official talks later that day, Dr. Kaunda and Smt. Gandhi agreed on the need to defuse tension in South Asia. They expressed the hope that no power would take any action which would be contradictory to the process of reducing tension in the area. Smt. Gandhi also explained to him India's point of view regarding the situation in South Asia.

Indo-Zambian co-operation received further impetus when Dr. Kaunda paid another state visit to India in the middle of September, 1980. In course of his visit four protocols relating to industry, agriculture and rural development, small-scale sector, trade and joint ventures were signed. According to the protocol on industrial cooperation, the Metallurgical and Engineering Consultants (India) Ltd (MECON) would examine the possibilities for the establishment of a steel rolling mill in Zambia. The possibilities of setting up a joint venture pulp and paper mill in Zambia are envisaged in the protocol with buy-back arrangements for the purchase of pulp and paper by India. The National Industrial Development Corporation (NIDC) would provide assistance in strengthening general and functional consultancy to

Zambia. India would also assist Zambia in updating and revising some feasibility reports that have already been prepared for various Zambian projects.

Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. (BHEL) would assist Zambia in the conduct of feasibility studies for the construction of hydro-power generation projects and in the execution of turnkey projects. BHEL will also assist in the establishment of industries for the manufacture of electrical equipments, such as transformers, circuit breakers and motors.

Zambia would consider to co-operate with Hindustan Machine Tools (HMT) in the turnkey establishment in the polytechnics and industrial training institutions. Other areas identified for co-operation are the setting up of common facilities centre and training of Zambian personnel, establishment of factories for the manufacture of machine tools, besides providing technology for setting up of light engineering industries and metal cutting.

The two countries also agreed to take steps to expand the bilateral volume of trade. The Zambian side noted the request from India to increase the present level of direct supplies of copper to a minimum level of 24,000 tonnes per year. Zambia might also consider possibilities of importing from Indian railway, coaches, wagons and other railway equipment.

Under the protocol on small-scale industries, India would assist Zambia in the establishment of a comprehensive structure for the development of small scale industries in Zambia. An expert team will visit Zambia before the end of the year to prepare a detailed plan of action. It will also prepare a blueprint for the establishment of training institute for small-scale industries.

According to the protocol on agriculture and rural development, India has agreed to provide training facilities for Zambian personnel in various disciplines of agriculture, especially in the area of agricultural extension at field level. Both sides would also co-operate in establishing joint ventures in Zambia for production and processing of tea and coffee.

Dr. Kaunda also visited Haryana Agricultural University at Hissar and Jamshedpur Steel Plant. Addressing a news conference at the conclusion of his talks with Smt. Indira Gandhi, Dr. Kaunda described his visit as "tremendously successful." He said it has been an eye-opener to great success India has achieved in various fields, particularly in science and technology. He said that Zambia attached great importance to these achievements because it could now turn to India for assistance to Zambian plans.

Smt. Gandhi's visit to Zimbabwe

Smt. Indira Gandhi, the Prime Minister of India, was specially invited to attend the Zimbabwe Independence Day celebration in April this year. During her three-day stay, she also met other African leaders. India has also established diplomatic relations with Zimbabwe. The Indian Prime Minister has assured all help to Zimbabwe but said that it was for the new leaders of Zimbabwe to identify in what precise way India could help them.

Indian Trade Team for East Africa

An eight member trade mission of the Indian Engineering Industry went on 8 June 1980 for a three-week visit of four African countries, viz. Kenya, Zambia, Ethiopia and Zimbabwe. The specialized team, whose visit had been sponsored by the Association of Indian Engineering Industry (AIEI) was unique, as it was for the first time an Indian trade mission went to Zimbabwe after its independence to assess possible areas for bilateral trade and industrial co-operation.

African countries are opening up for industrialization and as such massive investments are expected for the development of infrastructure. India's export of engineering goods to Africa has increased from Rs. 48.6 crores in 1974-75 to Rs. 150 crores in 1978-79. Of this, East Africa accounted for Rs. 65 crores in 1978-79. The major role for the trade team was to identify further areas of industrial co-operation by way of joint ventures, technical co-operation and setting up of industries in those countries.

Kenya is one of the largest markets amongst African countries in terms of volume of trade. India's exports to Kenya which now consist of more than 50 per cent of engineering goods, crossed Rs. 21 crores in 1978-79. Kenya has been the venue of the largest single Indian joint venture projects abroad in recent years. Projects in operation include paper and pulp mill, woollen and textile mills, synthetic yarn plants, automobile ancillary manufacturing units etc.

Zambian economy heavily depends upon imports, and India has good scope for expanding her exports specially of engineering products like farm implements, wiring equipments and passenger and commercial vehicles. Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI) has recently extended a credit of Rs. 100 million to cover exports of capital goods and machinery to this country. A government-to-government credit has also been extended to finance projects in Zambia.

Indian Ocean as Zone of Peace

India and Seychelles have strongly pleaded for conversion of the Indian Ocean into a Zone of Peace. This has been highlighted in the India-Seychelles joint press statement issued at the end of the Seychelles President, France Albert Rene's visit to India (May 2 — May 11, 1980). The statement reiterated the opposition of both the countries to all forms of "intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign States." The two countries stressed the importance of "creating conditions in which all states in the region could fully determine their own destinies without fear of external threat or interference."

Both the countries also expressed deep concern for the explosive situation in South Africa "resulting from the heinous policy of apartheid and denial of basic human rights to a majority of South African people."

Voicing India's concern over the proposed arrival of American warships in the Indian Ocean region of East Africa, Shri P. V. Narasimha Rao said in Rajya Sabha (August 1, 1980) that India favoured the return of Diego Garcia to Mauritius. The government of India was aware that the US Administration planned to "pre-position" seven ships carrying in military equipment at Diego Garcia. These were equipped with nuclear warheads as well. The Government of India was of the opinion that the expansion of the military base at Diego Garcia was inimical to the peace and stability in the region as a whole as it raised a spectre of great power confrontation in the region.

Fertilizer Projects in Senegal

Shri Veerendra Patil, Minister of Petroleum and Chemicals, has said that a consortium of Indian fertilizer companies has agreed to make an equity investment upto \$ 20 million in a phosphatic fertiliser projects in Senegal with a stipulation that 66,000 tonnes of phosphatic acid will be supplied annually by Senegal to Indian companies.

India calls UN sanctions against Pretoria

In a message to the UN Council for Namibia on the occasion of Namibia Day, Shri P. V. Narasimha Rao, Minister of External Affairs, observed that mandatory sanctions as provided for in the UN Charter should be imposed against South Africa, without further delay to force it to comply with the UN resolution on Namibia. He further stated that India was greatly concerned that in defiance of unanimous world opinion South Africa has so far refused to comply

with the UN resolution on Namibia. The Government of India was of the view that the negotiations undertaken by the Western countries were being used by the South African government to perpetrate its occupation by Namibia.

India offers credit to Sudan

India has agreed to a line of credit of Rs. 120 million to Sudan. The credit will be given by the Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI) to the Bank of Sudan for purchase of capital goods and engineering products. The agreement was reached at the Indo-Sudanese trade talk which concluded in New Delhi on August 30, 1980. On behalf of the Government of India, the agreed minutes of the talk was signed by Shri Pranab Mukherjee, the Minister of Commerce and Steel and Mines while Mr. Farouq Maqhboul, the Commerce Minister represented the Government of Sudan.

Several engineering and capital goods, handtools, spare parts, buses, bicycles, fans, building material, diesel engines, lathes, motor pumps, agricultural equipments including tractors, flour milling machinery and electric generators—were identified for which the line of credit was offered to Sudan.

Both the countries agreed to maximize bilateral trade. They also agreed on the scope for cooperation in the industrial joint ventures and projects, agricultural farms, industrial estates, river transport, telecommunications, establishment of better storage facilities and in the petroleum and petro-chemicals sectors.

Commercial relations between India and Sudan were governed by the trade agreement of 1965, which was based on a "most favoured nation" treatment. It provided specially for the two-way trade in defined commodities within ceiling with bilateral payment in pound sterling. In December 1976, the pattern of trade was made fully open, payable in free foreign currency.

India's exports to Sudan during 1976-77, 1977-78 and 1978-79 were worth Rs. 52.48 crores, Rs. 35.57 crores and Rs. 44.49 crores respectively. India's imports to Sudan during the same years were worth Rs. 10.87 crores, Rs. 52.56 crores and Rs. 17.35 crores respectively. During the first four months of 1979-80, India's exports to Sudan were worth Rs. 8.86 crores and imports were worth Rs. 29 lakhs.

Earlier India used to import from Sudan cotton and groundnut oil. However, with the improvement of indigenous production of cotton, the volume of India's imports from Sudan has reduced considerably.

Main items of export from India to Sudan are tea, spices,

chemicals, textiles, yarn fabrics and transport equipments. The export of tea from India is also substantial. In 1977-78, India had exported tea worth of Rs. 24.88 crores though in 1978-79, it came down to Rs. 17.80 crores. But in April 1980 the entire tea contract of Sudan worth \$ 25.5 million was awarded to India.

Ethiopia's Message to Prime Minister

Ethiopia's President Mengistu Haile Mariam has sent a special message to Prime Minister giving details of heightening tension in the Horn of Africa with particular reference to repeated Somalian aggressions against Ethiopia and the establishment of American bases in Somalia—in Berbera and Kisimayo.

The message was delivered by a three-member delegation from the Socialist Ethiopia. This was the first high-level delegation from Socialist Ethiopia to visit India. Smt. Indira Gandhi shared Ethiopia's concern over the developments in the region and expressed India's considered view on the danger of military bases in foreign countries. She also underlined India's firm belief in the OAU Charter.

Book Reviews

Political Leadership in Sierra Leone : John R. Cartwright. Croom Helm. London, 1978; Pp. 308; £ 12.95.

This is a study of the effect that different types of political leadership can have upon the shaping of a state. It focusses upon two successive Prime Ministers of the small West African State of Sierra Leone, Dr. Milton Margai and his brother Albert Margai.

The author considers the interactions of various constraints and of the implications of various courses of action, which have relevance to the study of political leadership in any state.

The author has examined both physical and human features that have exercised constraints on political leadership in Sierra Leone, whose experience at the start of decolonization was not different from that of other African States, such as Guinea, Liberia, Senegal and the Gold Coast.

In considering the two Margai

brothers as political leaders of Sierra Leone, the author offers a brief sketch of their careers, some comments on their general attitudes towards problems and the style of action. He has summarized the similarities and differences of the two as political leaders. The author is of the view that the personalities of the two Prime Ministers of Sierra Leone had a considerable effect on their respective performances. The appearance was heightened by the contrast in personal styles of the two men. Milton was abstemious in his living style, showing "little interest in displays of either power or affluence". On the other hand Albert showed "a considerable appetite for all the earthly pleasures, and enjoyed the exercise of power and the display of his considerable wealth. According to the author, though the two brothers differed sharply in policies,

styles, bases of legitimacy and in their ideological bearings, these differences were overshadowed by one common feature *viz.* both were Mendes, who had "a head start in filling modern roles, even though they comprised 30 per cent of the total population".

The author has dealt with a number of political events in Sierra Leone between 1951-67. But his main focus is upon events emanating from the major social upheavals of 1954 and 1955 to 1967. In an overview of Sierra Leone politics, he shows clearly the importance of conflict between ethnic or cultural groups as a basis for political action. The author has discussed specific events such as the diamond rush and the growth of cash-crop farming as factors bearing on political relationships and has touched briefly on patterns of formal education.

He has also considered the most proximate factors responsible for the growth of political organizations opposed to the hegemony of the Sierra Leone Peoples Party, *viz.* 'class' and regional antagonisms.

What was the impact of the conflict on the 'modernization' dimension on the two Margais as leaders? The most important of all the constraints upon the two Margais, in view of the author, was the pressure for 'development'. The understanding of 'development' by leaders of the Third World encompasses the

notion of economic growth, an increase in the various indicators of economic well being such as per capita income or energy consumption, and value added income through processing raw materials.

At the time of independence Sierra Leone was not having high material standard of living for many of its people. It contained three productive sectors: an agricultural sector; an enclave mining sector operated by large foreign corporations; and an indigenous mining sector. The author has examined the role of these three sectors in the economic development of Sierra Leone and their impact on political leadership.

The way in which each of the three economic sectors developed created its own set of vested interests, who resisted any attempt by a political leader to alter the *status quo*. The creation of a dependent relationship between politicians and the foreign companies, in view of the author, was perhaps the most serious effect of the latter's entrenchment in the economy of Sierra Leone. For example, Dr. Margai's 'open door' policy allowed a tremendous range of inducements to plunge Sierra Leone deeply into "cash economy", which was essentially a continuation of the colonial pattern of *laissez faire* economy. The author sketches the features of Sierra Leone's economy and makes an exhaustive analysis of the 'modernization' and the neo-Marxist para-

digm.

In sum, he has examined in details the attitudes of two political leaders and their behaviour in dealing with the complex nature of problems facing Sierra Leone. He has argued that the limits to what a leader can do are set by the integration of his own attributes with the patterns of relationships established between him and other actors in the polity. Specifically, the leader operates within the internalized constraints imposed by his 'world view' (radical ideology, conservative ideology or non-ideological), the specific policies he finds acceptable (conservative or innovative) and the style in which he seeks to implement his policies (brokerage or creative). In his relations with others, a leader is constrained by his basis of legiti-

macy and the nature of his links to the popular.

The problems facing African leaders are so enormous that they cannot be sure that any course they may follow, will lead to a desirable goal for their country. A study like this showing the constraints under which leaders must operate, can help dispel both the unrealistic expectations that surround most leaders at independence, and the harsh judgements that are later made about their competence and their motivations.

The book is compact and well written. It shows much careful research and extensive knowledge of Sierra Leone's politics. It provides numerous useful insights into the problems faced by political leadership of this small West African State.

B.N. MEHRISH

Industrial Relations In Africa: Edited by Ukandi G. Damachi, H. Dieter Seibel and Lester Trachtman; International Institute for Labour Studies, 1979; The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1979.

The sixties and the seventies of the century have witnessed the emergence of all nations in Africa from the colonial status into sovereign nation states excepting the Union of South Africa. This has brought in its wake the urgent need of transforming the colonial economies of the nations into modern economies raising among others, the issues of industrial

relations, the role of the trade unions and their status in the communities. The present study published by International Institute for Labour Studies is useful in appreciating the basic elements that have shaped the evolution of these relations in different communities — the features that are common to all of them and those that present divergent pictures. A

limited field is chosen comprising only French and English speaking Africa. This helps in better understanding of the influences that are relevant in the developments in this field such as labour and income conditions, colonial policies responsible for the initial impetus to trade union movements, legal frameworks in which they had to operate, conflicts among the classes, and the policies adopted by the national governments after independence. They together explain both the common features of the industrial relations as well as the divergent paths that have been taken in the two groups of countries under study.

The study throws an interesting light on the political elements present in labour movements almost from the very start. This is explained by the fact that the employers involved were the foreigners and the colonial administration was the chief employer. It was therefore natural that the colonial governments identified labour unrest with rebellion regarding the demand for higher wages or better working conditions as subversive. "The governments taught Africans a powerful lesson by summoning troops, shooting strikers and sacking, imprisoning or exiling strike leaders."⁽³⁾ This had an unintended effect; the political leaders saw in strikes not only an economic but also a political weapon. The trade union movement thus

provided valuable training ground for political leaders that took over the functions of the government after independence.

One consequence of this close association between the labour movement and the struggle for independence was attempts on the part of political parties to control industrial relations through the trade unions developed under their sponsorship. Thus for instance George R. Martens in his contribution to the volume writes: "A new method of industrial relations is slowly evolving in French-speaking Africa. It is increasingly dominated by political priorities..."⁽¹⁷⁾ and discouraged the legitimate expression of claims by the various interest groups⁽⁶⁵⁾. As noted by Jon Kraus, in Ghana too a political exchange relationship has developed between the ruling National Redemption Council and the unions "providing material and symbolic support for one another"⁽¹⁴⁷⁾. This 'has tended to put these leaders in the middle of contrasting pressures from the union members and the Government. In certain unions this has at times led members to feel profoundly alienated from their leaders...' ⁽¹⁵⁶⁾. In Nigeria on the other hand according to Victor P. Diejomaoh '...the policies of the present Nigerian government are ...in the main directed towards strengthening the Nigerian trade union movement through internal reorganisation, and the elimina-

tion of external divisive factors and the education of the leadership of the trade union through the establishment of a government — financed Trade Union Institute'. (192). Thus the situation in different countries differ but general trends seems to be in the direction of continuing close relationship between the political and labour leadership at times helping, at times thwarting the legitimate functions of the labour movement.

The differing colonial policies of France and Britain had their repercussions on the growth of the trade union movements in the two groups of nations. Due to the French colonial policy of assimilation there were similarities in labour legislation between the trade union structure in France and those in the Overseas Territories. Again the French trade union movement exerted considerable influence on their African counterparts. After independence, however, political policies have a greater say in determining both the trade union structure and trade union policies in Francophone Africa. George R. Martens has noted that the trade unions are no longer able to process their members' grievances and disputes are settled by means of dialogue and compromise within national political party structure. The relations between the trade unions and the political parties are often strained and there is a trend towards drafting national, inter

professional accord which apply to all workers. In the Anglophone Africa on the other hand the British policy was influenced by current circumstances and events; the demand of the settlers for the introduction of compulsory labour in agriculture and public service, the increased demand for raw materials and men during the First World War, the need for increased productivity were some of the factors that shaped their policies. They thwarted for quite some time emergence of trade unionism.

After independence all this changed and the difference between the two group of countries narrowed down. Most of the countries in Africa witnessed a rapid increase in the number and membership of the trade unions. Their politicalization continued under the compulsions of developmental pressures. Kenya for instance after an initial period of trade union rivalries seems to have settled down to relative industrial peace. Eleazar Lwaji notes in this connection: "This apparent picture of relative industrial peace can be said to have been brought about by two factors: namely, the more effective use of the private negotiating machinery and a more conscious attempt to settle disputes through direct arrangements". (211) In Tanzania after an initial period of consolidation and reorganization the National Union of Tanganyika Employees (NUTA) has

become in the words of Paschal B. Mihyo, 'one of the state institutions for national development' (250). After 1977 a new structure of the trade union movement has emerged. The new Union 'was formed as a mass organisation of the new political party CCM...' (252) Its objectives include: 'To interpret the policy of the party to the workers and ensure that party directives are complied with; to protect and defend the policy of the party against those opposed to 'Ujamaa'...' (252) Thus union has become an integral part of the ruling party and an institution for the stimulation of economic development. These few illustrations suffice to give an indication of the present position of the trade union movement both in Anglophone and Francophone Africa. The studies included in this voluminous work give

details of the industrial relations and trade union movements in a number of countries. The case studies follow a uniform format thus making it easy to compare the conditions in different sectors of the field of industrial relations in various countries.

The continent of Africa is today poised for a big leap forward. Its minerals, markets and manpower have attracted attention of the big powers and mighty multinationals. Through their impact the economy and social relationships might change considerably. To understand the coming events fully it will be necessary to appreciate the situations as they exist today in various fields. One such important field is that of industrial relations. The volume under review could be a good introduction to the study of this field.

DR. SATYAVATI S JHAVERI

Aid and Development in Southern Africa : British Aid to Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland : David Jones; Croom Helm, London, in association with the Overseas Development Institute; Pp. 313; £ 11.95 net in U.K. only.

Aid undoubtedly constitutes a vital component of the development package in the developing countries. One of the disturbing elements in the current deadlock in the North-South dialogue relates to the inadequacy of aid as provided, to this day, by developed countries (DCs) to less developed countries (LDCs). The

former colonial territories, on attaining independence, were naturally anxious to raise the tempo of development to meet with the rising expectations of their peoples; and whether or not the capital accumulation theorem was applicable to their situation the vicious circle of their limited capability in raising sufficiency of

development resources internally was real. The aid from outside was, therefore, found to be an unavoidable golden means to break the chain of low income — low savings — low investment — low production, resulting in low income again. Its role was further useful in defusing tensions emanating from the colonial legacy by managing higher investment to push up production cycle to help reverse the vicious circular flow of poverty. So far so good. But aid does not always fulfil a developmental function, nor is always conceived as such by either a donor or a recipient country for that matter. It is invariably enmeshed with political consideration of one or the other kind.

In this book David Jones is not concerned with the global view of aid, but a very particular one, the relationship of one aid donor, Britain, with three aid recipients — small, rather very small southern African countries — Botswana with a population of 6,70,000 (1973) less than that of Pune, Lesotho with 11,50,000 and Swaziland around 4,70,000. The author examines in some detail the objectives of both sides in giving and taking aid. He goes into the question of the adequacy of such objectives from a purely 'developmental' point of view, and concludes that "judged from the liberal redistributionist viewpoint British aid to these countries in this period emerges as virtuous though sometimes frustratingly

neutral". He believes that "the general effect of British aid was to permit the recipients to do more of what they would have done anyway".

The three territories occupy a unique geo-political position in Africa in the sense that at the time of their independence they formed a buffer between White-South Africa and the Black ruled Africa. But unfortunately they were badly landlocked. While Botswana and Lesotho had their external transport lanes through South Africa only Swaziland could find an outlet to the outside world through Mozambique. But, even that territory was better equipped in her trade and transport linkages with South Africa. Thus, apart from having extensive boundaries with South Africa, the economies of the three States were interlocked with that of the 'Republic' which held a commanding position. There were no trade barriers between them and they had always shared the same currency. Their lurking fear of South Africa was, therefore, not an imaginary one. The white 'Republic' in the past had always sought ways and means to incorporate them politically to obtain their valuable resources. They had in the circumstances little option but to cling to Britain as a mother country not to fail them against the powerful racist regime which still believed that BLS (Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) had to be put under

political, military and economic pressure to prevent the use of their territories as political and military bases for attacks on the Republic. In extending technical and other assistance to BLS or reflecting on the propositions like economic co-operation in the region South Africa has always thought of turning them into dependent vassal states. This was the motivation behind the granting of generous terms to BLS under the revised 1969 customs union agreement between them to replace their dependence on the U.K., with a much more dangerous dependence on the Republic.

The three countries are aware of the South African designs. But what was the alternative? Their predicament was neatly summed up by the Lesotho High Commissioner to Britain who said: "Having survived for 150 years, we have no intention to commit national suicide through brava-do." Such have been the compelling reasons for Britain to treat BLS as a special category in the matter of grant of aid. The aid in their case had also to play the role of countering the South African pressures. The quantum of aid was also determined by such considerations. They got from Britain over £ 3 per head in 1972-73 in aid as against £ 0.10 per head granted to India, because from Britain's angle, aid in their case also served a purpose of 'peaceful co-existence' by avoid-

ing the appearance of driving these states into a position of political subservience to the Republic.

The purposes for which BLS qualified for British aid were, therefore, not merely altruistic, promoting development and alleviating poverty aimed at promoting Britain's political and commercial interests. Although developmental functions of aid have been important, but the belief that aid should lay the foundation for 'self-sustaining' growth did not hold much water in the case of Britain's aid to BLS. The aid justification based on capital scarcity or 'two-gap' model were largely irrelevant in this situation unless we included in the term capital, the provisions for education, health, government services and high-level skills which are conventionally classified under consumption.

The author underlines in short the following reasons for special consideration of British aid to BLS. Financial viability, which was initially very important for smaller countries like BLS; diseconomies of scale in the sense that compared with larger states they had to incur larger administration expenses relative to the size of their population, past neglect, their enforced relationship with South Africa and the weight of precedent.

David Jones thus discusses the problems of aid policies by an in-depth economic and political

analysis of the situation prevailing in BLS who have to live and survive under the shadow of ultra-racial politics of South Africa. His part one : General Introduction makes a lively study of theoretical considerations like the resources for aid, and what it is meant to do in the given situation and circumstances of BLS. He then proceeds with a considerable detail of the country-study to find out the achievements of British aid there.

While Jones discusses the issues concerning aid during the formative years of BLS upto 1974, it will be interesting to stretch the analysis of the situation as it has subsequently developed particularly in the wake of independence of Zimbabwe which is bound to substantially influence the aid policies of Britain and other aid givers to the African countries in this region. Besides, Botswana has joined hands to become one of the front-line states in aiding and abetting the liberation struggle of the blacks against the white minority rule in Africa; and the blatant racist politics of South Africa. Again both Botswana and Swaziland have attained viable economies

and Botswana in particular has attracted larger aid packets from other sources as well ever since 1968-69. In the light of such development, Britain may well be advised to review its aid policies vis-a-vis BLS. In Botswana, as it is, Britain no more makes unique contribution to developmental effort except for technical assistance. She may find it worthwhile, to be more judicious in allocating aid to BLS by stressing the need for improving the pattern of development by aiding such sectors which could help in the internal integration of the economies by appropriately linking agricultural, mining and industrial sectors internally. To achieve this, rural sector surely deserves better attention from the aid-givers, as also in the policy decisions of the recipient countries.

David Jones' is a policy-oriented study based on substantial research. It would be found very useful not only by the academics at the universities and research institutions, but also by the aid-giving and administering national and international agencies world over.

R.R. RAMCHANDANI

Modern African Poetry and the African Predicament : R. N. Egedu; The Macmillan Press Ltd., London 1978; Pp. 154; 3.00

Decolonization has proved an historical process, almost inevitable in-so-far as it entails a natural confrontation between

two opposing forces. From the small spark to the prairie fire, it carries in its wake a 'new' humanity in search of freedom. In Africa as in other colonized areas, violence has been the keynote of all struggles — the violence of the colonizers opposed by the revolutionary violence of the 'natives'. The successful armed struggles for national liberation of the Portuguese and French-African colonies, the armed struggles in southern Africa and Zimbabwe, epitomize various stages in Africa's process of decolonization along with structural changes.

It may be too obvious to state that this process has profoundly affected the African literary life-stream. And in fact, protest against colonialism has been the really moving and developing theme of modern African poetry. Imperialism, capitalistic exploitation and militarism, the three pillars on which white rule thrived have been accompanied by spiritual and psychological imperialism and exploitation.

This book is one of few critical though sympathetic studies of political poetry or the political aspects of African poetry from practically every region in that sub-continent, from which the author has made a prudent and representative selection. Not resting content with a politico-historical background of the pieces chosen, he has gone into the intricacies and technicalities of poetic composition and verse-play in the

largely *vers libre* style of every renowned modern African poet — Senghor, U Tam'si, Okigbo, Lanrie Peters, David and Birago Diop and others.

For most African poets that which was African was rich and meaningful and that which was non-African i.e. white, was disruptive and destructive—

ON THIS dirty patch
a tree once stood
shedding incense on the infant
corn :
its boughs stretched across a
heaven
brightened by the last fires of
a tribe.
They sent surveyors and builders
who cut that tree
planting in its place
A huge senseless cathedral of
doom.

This *doom* was cultural, economic, political and psychological. Much of African poetry is anti-Christianity or anti-the spread of an alien religion. As Fanon observed — "The Church in the colonies is the white people's Church, the foreigner's Church. She does not call the native to God's ways but to the ways of the white man, of the master, of the oppressor. And as we know, in this matter many are called but few chosen." (1963)

Before World War II, however, African nationalism based on the African heritage as opposed to the "European heritage" did not take concrete shape. Till

then, the privileged few who could find a strategy of self-defence in the ideas of European nationalism were largely severed from their own countrymen. They wished to defend their people and themselves but at the same time their own positions of relative privilege rested on accepting the superiority of the civilization represented by their conqueror. But from early days, especially in West Africa, there was a vivid accent on the values and virtues of Africa's own culture. Negritude — the rejection of Western civilization, a rejection that was positive in its assertion of the values of self-acceptance and revolt, upheld Negro-ness, view of death and ancestors, view of nature, in short, the African cultural consciousness against the Francophone efforts to organically absorb the African people.

South Africa, the only country on this earth where the criterion of ethnic origin alone of the overwhelming majority of the population, condemns them to enjoy a trivial portion of the nation's riches, with its intense dehumanizing quality provides the backdrop for South African poetry—

.....these sores.....
 unhealed and unattended
 that bleed afresh each day
 under the horny ministrants
 of law
 must, under impulse of augmented streams
 explode in gouts and swish

these papered clerks and all
 into a messy bloodied waste .
 Radical opposition in South Africa speaks in one voice on the subject of independence — only through extra-legal mass action including armed struggle, can the white monolith be displaced and a just society established. Not only have income disparities between Whites and Blacks increased of late, even the paltry liberties enjoyed by the majority race have been subtly eroded through various laws. (Slovo 1976). The idea of "redistributing power" at the top is in fact, a judicious attempt to cling more tenaciously to it specially when a black revolutionary breakthrough hangs like an impending thunderstorm on the horizon and is no more an impossibility. South African people's optimism of a struggle yet to result in victory shines forth with the emphasis on 'purposeful action'—

The sons and daughters of
 our beginnings
 Boldly move to post-white
 fearlessness
 Their sharpnesses at the murderer's throat
 Carving your song on the face
 of the earth
 In the stillness of the night
 Informed by the rhythm of
 your spirit
 We hear the song of warriors
 And rejoice to find fire in our
 hands.

Post-colonial Africa (here the author deals only with Nigeria,

Ghana and Uganda) characterized by internecine conflicts and party rivalry, with the political pace set by tribal feuds, rule of the military coups d'etat and counter-coups d'etat, corruption — in toto — the ills and rigours accompanying newly-freed states where the struggle for independence failed to result in a complete break-up of the colonial bourgeois superstructures : where the Super Powers attempt to wedge in using news — poetry reflects all these. The poor remain poor or become poorer because the politicians' greed for money is as fervent as that for

power. In perhaps the most telling poem in this volume, the turmoil of 'new' Africa projects itself—

Now no more the pale-faced
strangers

With unhallowed feet

The heritage of our fathers .
profane;

Now no missioned benevolent
despots

Bulldoze an unwilling race;

No more now the foreign
hawks

On alien chickens prey —

But we on us.

ELA DUTT LUTTHUI

AFRICA QUARTERLY

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The Organisation of African Unity and African Identity

A. BOLAJI AKINYEMI

AS critical issues of international dimensions threaten to envelop the African Continent, self-appointed spokesmen push themselves forward, each claiming that its view is the African view. For ideological reasons, non-African nations also push forward Africans who support their views as African spokesmen. The crucial question then is: Does Africa have a point of view?

The objectives of the Organisation are quite clearly spelt out in Article II:

- (a) To promote the unity and solidarity of the African States;
- (b) To coordinate and intensify the ircooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa;
- (c) To defend their soveriegnty, their territorial integrity and independence;
- (d) To eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa and
- (e) To promote international cooperation having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration of Human Rights.

To these objectives should be added the Principles of Article II of the Charter:

- (1) The sovereign equality of all Member of States;
- (2) Non-interference in the internal affairs of States;
- (3) Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent existence;
- (4) Peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration;
- (5) Unreserved condemnation, in all its forms, of political

assassination as well as of subversive activities on the part of neighbouring States or other State;

- (6) Absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories which are still dependent;
- (7) Affirmation of policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocs.

These represent the constituents of the African Identity in the sense that these were and still are the principles which African States set out to guide their behaviour within the international system, to give form to their foreign policies. These are the standards by which they wish to be judged.

An analysis may be made of the terms of resolution by the Organisation of African Unity of six crisis-issues which had arisen since its inception in 1963 in order to discover any congruence between the objectives in Article II and the principles in Article III of the Charter and the terms of the resolution. The six crises are:

- (1) The Congolese crisis of 1964
- (2) The Nigerian crisis, 1967-1970
- (3) The crisis over dialogue, 1971
- (4) The issue of irredentism and boundary adjustments
- (5) The crisis over unconstitutional changes of government and
- (6) The crisis over Angola

The Congolese crisis of 1964:

It is not necessary to go into the tortuous history of this period.¹ Suffice to say that there were four issues at stake in this crisis. The first was the legitimacy of Moise Tshombe in his capacity as Prime Minister of the Congo (now Zaire). By legitimacy, I do not mean the legality of the appointment of Moise Tshombe as Prime Minister. No one disputed the legal right of President Kasavubu to appoint Tshombe as Prime Minister. What was in doubt was his ideological legitimacy or should I say his Pan-African legitimacy. After all, Moise Tshombe, as Premier of break-away Katanga had violated three of the five objectives of Article II of the OAU charter and four of the seven principles of Article III of the OAU charter. The objectives violated are —

Article II (1a): *To promote the unity and solidarity of the African States.* Tshombe's act of secession and defiance of any attempt at peaceful integration between 1960 and 1961 in fact split Africa and proved to be one of the stumbling blocks to the merger of the Casablanca and Monrovia blocs.²

Article II (1c): *To defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity*

and independence. Not only did Tshombe's act of secession and his use of white mercenaries violate the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of the Congo, it also, in a more fundamental way threatened the collective sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of African states in two senses. Firstly, the use of white mercenaries was not only offensive to African pride at a psychological moment when independence was supposed to signify the re-emergence of the free African but introduced a phenomenon which still plagues Africa today.³ Secondly, the Congo provided an opportunity where the United Nations almost acted as a colonial Power in Africa at the very time when the battle against colonialism was on the point of success.⁴ The chaos into which the Congo was plunged did so much to detract from the image of people responsible enough to be independent.

Article II (1d): *To eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa.* Tshombe's violation of this article revolved around two points. Not only did the chaos into which he plunged the Congo undermine the psychological underpinning of independence for the whole of Africa and to that extent cannot be regarded as contributing to the eradication of colonialism, the use of mercenaries, some of them recruited from Zimbabwe and South Africa of course meant that if Tshombe had been successful, he would have been helped to power by Zimbabwe and South Africa vicariously, and he could not have pursued anti-Zimbabwe or anti-South African policies.

The four principles of Article III which he violated were:

Article III (3): *Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and its inalienable right to independent existence.* This was violated by his earlier act of secession and the chaos in which he plunged the Congo.

Article III (4): *Peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration.* The act of secession could not possibly be regarded as a peaceful attempt to resolve the political conflicts in the Congo at that time.

Article III (5): *Unreserved condemnation, in all its forms, of political assassination ...* Patrice Lumumba was killed in Katanga while Tshombe was Premier there and the general belief is that Tshombe has direct responsibility for his death.

Article III (6): *Absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories which are still dependent.* (1d) is applicable here.

The lack of Pan-African legitimacy of Tshombe was demons-

trated by the refusal of his fellow heads of state and government to allow him to attend the 1964 OAU annual summit. This act in itself was a violation of Article III (1) "The sovereign equality of all member states" and III (2) "Non-interference in the internal affairs of states". The OAU quickly corrected itself, a month later, and dealt with Tshombe as Prime Minister in the special OAU Council of Ministers meeting held from 5 to 10 September 1964.

The second issue involved in the Zairean crisis was the involvement of non-African actors in the crisis. These non-African actors comprise foreign mercenaries, directly recruited by Moïse Tshombe, the United States, Belgium, South Africa and the People's Republic of China.

The third issue was the existence of a rebel force and government which controlled substantial parts of the Congo.

The fourth issue was the open support given to the rebel movement by Congo (Brazzaville) and Burundi.

The OAU decisions were (1) that the Congo itself should order the expulsion of all mercenaries and foreign military forces to be replaced by an OAU force which takes care of the second issue, (2) that there should be cease-fire enforceable on all parties in the Congo, (3) that a government of national unity should be set up to ensure the maintenance of law and order and to hold free elections, and (4) an OAU Commission should try and reconcile the Congo and her neighbours.

The first three decisions are indeed surprising because they are all directed at issues which are essentially domestic. What then about the prohibition in Article III (2) against "Non-interference in the internal affairs of states" and the affirmation in Article III (1) about "the sovereign equality of all member states?" Quite sensibly, the OAU has followed the United Nations practice in holding that discussions and recommendations do not constitute interference.⁵ Therefore, there has been no violation, as such, of Article III (1 and 2).

Looking at the contents of the first three decisions, though this seems like stretching the meaning of non-interference too far, the Government and the rebel forces have been placed on a level of equality. This implies a denial of the legitimacy of the Tshombe government for reasons already adduced. Furthermore, to the extent that the Congo (Brazzaville) and Burundi were supporting the Congolese rebels, they should have been condemned for violating Article III (5) "Unreserved condemnation, in all its forms, of political assassination as well as of subversive activities on the part of neighbouring states or any other state," but they were not because the rebels, in the eyes of the OAU had more legitimacy than the Tshombe govern-

ment. The fourth decision of the OAU which dealt with the need for a Commission to reconcile the Congo and her neighbours would have become irrelevant if the first three decisions had been carried out.

That this interpretation as to the perception by the OAU of the lack of legitimacy on the part of Tshombe is accurate is shown by the fact that when the OAU Commission which was set up to implement these decisions decided to send a delegation to Washington in order to get the United States government to stop the supply of arms to the Congo, Tshombe stopped all cooperation with the OAU Commission on the grounds that it was violating the sovereignty of the Congo.⁶

The conclusion to be drawn from this episode is that (1) the principles in Article III do not have absolute meanings. The true meanings can only be ascertained in relationship to the objectives set out in Article II. (2) In this particular case, Moise Tshombe, the Head of Government of the Congo, had so violated the objectives of Article II that the OAU as long as it had the opportunity was prepared to deny him protection accorded by Article III.

The Nigerian crisis, 1967-1970

There were similarities of issues between the Nigerian and the Congolese Crisis while at the same time there were marked differences. There was the issue of secession but in the Nigerian case it was the rebels and not the Central government that incurred the odium of secession. There was the issue of foreign mercenaries/South African/Portuguese involvement but in the Nigerian crisis it was the rebels and not the Central government that carried the opprobrium. There was the humanitarian issue which in the Nigerian crisis involved the issue of so-called genocide: casualties from air-raids, war activities, relief supplies, etc.

The two important decisions made by the OAU in as far as the theme of this paper is concerned were: (1) The insistence of the OAU in discussing the issue. Nigeria initially insisted that even to put the Nigerian crisis on the agenda was a violation of Article III (2) which guaranteed non-interference with the internal affairs of member states.⁷ However, the OAU insisted and finally persuaded Nigeria that to discuss the issue was not a violation of Article III (2). This is consistent with the stand on the Congolese crisis discussed above, and the same justification can be cited. (2) The OAU, in spite of defections by Zambia, Tanzania, Gabon and Ivory Coast, was steadfast in supporting Nigerian territorial integrity. The terms of all the resolutions passed were those acceptable to the Nigerian Government. For

example, the terms of the communique issued by the OAU Consultative Committee after the Naimy meeting appealed for strictly humanitarian relief supplies provided these supplies are through the Federal Government-operated mercy corridor rather than through direct flights preferred by the secessionists.

The conclusion to be drawn from this episode is that the Biafrans, just like Tshombe in his Katanga days, violated Article II, paragraphs 1a, 1c, and 1d and Article III, paragraphs 4 and 6. It should then be obvious that OAU support for the Nigerian government was consistent with the OAU's denial of legitimacy to Tshombe and both decisions were made on the same grounds.

Of course, it is pertinent here to raise the question of humanitarian aspects of the Nigerian crisis. After all, they influenced the actions of the states which recognized Biafra, especially Tanzania.⁸ Apart from the fact that the Nigerian government, by setting up the International Observer Team, attempted to defuse the issue,⁹ the OAU took the position that it was the act of secession that led to the untold suffering of the Biafrans. However, if for the sake of argument, we were to admit the validity of the humanitarian question, one can still justify the OAU decisions on the grounds that promotion of international cooperation with regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not only one of five objectives of the OAU, of which the Biafran leaders had violated three, it is in fact the last named objective, while the three violated by the Biafrans came first. If one were to read a hierarchy of importance into the ordering of the objectives in Article II, then it becomes obvious that human rights is the least of OAU preoccupations.

The crisis over dialogue, 1971¹⁰

Even though much noise was made about dialogue in 1971, the OAU's views on it have in fact been meticulously stated in the 1969 Lusaka manifesto:

... We have always preferred and we still prefer to achieve (Liberation) without physical violence. We would prefer to negotiate rather than destroy, to talk rather than kill. We do not advocate violence; we advocate an end to the violence against human dignity which is now being perpetrated by the oppressors of Africa. If peaceful progress to emancipation were possible, or if changed circumstances were to make it possible in the future, we would urge our brothers in the resistance movements to use peaceful methods of struggle

In essence then, the question for the OAU in 1971 was: Was the

white minority regime in South Africa ready to talk to Blacks in South Africa about the changes needed within the system?

However, to Ivory Coast, Ghana and the other States in favour of dialogue, the issue was framed differently. They disagreed with the underlying assumptions of the Lusaka manifesto that (1) the initial step should be a dialogue between Blacks and Whites in South Africa; and (2) that the white minority regime should manifest a prior willingness to discuss changes that would lead towards majority rule. South Africa itself has ruled out these two assumptions. Where the position of Ivory Coast and company differed from the South African position was that Ivory Coast believed that talks between the white minority regime and independent African States would lead to changes in the domestic system of South Africa.

What the OAU did at the 1971 Summit in Addis Ababa was to reaffirm the terms of the Lusaka manifesto by a majority of seventeen. The OAU could not have done otherwise without violating Articles II (Id) and Article III (6) of its own Charter.

Of course, it is true that of the twenty-eight states who voted for the OAU position, there are those who have substantial economic relations with South Africa. But what the OAU had done is to deny legitimacy to such economic relations with South Africa as well as to refuse to accord legitimacy to the South African regime itself. This is not unimportant or insignificant, or even unprecedented. For years, the United States and the People's Republic of China carried on the Warsaw talks while the United States continued its opposition to seating China in the United Nations and its opposition to diplomatic recognition of China by countries outside the Soviet bloc. Secondly, due to the OAU position, the South African regime is still regarded as an international pariah with states having diplomatic relations with South Africa having to justify what under normal circumstances need no justification.

The issue of irredentism and boundary adjustments

All African boundaries are artificial to the extent that they were drawn haphazardly to suit colonial interests without regard to language or national affinities of the Africans.¹¹ Any attempt at redrawing these boundaries would have created enormous difficulties for all African states and one should not even rule out the possibility that some African states might have ceased to exist as independent entities. Both Articles II (1c) "To defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence" and III (3) "Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and for its inalienable right to independent existence" give legal legitimization to the existing

boundaries. But within one year of its existence, the OAU had to tackle four serious issues of border conflicts¹² including the use of armed forces that it passed a special resolution at the 1964 Cairo Summit "solemnly declaring that all member states pledge themselves to respect the border existing on their achievement of national independence". There is no border dispute that has come before the OAU where the OAU has sanctioned any boundary adjustment. The OAU itself has always refrained from imposing any actual terms of settlement, leaving it to the parties to the dispute, with the aid of mediators, to work out the terms of settlement. What the OAU has invariably done is to let the parties know that the conflicts were to be settled within the context of Article III (3).

Unconstitutional changes of government

The very conference where the OAU was established was faced with the issue of the assassination of Sylvannus Olympio, the President of Togo. The question was whether the new government should be allowed to participate at the conference.¹³ It was not. Since then, there have been several coups in Africa. The OAU has not reacted to all these coups. On those coups where the OAU had reacted, the following factors had been present:¹⁴

- (a) suspicion of an external agent in the form of a non-African power,
- (b) the change in government being accompanied by a change in ideological postures, and
- (c) at least one state challenging the credentials of representatives of the new government at the post-coup OAU conference.

It is apparent that the presence of the first two factors, depending on what non-African power and what ideological postures are involved, could violate every single provision in Article II (1) and III of the charter. For example, the suspicion that the United States was behind the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah and the consequent installation of a pro-West regime that was less militant on the issues of colonialism affected Articles II (1c, d, and e) and III (1, 2, 3, 6 and 7).

With all these articles at stake, the OAU had felt the need to do something. But just what, exactly? It has no troops to unseat a new government. Its economic capability to impose sanctions is negligible. However, even if all these physical constraints were not there, how about the legal constraints of Article III (1) "sovereign equality" and III (2) "non-interference"?

What the OAU has done is to refuse participatory legitimacy to the new government by refusing to seat its representatives at the OAU conference which is held immediately after the coup.¹⁵ And then the OAU conveniently lets it drop. The sanction does not amount to much but then there is little the OAU can do about these cases.

The Angolan crisis

There is only one aspect of the Angolan crisis which is germane to the theme of this lecture: The Angolan crisis was a fight for the soul of the OAU between the United States and a group of African states led by Nigeria.

The issue as seen by the United States and the West was that there should be no radical government in Angola that would (a) deny a position of political, economic and military influence to the United States in particular and the West in general,¹⁶ and (b) precipitate a confrontation with South Africa by supporting freedom fighters. As seen by Nigeria and some African states the issue was which of the Angolan political parties would best serve African interests in southern Africa? The intervention by South African troops on the side of the U.S. supported FNLA and UNITA decided the question. To the United States, the Soviet Union was the enemy. To Nigeria, South Africa was the enemy. The crucial question then was: Whose view would the OAU adopt at its January 1976 Summit: the United States view that the Soviet Union was the enemy or the Nigerian view that South Africa was the enemy?

Officially, no view prevailed. Twenty-two African states supported the Nigerian position while an equal number supported the United States' position. Two states were neutral, one pro-Nigeria (Ethiopia) and one pro-United States (Uganda). But in spite of this result, I regard it as a victory for the OAU because when a regional organization fights a super power to a draw, and when a regional organization which for its thirteen years of existence has always accepted the United States perception of events refuses to accept that perception then it can be rightly regarded as a victory. As Idi Amin, the then OAU chairman, put it "we should not allow ourselves to be brainwashed by Western powers into believing that the presence of Soviet technicians in Angola is an indication that the Soviets want to colonize Africa".¹⁷

The officially drawn game was to become clear-cut victory two weeks later when the Angolan Government under the MPLA was admitted as a member of the OAU.

Political issues are seldom clear-cut enough for political actors

to score high on consistency. And yet as I have shown above, the OAU has steadily maintained a consistency that has allowed it to project a collective image of unrelenting anti-colonialism, pre-occupation with issues of black dignity and an unideological approach to intra-African problems.

There is a crucial point that needs to be made and that is that the very existence of the Organisation of African Unity is not only a *sine qua non* for the evolution of an African Identity, it is in itself a veritable manifestation of the existence of an African Identity. Both of these propositions need to be expanded upon and I will do so in the reverse order in which I made the propositions.

If wish were father to the thought, then the thought must be father to the deed. The concept of an African Identity must have existed in the African sub-conscious before its constituents were articulated in Article II of the OAU charter. To that extent, and that extent alone, the OAU is a manifestation of, rather than a creator of, the African Identity. In which case one may raise the question: at what point in time did the Africans become aware that they have an identity rather than identities to project? Julius Nyerere, one of the most articulate and deep political thinkers in Africa, had this answer: "Africans, all over the continent, without a word being spoken either from one individual to another or from one African country to another looked at the European, looked at one another, and knew that in relation to the European, they were one."²⁰

It probably was not that simple. It was non-African behaviour rather than non-African existence *simpliciter* that created the consciousness of an African Identity. Even that phenomenon is still operative today. An event in Europe will probably get the headline "Spanish X does this" or "Romanian Y does that" whereas in Africa it is most likely to be "African X does This" as witness the foreign press division of "African Authenticity" when Jean Bokassa of the Central African Empire declared himself Emperor.²¹

The assertion that the OAU manifests but does not create the African Identity can also be justified on historical grounds. If the OAU were to be regarded, as it should be, as an institutionalized form of Pan-Africanism, and if we can discover constituents of an African Identity in the pre-OAU Pan-Africanism, then whether or not the constituents of the African Identity in the pre-OAU Pan-Africanism are the same as those of the OAU, then at least, it would have been proved that the consciousness of an African Identity predates the OAU.

An argument may be raised that if the two sets of the constituents of the African Identity above are quite different, then the

existence of the pre-OAU set cannot be used as a justification for the proposition that the OAU is not a creator of the OAU set. However, the issue being raised here is different. The essential thing is the consciousness of being is different from others. The consciousness that one is *Homo sapiens* in contradistinction to other members of the animal world is not negated by the fact that the basis of the consciousness changes with medical and scientific research.

Be that as it may, is it possible to discover constituents of an African Identity in the Pre-OAU Pan-Africanism? An analysis of the proceedings and conclusions of the five Pan-African Congresses, culminating in the 1945 Manchester congress, will identify the constituents of this African Identity as follows:²⁰

- (a) Belief in absolute equality of races
- (b) Belief in the unity of African peoples
- (c) Belief in self-determination and independence of African peoples
- (d) Belief in equality of rights for African peoples
- (e) Belief that underdevelopment is a result of colonialism
- (f) Belief in the use of force as a last resort to achieve independence.

Even though the issue is not central to the theme of this paper, even a cursory comparison between the five points above and Article II of the OAU Charter will reveal a wide congruence.

The first point is rephrased in Article II (e), the second point is restated in II (a), the third and fourth points are rephrased in II(d) and the sixth point is to be found in the OAU Liberation Committee as the instrumentality for the implementation of II (d).

One is again open to the criticism that by focussing on the main Pan-African Congresses, one is ignoring other African organizations which were in existence at this time and whose activities might have led to a lack of consensus on core issues as to negate any conclusion that there was an African Identity in being. The fact remains however that those other organizations were peripheral to the main stream of Pan-Africanism. Every input into the ethic of Pan-Africanism cannot be regarded as a separate element in the African Identity. Only the ideas accepted by the central organs of Pan-Africanism can be accorded legitimacy as constituents of the African Identity, and the weight of scholarly opinion now is to regard the Pan-African Congresses and the OAU as the central organs of Pan-Africanism.

The second proposition which need amplification is that the very existence of the OAU is *sine qua non* for the evolution of an

African Identity. On the surface, this is contradictory to the view expressed above that the OAU manifests but does not create the African Identity. The contradiction is more apparent than real. What I mean is that the very existence of the OAU has concretized —has infused a more certain meaning into the concept of African Identity. Because of OAU decisions and pronouncements, it is possible to talk of an African point of view on this subject or that subject. Scholarly articles have been written on such issues as "The OAU and the Concept of Non-interference in the Internal Affairs of Member States",²¹ "The OAU: The Practice of Recognition of Governments",²² "The OAU and International Law",²³ and "The OAU and the Concept of Neo-Colonialism",²⁴ to mention only a few. Of course, one should not forget the path-blazing work of Ali Mazrui *Towards a Pax-Africana: A Study of Ideology and Ambition* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967).

A corollary of this which is equally correct is that without the OAU, there would have been no African Identity to speak of. Before the OAU was established, one had the existence of the Monrovia and Casablanca blocs. A view which is often ignored is that irrespective of the logic and rationality of the points of view being advanced, group loyalty proved stronger than the need for cooperation.²⁵ All those who are familiar with the story behind the formation of the Monrovia bloc know very well that Mali and Guinea who were members of the Casablanca bloc had agreed to cosponsor the conference which eventually led to the formation of the Monrovia bloc. Under pressure from Nkrumah, Modibo Keita of Mali and Sekou Toure of Guinea backed down with the result that a conference which was conceived to stop the fragmentation of Africa into blocs ended up leading to the formation of yet another bloc. What happened in this case was that Nkrumah, the most ardent exponent of African unity, placed the cohesion of the Casablanca bloc above the formation, at that time, of an all-African bloc. He obviously succeeded in convincing Sekou Toure and Modibo Keita that loyalty to the organization, in this case, the Casablanca bloc, was more important to any identity of views which they might share with other African leaders outside the organization.

It is quite clear that without the existence of the OAU, pressure to be loyal to one's own group have been stronger than the pressure to cooperate over issues. The in-fighting that goes on within the OAU before consensus is arrived at would have been out-fighting between the pre-OAU blocs without a consensus being arrived at. To buttress this point, one needs only to allude to the fact that membership in a bloc was no reflection of ideological sympathy or

empathy with the *raison d'être* of the bloc. Morocco, one of the most conservative of the African states was a member of the Casa-blanca bloc primarily because the bloc supported Morocco's claim to Mauritania. Also because of the antipathy felt by some states towards Ghana under Nkrumah, as long as there was the existence of more than one organization, the anti-Nkrumah states would have drifted into the organization opposite that to which Ghana belonged to, and this would have been carried over to support or non-support over issues.

There is one issue to which this article does not direct itself, and that is whether the constituents of the African Identity as embodied by the OAU is inimical to the African revolution. I know that there is a school of thought which argues that at times, nothing is better than something. The phoenix and ashes syndrome has never commended itself to me.

Finally, to dispose of another question before it is raised. Can one accurately talk of African points of view on this and that when one can point to some African states who go their separate ways? In other words, what unity and solidarity are there when some states behave in ways which are often contrary to the OAU consensus? This is the type of question which is usually raised about international organizations but seldom about nation-states where the same phenomenon occurs. The fact that there are law-breakers in every state does not lead to a conclusion that there is no system of law in this or that state. In fact, it is only when there is widespread and persistent violation of the law that one talks about a breakdown of law and order. My analysis has shown that there has been no widespread defiance of OAU consensus by its member states.

1. See E.W. Lefever, *Crisis in the Congo: A United Nations Force in Action* (Washington D.C., Brookings Institution, 1965); Colin Legum, *Congo Disaster* (Maryland, Penguin, 1961); Immanuel Wallerstein, *Africa: The Politics of Unity* (New York, Vintage Books, 1969); and Conor Cruise O'Brien, *To Katanga and Back* (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1962).
2. A.B. Akinyemi, *Federalism and Foreign Policy: The Nigerian Experience* (Ibadan, Ibadan University Press 1975) Pp. 161 — 168; and Wallerstein, *Op. cit.* Pp 42-54
3. Mercenaries have been involved in the Congo (now Zaire), the Nigerian Civil War, the Angolan Civil War, and in the invasion of Benin.
4. This is obvious from the fact that even though the United Nations Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld had Lumumba's request for a Security Council Meeting before him, it was under his own powers, Article 99 of the Charter, that Hammarskjöld dealt with the Security Council. Also, at a point in time during the United Nations operations, the United Nations forces closed the

- Congolese airport and radio to Patrice Lumumba, the Prime Minister. See Akinyemi, *op. cit.* Pp. 39-41
5. See A.B. Akinyemi, "The Organisation of African Unity and The Concept of Non-Interference in Internal Affairs of Member-States" *British Yearbook of International Law*, 1972-73, Pp. 393-400
 6. Zdenek Cervanka, *The Unfinished Quest For Unity* (London, Julian Friedman, 1977) p. 88; See also Wallerstein, *op. cit.*
 7. Cervanka, *ibid.* Pp. 98-99. See also Chimelu Chime, *Integration and Politics Among African States* (Uppsala, The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies) Pp. 243-250
 8. Julius Nyerere, *The Nigeria-Biafra Crisis* (Dar es Salaam Government Printer, 1969)
 9. A.B. Akinyemi, *The British Press and The Nigerian Civil War: The Godfather Complex* (Lagos, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Monograph Series no. 2, 1979)
 10. M. Wlfers *Politics in the Organization of African Unity* (London, Methuen & Co., 1976) Pp. 36-45 See also Cervanka, *op. cit.* Pp. 116-122
 11. Carl G. Widstrand, ed., *African Boundary Problems*, (Uppsala, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies)
 12. See Julius Adelayi, "Hard Times Ahead For the O.A.U.", *Daily Times*, April 17, 1964. Boundary Conflicts have involved Algeria, Morocco Ethiopia Somalia, Kenya and Mauritania
 13. Akinyemi, *Federalism and Foreign Policy* Pp. 180-187
 14. See Akinyemi, "Concept of Non-Interference", *op. cit.*
 15. *Ibid*
 16. See A.B. Akinyemi, *Angola and Nigeria: A Study in the National Interest* (Geneva: Graduate Institute of International Studies, 1978) Collection "Conferences" No. 16, especially section I, 'African and Non-African Perceptions of the Angolan Crisis'
 17. One of Idi Amin's off-the-cuff remarks from the chair at the OAU Extraordinary summit where the author was present.
 18. J.K. Nyerere, cited in Akinyemi, *Federalism and Foreign Policy*, p. 1
 19. Headline in *Time* magazine was "Mounting a Golden Throne—A lot more Napoleonic Panoply Than 'African Authenticity'", December 11, 1977
 20. A. Ajala, *Pan-Africanism: Evolution, Progress and Prospects* (London, Andre Deutsch, 1973) Pp. 10-12
 21. Akinyemi., *op. cit.*
 22. A.B. Akinyemi in *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. XXXVI No. 1, 1975
 23. R.A. Akindele in *Nigerian Journal of International Studies*, Vol. I, 1975
 24. A.B. Akinyemi in *Africa Quarterly*, Vol. XIV. Nos. 1 & 2
 25. See Akinyemi, *Federalism and Foreign Policy*, Chapter 7

The Ethiopian Parliament: Origins and Evolution

P.P. D'SOUZA

The general image of Ethiopia before 1971 has been that of an absolute monarchy totally dominated by the personality of Emperor Haile Selassie I. This was due in no small measure, to the fact that he had already been at the helm of affairs for almost half a century, during which period such was his all-pervading influence, that those unfamiliar with the country were surprised to hear that Ethiopia had a parliament at all. In fact, the Ethiopian parliament had been in continuous existence for over forty years, apart from a short break of five years during the Italian occupation of Ethiopia. It is however true that in the political life of Ethiopia, parliament had played a subservient and secondary role.

The marginal, and somewhat hesitant, role of the Ethiopian parliament was to some extent due to its emergence, not in response to felt needs or popular demand, but as a gift from an Emperor ostensibly seeking to pave the way for the transition of Ethiopia's constitutional set-up, under his paternal guidance, from the feudal to the modern age. Not only was it a body imposed from above, but also essentially an alien institution, grafted on to a system that had in the past been basically authoritarian. Furthermore, the Emperor's long tenure in office and his prestige and personality, had enabled him to completely dominate every aspect of life in Ethiopia, and in that measure, the role of Parliament — as indeed of all other potential centres of potential power — had been completely overshadowed. Elsewhere in Africa, Parliaments have been the "basis of legitimate indigenous authority to replace the departing colonial authority", but in Ethiopia there already existed such a basis, in the

institution of the monarchy, which had been in existence, without any major break, for some 2000 years, and the evolution of parliament in Ethiopia, therefore, remained somewhat stunted.

The need for some kind of advisory body had been felt at an early stage. During the last stages of his rule when he was for the most part ill, the Emperor Menelik II appointed ministers to help in the running of the country, as also to blunt criticism that Ethiopia was an autocratic monarchy. It was in this spirit that the ministerial Council continued to exist even after his death in 1913. In 1926, the ministers were dismissed by the Regent (later to be Haile Salassie I), on the plea of the people, and were replaced the following year by a Council of Eldermen for advisory purposes. This body could be said to be the forerunner of the Parliament as is later evolved. About a year after his accession to the throne, on July 16, 1931, Emperor Haile Selassie I granted to the people of Ethiopia a written constitution under which the first parliament was established.

Looking at the circumstances surrounding the origin of the Ethiopian Parliament it is indeed surprising that it was born at all. It is even more surprising that having been born, it was able, not only to survive but to grow. The Emperor, though an absolute ruler, did not operate in a complete political vacuum. He had to contend with, and placate, strong pressure groups, who, by training and experience, could not be expected to take kindly to an experiment which was a break from a tradition of two millennia, and in any case so obviously a measure that would gradually erode their own privileges and status.

Only a few years earlier Ethiopia had overcome a serious threat to its traditional framework in the person of Lij Eyassu. It was therefore easy to fan suspicion of the new-fangled ideas of the young monarch (who had only recently ascended the throne) on grounds that the existing framework had stood the test of time, and was invested with the sanction of almost divine prescription. Wider participation in the affairs of the state — so far the exclusive preserve of the sovereign — could be considered risky, in that people at large, because of their parochial outlook and lack of experience and education, might prove unreliable and unworthy of the trust bestowed on them. The Emperor, however, was able to prevail over these conservative elements. Thirty-five years later the Emperor reminisced ruefully, "...aware of the long term benefits to be realised, we granted to our people the nation's first written constitution in 1931. The difficulties which we encountered in accomplishing this radical departure from custom, the trials to eliminate surviving feudal traditions in achieving this notable step along the path of progress were heavy in-

deed, even wearisome. Even surviving eye-witnesses could have but a vague recollection of those difficult times. How much less can those far removed from that period be expected to appreciate the troubles to which we were put in those days..."

The Emperor was conscious of the dangers of associating the people in the governance of the country, and he was careful to ensure that this was effected without upsetting the primary and historic relationship of the Emperor to the people, as that of a father to his children. The 1931 constitution thus clearly stipulated that "supreme power rests in the hands of the Emperor". The intention was that the new institution of parliament should assist and cooperate with the monarch, and like monarchies elsewhere, act like an advisory body so help cope with the increasing complexity of life, provide a voice for regional interests and preserve an aura of participation by the people. Thereby the edge would be taken off criticism and comparison with nascent democracies and republican forms of government elsewhere. There was, however, no question whatsoever that parliament should in any way be the final repository and source of power.

The fear, rather, was that the new parliamentarians would be too sectarian in their approach, and that this might make Parliament an institution serving, not the common good, but that of each individual province. In his address to the first Parliament the Emperor said, "you must, therefore, realise that besides issues concerning your own birth place, there are greater issues concerning all provinces and all families, which when put together, are of common interest to all, and that the protector of these common interests is the government, while the Emperor is the source of enlightenment to all". This was elaborated in the speech made immediately thereafter by the President of the Senate, Bejirond Tekle Hawariat, the Minister of Finance. In the presence of the Emperor, he explained to the new Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, the various types of government that were possible. For the "present condition of Ethiopia", he said, the most suitable government was "an imperial government with the Emperor having full power, and the law being determined by the will of the Emperor, while the details are deliberated by an assembly of princes and notables established by the permission of the Emperor".

The very fact that the 1931 constitution was revised, showed that the existing constitutional framework was unable to meet the aspirations of the people, given the social and economic development of Ethiopia, and the changes taking place elsewhere in the world. The federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia in 1952 also necessitated

amendment of the constitution since the existing one suffered in comparison with the more liberal Eritrean constitution. The process of revision took some six years, and went through several stages including scrutiny by a committee of ministers (under the chairmanship of Prime Minister Bitwoded Makonnen Endalkachew) and a Constitutional Committee. Understandably, conservative elements once again strongly resisted any further concession to popular sentiment. The Emperor, however, was able to prevail upon the Crown Council to accept the revised Constitution. After Parliament had given its approval, it was promulgated on 3 November 1955, the silver jubilee anniversary of the Emperor's coronation.

Over the years, the Ethiopian Parliament progressively grew in composition, power and status. Its gradual evolution is best seen in the development of the electoral procedure. The first constitution of 1931 did not provide for any electoral law. It was decided that temporarily, and until such time as the people were in a position to elect, the Chamber of Deputies would be chosen by the nobility (MEKUANENT) and the local chiefs (SHUMOCH). The inhabitants of an electoral district were called upon to assemble before the governor of the district, who explained the purpose of the meeting. These assemblies elected distinguished figures from among the noblemen, by acclamation, to form groups, which in turn elected Deputies. The Deputies elected were announced to the Assembly of the people which generally approved of their election.

The life of this first Parliament was interrupted by the Italian occupation. It was reactivated on the termination of Italian rule, and summoned by a proclamation of 9 March 1941. There was still no electoral law, and the proclamation itself prescribed a procedure of indirect election. The new procedure was less vague than the one adopted for the first Parliament. It stipulated that candidates should be male, over the age of 31, versed in public affairs and of known loyalty and patriotism. The voting was to be by secret ballot, and the franchise was restricted to those paying land tax. Each of the 12 provinces was divided into 20 electoral districts. The 20 electors, chosen from each sub-province, assembled in the capital city of the province, and in the presence of civil and religious authorities, elected by secret ballot, 5 men amongst the nominated candidates to be Deputies.

There was no fixed term for the second Ethiopian Parliament which continued in existence until dissolved in 1957. In the meantime, steps for constitutional reform were taken in hand, and the revised Constitution of 1955 completely overhauled Parliament, both in its organization and functioning. The new Chamber of Deputies

was now to be elected directly for a four-year term, on the principle of universal adult suffrage. Women won seats in the first elections in 1957, one of whom was elected Vice-President of the Chamber of Deputies.

An electoral law was introduced which made the Chamber of Deputies representative of the people at large in a more rational manner. This law provided for constituencies of two types—rural and urban. A rural constituency was to consist of 200,000 inhabitants, represented by 2 Deputies. Urban constituencies related to towns with a population of more than 30,000. Each such urban constituency returned one Deputy, plus one additional deputy for every additional 50,000 of the population. There was provision for constituency returned one Deputy, plus one additional deputy for every additional 50,000 of the population. There was provision for constituency committees and electoral boards (under the Ministry of Interior) entrusted with the task of looking into appeals by individuals who had not been registered as voters, or whose request for transfer of registration to another constituency had been turned down by the Registration Officers. The Ethiopian Chamber of Deputies thus had 250 Deputies, as against 60 under the first constitution. In other words there was thus a prescribed and definite electoral law which provided for increased and more broad-based representation of the people, with provision for the composition to keep pace with growth in population.

The growing interest of the people in the work of Parliament can be seen from the steady rise in the number of candidates seeking election. The number of candidates in the general elections in 1969 was double that in the first election in 1957 (1306 and 602 respectively). Likewise the percentage of voters was consistently high, as is clear from table I.

TABLE—I : ETHIOPIAN ELECTIONS:

<i>Year of election</i>	<i>Total registered electorate</i>	<i>Total number of votes cast</i>	<i>Percentage votes cast</i>
1957	3784226	2542608	60%
1961	3939094	2852810	72%
1965	3137157	3203113	62%
1969	52498996	3674427	69%

It is also of interest that 58% of the voters in the 1969 election were between the ages of 21 and 35, and that 27% of the total votes polled were by women.

Apart from changes in the composition of the chamber of Deputies, there were also changes in the composition of the Senate. The first Senate was appointed from among the nobility, who had served the Emperor for a long time as princes, ministers, judges or high military officers. The original body consisted of only 28 members that is, half the size of the Chamber of Deputies. Under the 1955 Constitution this proportion was retained as also the principle of nomination by the Emperor. The new electoral law however prescribed that only those over 35 years of age could be nominated to the Senate (as against an age limit of 25 years for the Chamber of Deputies). A Senator had to be either a prince, former high government officer, or "other person generally esteemed for his character, judgement and public service". He was eligible for reappointment on completion of the term of 6 years. One-third of the Senate was renewed every two years.

The above would indicate that the Senate was intended to be a conservative body so as to counter-balance the possible emergence of radical elements in the Chamber of Deputies. Because of their general background of experience of public affairs, member of the Senate tended to exercise a steadying influence on the Lower House. Many of its members were competent ex-deputies. A woman was appointed for the first time in 1969. The history of the Senate also showed that it had, on occasion, proved more critical of the government than the Chamber of Deputies. The Senate was instrumental in seeing that government proposals like the Local Government Bill and the Italian Loan were aborted. Both measures had been initially accepted by the Chamber of Deputies. The Senate, however voted against approval of the latter, and took no decisive action in regard to the former within the stipulated period of two months. When these bills came up before a joint meeting of the two houses—as required under the Constitution—the Senate was able to influence a sufficient number of Deputies, with the result that at the joint meeting the two bills failed to win majority support.

Parliament under the 1931 Constitution was purely a deliberative body. The revised Constitution of 1955 prescribed in detail the legislative process as also the means whereby Parliament could check the executive.

The normal procedure for enacting legislation was through proclamations. These were to be vetted by the Council of Ministers, and, after approval by the Emperor, were submitted to Parliament. Here they went through the customary procedure of three readings, reference to the appropriate standing committee, debate in the full House and approval by majority vote. If one House did not approve

a draft proclamation within two months of its receipt from the other house, the matter was considered at a joint meeting of the two Houses. If the proclamation had the support of both Houses, it was sent to the Emperor, through the Prime Minister, for final approval, and thereafter, publication in the NEGARIT GAZETA (official gazettee).

Either House of Parliament had the right to initiate legislation. There was only one instance of a legislative proposal, initiated by Parliament, being approved as law viz., the Members of Parliament (Salaries) Proclamation (No. 187 of 1962). In 1967 Senator Kegnazmach Tsegaye Gebreah introduced a bill in amplification of the constitutional provisions pertaining to the judiciary. It was accepted by both Houses and sent to the Emperor for ratification. For reasons that are not clear, it did not receive the approval of the executive. Although this power of initiating legislation was rarely exercised, Parliament was not chary of passing innumerable motions on a diversity of matters of current, albeit local, interest. The 1967-68 session for example, accepted some 70 motions on subjects ranging from unemployment to the Amharie alphabet and cattle disease. This method of drawing the attention of the Government to urgent problems was increasingly utilised, and experience showed that the Government was not unresponsive.

It was theoretically possible for the executive to bypass the legislature by issuing decrees. The Constitution stipulated that such decrees must be "consistent with the constitution", and be issued at the instance of the Council of Ministers, and with the approval of the Emperor, in the event of an emergency arising, and there being inadequate time for normal legislative process. Decrees were also issued if the matter was urgent, and Parliament was not in session, that is between June and November of each year. However, such decrees had to be submitted to Parliament as soon as it was reconvened. If rejected by both Houses of Parliament, the Emperor had no power to reverse the disapproval by Parliament. However, if the decree was approved by one house, and no action was taken by the other, or if the Parliament approved the decree with amendments, and such amendments were unacceptable to the Emperor, or when Parliament neither expressly ratified the whole decree nor expressly rejected it, such decree remained in effect, unless it was subsequently disapproved by both Chambers of Parliament, by a majority vote, in the form of a notice of disapproval.

A case in point was the law concerning the Civil Procedure Code (No. 52 of 1965) which was introduced in Parliament, and was under discussion when Parliament recessed. During the recess the

executive declared it an urgent matter, and with the approval of the Emperor, issued it as a decree. When Parliament reassembled, it was asked to drop consideration of the legislative proposal, and to discuss only the decree, on the subject. While the Senate accepted the Prime Minister's request, the chamber of Deputies rejected the decree, resenting the fact that the executive had cared to issue a decree on a subject which was being discussed as normal legislation. The chamber of deputies notified the senate of its rejection of the decree. However, the constitution provided only that "every proposal of legislation *approved* by the Chamber of Parliament shall be immediately forwarded through the President thereof to the other Chamber".

Hence there was no specific provision for forwarding to the other House a bill which had been disapproved. Without regard for procedure, the Senate rejected the decision of the Chamber of Deputies, and intimated that it would deliberate upon it. The Chamber of Deputies thereupon asked the Senate for a joint meeting. This was rejected as being unconstitutional. A report on the situation was communicated to the Emperor, who sent a message to both the Chambers supporting the viewpoint of the Senate and requesting them to deliberate on the decree in question. The Parliament did so and approved in with amendments. However, the amendments were not accepted by the executive, and the decree was sent back to the Parliament. Parliament, however, again communicated the decree, with the original amendments it had proposed, to the Emperor. Because of this deadlock, and the fact that Parliament had not specifically rejected the decree, the Civil Procedure Code decree remained in force and effective as law.

A similar case was that of the decree of Penal Code (Penalties) (No. 45 of 1961) which provided for the imposition of flogging as punishment for certain offences relating to the disturbance of public opinion. The Chamber of Deputies voted to reject this decree, but the Senate had approved it. A report of the situation was sent to the Emperor, but the decree remained in force since once again there was no specific disapproval by both houses. These two cases illustrate the fact that although the Constitution was distinctly weighted in favour of the Executive, the Legislature could and did seek to assert its views. The extent to which decrees and proclamations were used can be seen in Table-II.

TABLE-II : Proclamations & decrees issued (1955-66)

	<i>Proclamations</i>	<i>Decrees</i>
1955	2 (149-50/55)	—
1956	4 (151-154/56)	4 (16-19/56)

1957	4 (156-159/57)	11 (20-30/57)
1958	1 (160/58)	2 (31-32/58)
1959	2 (161-2/59)	8 (41-39/59)
1960	8 (163-170/60)	4 (41-44/60)
1961	14 (171-184/61)	3 (45-47/61)
1962	11 (185-195/62)	2 (48-49/62)
1963	16 (196-211/63)	2 (50-51/63)
1964	6 (212-216/64)	—
1965	11 (217-227/65)	1 (52/65)
1966	14 (229-242/66)	1 (53/66)

The executive also had the power to issue orders which were not communicated to Parliament. Such orders were in the nature of a prerogative of the Emperor, in respect of matters like the organisation, power and duties of Ministers, executive departments, administration of the government, as also the appointment, promotion, transfer, suspension and dismissal of officials of these bodies. Likewise, Legal Notices could be issued usually in the form subordinate laws, based on, and within the scope of, existing proclamations, decrees and orders which generally conferred on the executive, in their general provisions, the right to make or issue regulations necessary for implementation of their several provisions. By their very nature, Orders and Legal Notices did not provide much scope for arbitrary action by the Executive.

In relation to the powers that it exercised under the original Constitution, Parliament's powers under the revised Constitution were, to a certain extent enhanced. For example, Parliamentary approval was essential for "all treaties of peace, and all treaties and international agreements involving a modification of territory of the Empire, or of sovereignty/jurisdiction over any part of such territory, or laying a burden on Ethiopian subjects personally, or modifying legislation in existence or requiring expenditure of state funds or involving loans or monopolies". Other treaties, however, were within the scope of the Emperor's prerogative. The Emperor also had the "right to settle disputes with foreign powers by adjudication and other peaceful means, and provides for and agrees to measures of cooperation with foreign powers for the realization of the ends of security and common defence and "to ratify on behalf of Ethiopia treaties and other international agreements...." (Art. 30).

Under the revised Constitution, Parliament also enjoyed the power (not enjoyed earlier) of summoning the Prime Minister (or his deputies) to answer questions by members, if a motion to that effect was carried by a majority vote in the House (Art. 73). This enabled

Parliament to keep a watch on the functioning of the executive, and to put pressure on the ministers.

It also served as a warning to the ministers that the money voted by the Parliament should be utilized carefully and efficiently. Parliament did, in fact, exercise these rights fairly effectively and often. Likewise, Ministers or government officials had the right to attend meetings of Parliament or its committees, and to speak on any questions concerning the conduct of their ministers. In this manner they could anticipate possible criticism from members of Parliament.

Members of Parliament enjoyed special rights and privileges including freedom from arrest, exemption from summons to answer criminal charges, and, most important, freedom of speech. No action or change could be brought against any member of Parliament, or against any Minister appearing by right or on invitation, for words uttered or statements written and submitted to Parliament. (Art. 84 and 85).

According to Article 33, the Emperor had the right to dissolve both the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate by any order, but had to provide at the same time for the appointment of a new Senate or the election of Chamber of Deputies, or both, as the case might be. However, within 4 months of such an order being issued the new Chamber had to be called into session.

The most significant improvement in the position of the Ethiopian Parliament was in the financial field. It could scrutinise the budget. "No tax, duty, import or excise tax can be imposed, increased, reduced or abolished except by law. No exemption from payment of any tax, duty, etc. imposed by law should be granted except as authorised by law". Public revenues were expended by authorised law only.

Over the years, the powers of the Ethiopian Parliament had not merely been enlarged on paper. It did make use of these powers and was bold enough to reject government proposals like the Building Materials Excise Tax in 1960, the Italian Loan of 1964, the higher health tax in 1966 and the bill to raise revenue for new local government schemes in 1967. In opening the 1970-71 session of Parliament, the Emperor had urged both houses to give favourable consideration to the Government bill on tenancy reform, which was introduced in the Chamber of Deputies shortly thereafter. After going through the first reading and the committee stage, the bill encountered difficulty during the second reading, the debate lasting eight days, probably the longest time taken by Parliament over the general principle of any bill. An immediate vote might have gone against the government, and a temporary way out was found in the

acceptance of a motion seeking more details from the government of its land survey. However, this was yet another instance of parliament reacting adversely to proposals strongly endorsed by the Emperor.

In assessing the role of the Ethiopian Parliament, comparison must be made not with parliaments elsewhere, but with the first such body in Ethiopia which was a purely advisory body. One may legitimately question the absence of political parties, the property qualifications for candidates, or the lack of other features accepted as normal in parliamentary systems of government elsewhere. However, it must be remembered that, being a product of executive decision, rather than the outcome of popular demand, or a reincarnation of similar institutions in the historical past, the Ethiopian Parliament was unable to develop into an institution which would make it appear more obviously a rival focus of power to the executive in particular, against the background of the all-pervading influence of the Emperor. The latter, in any case, realised the inherent danger, in any progressive evolution of Parliament's powers and privileges, not only to his own position but to the entire socio-economic and political framework of the country. His views were best expressed in the following statement that he made to ministers and government officials in 1961:

"It is also axiomatic that change begets change, that each step forward leads logically and inexorably to the next, and the next. Once unleashed the forces of history cannot be contained or restrained, and he is naive indeed who says 'Thus far will I go and no further'".

The Ethiopian Parliament, therefore, remained essentially a forum for people to air their views in a regulated manner. The exercise of that function was further limited in influence, thanks to the scanty publicity given to its deliberations in the media, and its role, therefore, remained, in the final analysis, of marginal significance.



Class Formation and Post-Colonial State Theory in Africa

PAUL NURSEY-BRAY

Class analysis of Third World countries in the independence and post-independence period has faced many real difficulties. In all cases major problems have been engendered by the fact that the 'development' of the countries concerned has been heavily influenced, if not dictated, by the external needs and pressures of monopoly capital, operating through the agencies associated with colonialism and imperialism. One obvious consequence of this experience has been a process of class formation that differs widely from the European model. Thus, in charting an approach to class analysis many theorists, particularly those from the Third World, have felt a need to revamp orthodox categories in an effort to develop ones more applicable, in their view, to the specificities of the colonial and post-colonial situations:

A key feature influencing class formation in Africa is the fact that the main owning and exploiting class exists outside the national boundaries of the countries concerned. Particular difficulties therefore attend any attempt to describe the ruling section of the indigenous society. Terms, such as 'comprador bourgeoisie', 'petty bourgeoisie' or 'national bourgeoisie' have been used, although their utility lies more in the expression they give to the nature of dependence in a particular instance, than in their analytical precision. The fact of dependence in itself has found expression in the term 'metropolitan bourgeoisie', a group that are held to be the exogenous ruling class. This is another concept fraught with difficulties, for, while it enables an investigation of the relationship between the indigenous ruling stratum and the otherwise nebulous outside influences to take place,

it is virtually impossible to delineate the characteristics of the metropolitan bourgeoisie itself without begging any number of thorny questions relating to transnational corporations and the operation of international capital.

To these difficulties the theory of the 'post-colonial state' possessing specific attributes and characteristics, appears to offer some solution. Here at least is a concrete structure that can be investigated; an investigation that, it is claimed, yields insight both into the nature of the indigenous ruling strata, because of their necessary connection with the locus of political power, and into the relationships between the indigenous classes and the metropolitan bourgeoisies, since the post-colonial state plays a mediatory role in these relationships. Moreover it offers an opportunity to focus on issues related to development and class from an indigenous perspective. This partly explains its attraction for African and other Third World theorists, who, goaded by the Eurocentricity of the greater part of development theory, have been seeking to repossess the theoretical initiative.

The notion of the post-colonial state has therefore gained a certain vogue in recent years,¹ and has already elicited several general critiques.² Unfortunately the concept fails of its promise, creating more problems than it resolves. The focus of attention on the peculiarities of the post-colonial state gives it a status that apparently assigns to it a direct rather than a mediatory role in the development of class relations. It is the control of the state rather than the relationship to the productive forces that is frequently taken as the crucial criterion for defining a ruling "class". This is an acceptable viewpoint if the intention is to embark on a critique of class analysis, and establish the basis for a ruling élite model in its stead. But if, as is all too often the case, the intention is to remain true to class analysis, the use of the post-colonial state as an entirely independent variable is bound to introduce distortions.

While the concept has been applied in Asian as well as African countries, it is its use with respect to the latter that the theoretical implications to be examined most clearly appear.

The major problem engendered by post-colonial state theory with respect to characterizations of the ruling group in post-colonial society is the undue attention that is focussed on the peculiarities of class structures within a given national territory, ultimately at some cost to a due consideration of the international dimension. Although all theories of the post-colonial state take, to a great or lesser extent, some account of the international dimension of the class struggle, and most give it the central position it deserves, there is a distinct tendency to discuss classes in terms of their relationship to the post-

colonial state alone. The attention that is paid to what is claimed as the 'relative autonomy' of the post-colonial state, and to what is claimed as the 'relative autonomy' of the 'political class' that controls it, gives to the latter a status and significance much greater than would otherwise be accorded. This emphasis finds its most developed expression in the work of Issa Shivji, where it is asserted that the post-colonial state in Tanzania has been used by a new ruling class to establish its own economic base.³ He uses the term 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' to describe this new ruling class.

A critical examination of the notion of the post-colonial state, and of associated ideas on the 'political class' in post colonial societies, indicates that Shivji's assertion that the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' can be seen as an established and entrenched ruling class is a logical development of certain tendencies in post-colonial state theory; a direct result of giving to the post-colonial state a special significance in the mediation and articulation of class relations within post-colonial society. But the price of this development is high. Ultimately it means the abandoning of class theory altogether. The concentration on the ruling group in post-colonial society, and the way in which they establish and maintain themselves in power, means a distinct movement away from class analysis towards a ruling élite conception of post-colonial politics. This tendency towards élite theory varies directly with the extent to which the ruling group of the post-colonial state is given an autonomous and entrenched status, independent of internationally based class forces. As a tendency it is, thus, present, it will be argued, to a greater or lesser extent, in all theories of class explicitly associated with the idea of a post-colonial state, but emerges as a distinct theoretical position only with the formulations of Shivji. Clearly many problems are thereby engendered, for elite theory has a completely different set of theoretical implications and imperatives from class analysis. Moreover, when elite theory masquerades as class analysis, the problems are accentuated by being obscured. Additionally, since, in debates on African development, élite theory is still explicitly offered as an alternative style of analysis to class theory, then, to the extent that class analysis borrows the style of élite theory, it supports the case for its own inadequacy.

A survey of some of the major contributions to post-colonial state theory, and their treatment of the 'political class', is necessary in order to clarify the manner in which élite theory emerges.

One of the earliest analyses where an important role is ascribed to the post-colonial state with respect to the ruling stratum is Roger Murray's discussion of Fitch and Oppenheimer's study of Ghana. Murray draws attention to the fact that the "CPP leadership cadres⁴

...were drawn mainly from the *petty-bourgeoisie salariat...*" He proceeds to assert the peculiar nature of this ruling stratum introducing the crucial notion of their 'relative autonomy'.

"It is precisely the socially ambiguous and unstable character of the stratum which helps us to understand its relative autonomy and volatility in the political arena. The CPP 'political' class did not express or reflect a determinate economic class."⁶

This 'relative autonomy' stems, it is claimed, from the ambiguous nature of this 'political' class, which, lacking an economic base, is swayed both by the neo-colonial aspirations of the metropolitan bourgeoisies and the pressures from a "frustrated national bourgeoisie" seeking a "bourgeois-revolutionary solution to Ghana's continuing subordination to imperialism".⁶

Poised between a mediation of the interests of external capital and a furthering of the internal revolution against imperialism, the 'political' class, in control of the post-colonial state faces, in Murray's account, a real choice between establishing themselves as a class or pursuing a revolutionary strategy. In this situation the post-colonial state becomes, he believes, the instrument for the resolution of this dilemma, "In this setting", Murray insists, "the 'relative autonomy' of the ruling 'petty-bourgeois' ... stratum becomes a critical issue, whose import has to be examined in its *modus operandi* of state power".⁷ However, in its approach to this ruling stratum Murray's analysis is very circumspect. He emphasises the "partial" character of this 'political' class, seeing the problems of post-colonial society in the "accession to state power of unformed classes", and stresses the importance of treating this process as an "uncertain historical movement whose social direction and meaning will be defined and re-defined through practice".⁸ Nonetheless, this 'political' class has been singled out for special attention and its relationship to the 'relative autonomy' of the post-colonial state emphasised.

Claude Meillassoux's analysis of Mali also raises some of the important questions arising from a consideration of class structures in post-colonial society.⁹ It addresses itself explicitly to the question of whether, in the light of the unique characteristics of the post-colonial situation, a new ruling class can be said to have emerged. In the process the idea of a 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' makes its first, embryonic appearance. In his analysis of the role of the bureaucracy in Mali Meillassoux investigates the key question of whether the accession to power of the petty-bourgeoisie, in the shape of the bureaucracy, has meant the development of a new ruling class. He conducts his analysis in the light of the economic and political dominance

of a foreign country, the ex-colonial power, directing his attention to the analysis of social classes within a dependent social formation. Within the Malian situation the bureaucracy figures, he believes, as that ruling stratum which emerged from the process of decolonization. It did not seize power; on the contrary, it was the only available repository for the political power that was ceded at independence. It was, and remains, a dependent group, having its origin as an "instrument of western interests",¹⁰ a fact which continues to influence its development.

Meillassoux notes that this group has assumed some of the characteristics of a ruling social class firstly by its control of the economic infra-structure, through nationalisation and control of the state sector, which it uses as a means of exploitation, and also by its control over the repressive apparatus of the state. Meillassoux has no developed concept of a 'post-colonial state'. But his account of the rise to power of the bureaucracy is one that directs our attention to those peculiarities of the post-colonial situation noted by Murray. The bureaucracy, in his view, assumes power, not as the result of a domestic class struggle, but as the bequest of the colonial power. Its control over the political and economic powers of the state gives it "some of the characteristics of a social class; control of the economic infrastructure and use of it as a means of exploitation, control of the means of repression involving a resort to various devices to maintain dominance."¹¹ But, while drawing our attention to these unique features of the class situation in a dependent, post-colonial social formation, he is careful not to confer upon the bureaucracy the status of an established class. He notes that it does not own the means of production, but controls them through the political apparatus. Thus he situates the bureaucracy within the broad parameters of a model the key features of which are a dominant exogenous power and a dominant exogenous class. His conclusion, then, is that we are dealing with a dependent social element which is an "*outgrowth* of classes, but which may, in specific historical circumstances, assume important historical functions."¹² It can be seen that the role assigned to the bureaucratic bourgeoisie is carefully situated within a broad international framework of classes, and its role delimited by this position.¹³ The absence of any specific notion of a 'post-colonial state' possessing unique characteristics with respect to the mediation of classes, enables Meillassoux, it can be argued, to remark on the original features of the post-colonial situation without withdrawing any emphasis from those external factors that ultimately govern the activities of the bureaucracy.

Hamza Alavi has produced what is unquestionably the most

sophisticated discussion of the post-colonial state in his analysis of class structures and the post-colonial state in Pakistan and Bangladesh.¹⁴ He clearly sets out what are claimed as the most characteristic features of the post-colonial state. He describes it, for instance, as 'overdeveloped', referring to the fact that the powers of the colonial state inherited by its successor state are, because of the nature of colonial rule, exceptionally wide.¹⁵ With regard to class, Alavi notes, along with Murray and Meillassoux, that the state in post-colonial societies is established not by an ascendant, indigenous bourgeoisie, but by a foreign, imperialist bourgeoisie. At independence, while direct control over the colonial state is abandoned, the influence of the metropolitan bourgeoisies, Alavi argues, remains very strong. At the same time, in the case of Pakistan and Bangladesh, the post-colonial state is also subject to the influence of the indigenous bourgeoisie. Alavi's central thesis is that, because of these competing pressures, the post-colonial state is not subordinate to any single influence, and is not therefore, "the instrument of a single class":

"It is relatively autonomous and it mediates the competing interests of the three propertied classes, namely the metropolitan bourgeoisies, the indigenous bourgeoisie and the landed classes, while at the same time acting on behalf of them all to preserve the social order in which their interests are embodied, namely the institution of private property and the capitalist mode as the dominant mode of production."¹⁶

The corollary of this relative autonomy, claimed for the state, is a relative autonomy claimed for those in control of the state and the state apparatuses, the bureaucratic-military oligarchy. Its balanced position with respect to the claims of the three propertied classes "confers on the bureaucratic-military oligarchy in a post-colonial society a relatively autonomous role".¹⁷ This latter claim for the relative autonomy of the ruling oligarchy parallels the claim made by Murray for the political class in Ghana, but Alavi's assertion that the post-colonial state itself is endowed with the same relative autonomy breaks important new ground. "The essential issue", Alavi asserts "is that of the relative autonomy of the state apparatus as a whole and its mediatory role as between the competing interests of the three propertied classes, namely the domestic bourgeoisie, the metropolitan bourgeoisies and the landowning classes".¹⁸

In directing our attention to the critical role of this oligarchy in the post-colonial societies of Pakistan and Bangladesh Alavi concurs with Meillassoux's view that their position gives them a unique access to, and control over, economic resources.

"In this situation the military-bureaucratic oligarchies, the apparatus of the state, furthermore assume also a new and relatively autonomous economic role, which is not paralleled in the classical bourgeois state."¹⁹

The post-colonial state appropriates a very large part of the economic surplus and "deploys it in bureaucratically directed economic activity".²⁰ This gives to the bureaucratic-military oligarchy some of the characteristics of a ruling social class. However, Alavi does not assign to this oligarchy the status of an established class, despite the importance he ascribes to it within the political and social development of Pakistan and Bangladesh. Its existence, its peculiar feature of relative autonomy, is like the relative autonomy claimed for the post-colonial state itself, a contingent characteristic produced by the specific contradictions that occur within the class formations of post-colonial societies. Its position and status can then, as in Meillassoux's account, be seen as an outgrowth of class conflict, but an outgrowth that does not issue in the creation of a new class. As Alavi emphasises, the role of the bureaucratic-military oligarchy is relatively autonomous only because it is "determined within the matrix of a class society and not outside it", but one over which "no single class has exclusive command..."²¹ However, in introducing the claim that the post-colonial state itself, as well as the political class that controls it, possesses a relative autonomy. Alavi has introduced a significant factor into further discussion of the post-colonial situation.

It is clear that all these interpretations are trying to come to terms with similar problems arising from a consideration of post-colonial society, in particular with how to interpret the role and status of the 'political' class in control of the post-colonial state. In the concentration on the 'relative autonomy' both of this group, and, more particularly, on that of the post-colonial state itself, can be found the tendency towards élite theory. For, in the special emphasis, that is placed on the role of political power with respect to class, and on the particular attributes claimed for the political state, the framework, shadowy admittedly, of élite theory can be discerned. It remains shadowy, and of little significance, so long as the proclaimed 'relative autonomy' is seen as a contingent phenomenon, produced by the inter-penetration of international and national class relationships in post-colonial society. There is no sound basis here for the assertion that a new ruling class exists. But, when the post-colonial state is given a determinative status with respect to class, then there is a quite definite departure in the direction of élite theory. What can be

discerned as a tendency in post-colonial state theory as a whole thus emerges as a distinctive theoretical position with Issa Shivji's analysis of Tanzania, where the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' is accorded the status of an established and entrenched ruling class. In the circumstances it is ironic that Shivji himself should be so conscious of the dangers of élite theory as label it, along with underdevelopment, an export of Western capitalism.²²

Issa Shivji's theory of the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' was one of products of the debates on Tanzanian socialism conducted by a group of scholars at the University of Dar-es-Salaam in the early 1970's.²³

Shivji boldly cuts through the tangled skein of definitions and declares the bureaucratic petty-bourgeois elements in control of the post-colonial state to be, not an 'outgrowth' of class or a class-information, but an entrenched class with its own economic base. To do this Shivji has to shift the focus of our attention from exogenous class forces to internal class formation, and, in addition, to redefine the concept of class. It is not that Shivji ignores the major feature of the post-colonial class situation, the continued existence of a dominant metropolitan bourgeoisie. On the contrary, Shivji was one of the first, within the Tanzanian context, to direct attention to this important factor. In his book, *The Silent Class Struggle* he laments the fact that Tanzanian socialism has not taken sufficient account of the continuing presence of the Imperial nexus.

"Consequently, the class struggle, too, is on the international plane. Hence, when one talks about class struggle in Tanzania one cannot but analyse the international scene. The fundamental and antagonistic contradiction let it be emphasized, is between imperialism and the people, which form the dialectical opposites of the international capitalist system."²⁴

Shivji proceeds to draw attention to the fact that "the international bourgeoisie administers its interests in individual countries through varied means."²⁵ On this basis he saw the Tanzanian problem in terms, not only of the antagonistic contradiction between the Tanzanian people and imperialism, but also as being bound up with the bureaucratic elements that performed this function of administering imperial interests. It is clear that, at this stage, he in no sense regards this bureaucracy as an entrenched or established class. "Without a class-base in the international bourgeoisie, the bureaucracy," he declares, "can be more easily humanized and made amenable to workers' control".²⁶ Moreover, his assertion of an international dimension is clear and unequivocal.

In his later work, however, *Class Struggles in Tanzania*, while

Shivji still asserts the need to view the class struggle as set within an international framework, his attitude to the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' is ambiguous. While on the one hand he notes that the "bureaucratic bourgeoisie is not an independent class" but "a dependent bourgeoisie—dependent on the international bourgeoisie",²⁷ on the other he incongruously treats them as having a distinct class identity with an economic base internal to the Tanzanian economy.

There is, in short, a clear shift of attention from the international level to a study of class as determined by factors internal to Tanzania. It is to the rise of the 'bureaucratic-bourgeoisie' as a class proper that Shivji directs our attention, and to its struggles, firstly against other fractions of the petty-bourgeoisie, most particularly with the group Shivji terms the "commercial bourgeoisie"²⁸ Having emerged as the dominant fraction, and entrenched themselves as an established ruling class, the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' are, in Shivji's view, subsequently faced with a struggle against the workers and peasants. Clearly, this shift of emphasis, while it does not amount to a rejection of the international dimension, significantly moves the focus of our attention to the national level. The critical nature of this shift is apparent when we consider the status accorded to the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie'. For Murray, Alavi and Meillassoux the significant status of the political class in post-colonial society is the direct product of the class relationships engendered by exogenous forces. For Shivji, on the other hand, what is now claimed as a ruling class, the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' enjoys an existence and significance independent of such forces. Shivji's contradictory position is plain. While due obeisance is paid to international influences there is a clear assertion that a ruling class has emerged with an independent base.

This claim for the independent significance of the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' rests on the unique attributes Shivji claims for the state in the post-colonial situation. The importance of Alavi's claim for the 'relative autonomy' of the post-colonial state can be seen in the use that Shivji makes of this notion. In Shivji's account it is an 'autonomy' that gives to the state a determinative role in the formation of class. The control of the state is crucial, in his view, both in terms of defining a class, and in terms of that class creating, through its control of political power, an economic base for itself. Using an analysis that appears to derive from Althusser, Shivji applies Marxist categories in a way that enables him to place prime emphasis on the role of the state. There is an echo of Fanon in his assertion that Marxism is not a dogma, but a methodology that must be applied in concrete situations, "which may conceivably produce different conclusions from those reached by Marx".²⁹ Shivji's argument is that in

the post-colonial situation the state assumes a dominant role, relegating the question of the ownership of the means of production to a secondary importance. He sees an important parallel to be drawn between the post-colonial situation and the situation of states that are presumed to be involved in the transition to socialism. Using points that have emerged from the debates on the Soviet Union,³⁰ he tries to establish his position that it is not the ownership of the means of production that is crucial, but rather the way in which the class struggle is articulated through the state and state apparatuses. Thus he asserts that ... "the concept of class cannot be reduced to the question of the ownership of the means of production if ownership is considered in the narrower juridical sense..."

"In fact, in a class analysis political relations should be built into the class relations for the two are inseparable. But when one talks about political relations one brings in the question of state and state apparatuses as the seat of political power and class domination."³¹

With this definition of class, Shivji is now able to make a strong claim for the rôle of the post-colonial state. Whereas in countries involved in the transition from capitalism to socialism it is the state ownership of the means of production and the importance of the party that "have made the political instance most dominant", in the post-colonial situation "the embryonic nature of the classes and therefore the importance of the state in buttressing their economic interests, have brought forth the State as the dominant actor on the stage".³² It appears then that in order to identify the ruling class we need not seek to identify the dominant economic class, but the dominant political class, and must do so, presumably, by treating the post-colonial state in isolation from its international, imperial framework. The orthodox categories of Marxist class analysis have been reversed.

Thus, the post-colonial state is endowed with significant powers with respect to class formation. It is this conceptualization that makes Shivji's analysis distinct from that of the other theorists of the post-colonial situation. While for Meillassoux, Alavi and Murray the 'relative autonomy' of the state is engendered by a balance of class forces, for Shivji it is the 'overdeveloped' nature of the post-colonial state, in conjunction with the absence of any real class formation, that is of key importance.

"In an underdeveloped African country with a weak petty-bourgeoisie, its ruling section which comes to possess the instruments of state on the morrow of independence, relatively com-

mands enormous power and is therefore very strong. This was precisely the case with Tanzania.”³³

There is a vision here of a colonial state which had a major role to play in the colony's economy, being integrally involved in regulating and defending the economic system, and buttressed in its dominance by the absence of internal class opposition. It is this strong state, it is argued, that emerges as the crucial instrument of class formation in the post-colonial period.

Shivji's notion of the 'overdeveloped' state is similar to that of Alavi, but its position with respect to class formation is very different.

“So far as the dominance of the role of the state is concerned there is, therefore, a certain amount of continuity between the colonial and the post-independence state, with one very fundamental break: the post-independence state becomes the instrument for making the hitherto embryonic class a ruling class (also helping to carve out an economic base) and thereby initiating the establishment of certain specific social relations within the domestic economy.”³⁴

It is precisely the control over an 'overdeveloped' state in Tanzania that has, therefore, in Shivji's view, enabled a ruling class to emerge and to consolidate its position. The dominant fraction of the petty-bourgeoisie, defeats the commercial bourgeoisie, its chief rival, by using its control of the state apparatus to embark upon a nationalization programme. This action has a dual effect. It undermines the property base of the 'commercial bourgeoisie', private property, while, at the same time, it provides a property base, state property, for the newly triumphant faction, the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie.' It is worth emphasising here that the creation of the property base is successive to the achievement of control over the political state, and that it consists of state as opposed to private property.

Thus, on this account, the “Arusha nationalizations³⁵ constituted the first open attempt on the part of the bureaucratic sector of the petty bourgeoisie to carve out an economic base for itself”.³⁶ The nature of this economic base, located as it is in state, rather than private property, engenders certain consequences. The 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' have, of necessity, to consume within the limits set by the overall need to accumulate. That is to say, they must act with rational self-interest, and avoid posing a threat to their source of wealth by gratuitous overconsumption. Secondly, they cannot indulge in private accumulation. Since their economic base is state, not private property, private accumulation would undermine the position of the class as a whole and presumably would be supportive of

that of their rivals the 'commercial bourgeoisie.' Thus, the Leadership code³⁷ is a logical corollary of the Arusha programme, giving to the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' the necessary ideological cohesion.

"The accumulation of capital by the state is an important characteristic of this system. But it demands a restraint on the part of the 'bureaucratic bourgeois' class in terms of consumption so that the state may be left with enough for accumulation. Secondly, the individual members of the class cannot be allowed to accumulate because it is the function of the state to accumulate on behalf of the class as a whole. The 'leadership code' was objectively a recognition of precisely this fact. It placed a restraint on the part of the individual members of the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' not to compete with the state in the function of accumulation."³⁸

The acquisition of a property base in state property marks the establishment of the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' as a ruling class proper, the defeat of the 'commercial bourgeoisie', and the emergence of the contradiction between their class interests and those of the workers and peasants. The chief advantage enjoyed by the members of this new ruling class are seemingly the privileges that stem from their position and status within the state apparatus. In short, they enjoy incomes, and an access to resources, that makes them exceptional within a Tanzanian context.

"As a result of the historical circumstances under which the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' developed and its current domination of the state, and high income levels, it is members of this class who disproportionately benefit from various services education, medical facilities, etc."³⁹

The distinctive features of Shivji's analysis of class formation in the post-colonial situation are then, firstly, the assertion that the state's dominance is crucial to this process, enabling the dominant fraction of the petty-bourgeoisie to carve out for itself an economic base and establish itself as a ruling class. Secondly, there is the important idea that property is not owned by individual members of the class, but is state property, 'owned' by the class as a whole through its control of the political state. Finally, there is the assertion that the benefits of ownership flow from the favourable position members of the class are in with respect to the distribution of economic goods. Thus, while Shivji continues to assert that the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' is a dependent bourgeoisie, thus acknowledging the international nature of the class structure, he also asserts, rather

incongruously, that it is indeed a "bourgeoisie".⁴⁰ While, on the one hand he tells us that it is not yet a "fully-fledged class",⁴¹ on the other, he consistently accords it the status of an entrenched and established class with its own property base.

Shivji's formulations are a clear warning of the dangers attendant on over-emphasis on the role of the post-colonial state in class formation. In placing the prime emphasis on the political state and the political class that controls it he falls into the same error as Milovan Djilas in the latter's attempt to describe the ruling stratum in the Soviet Union in terms of class theory. Indeed the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' itself might be labelled a 'New Class'. Like Djilas, Shivji takes as the base point of his analysis the fact that there is a hierarchical structure in existence with a ruling group clearly in control, enjoying power, privilege and benefits denied to the great bulk of the people. Unlike a pure capitalist situation, in a metropolitan country, this group does not enjoy a privileged position by virtue of its direct private ownership of the means of production, but by its indirect access, to, and control over, the nationalised means of production, exercised through its direct control over the political apparatus. For both Shivji and Djilas the key feature that ultimately defines a class is not its relationship to the means of production, but to the political state. Djilas in his work *The New Class*⁴² clearly moves the referents for class away from a Marxist account insofar as his definition of property is one that derives from Roman law, where "property constitutes the use, enjoyment and disposition of material goods".⁴³ The nexus between property and ownership of the means of production having been broken, control of the political state and the ability to dispose of nationalised property is seen as a sufficient basis for proclaiming the ruling group to be a new owning and exploiting class.

"Ownership is nothing other than the right of profit and control. If one defines class benefits by this right, the Communist states have seen, in the final analysis, the origin of a new form of ownership or a new ruling and exploiting class."⁴⁴

For Shivji, as for Djilas, the new ruling class creates its own property base, after its accession to political power. In both accounts the relationship between what is claimed as a new ruling class and political power is of the essence.

Thus while claiming to give a Marxist account of the formation of a ruling class, Shivji has in fact surrendered to élite theory. The basis of the position and power of the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' as a new ruling class lies in their control of the post-colonial state. Not

surprisingly, for an *élite*, their position can be identified, not by their location with regard to the means of production, but their status vis à vis the distribution process. Their economic power flows from their control of the political, and not, as in class theory, vice versa. Class theory, defining class in terms of their relationship to the means of production, assumes contradictions and antagonisms between owning and non-owning classes. In postulating the struggle and conflict it is a dynamic analysis that assumes the necessity of change on the basis of contradictory interests. By contrast, *élite* theory is a static analysis that concentrates almost wholly on the *élite* and its efforts to maintain the status quo. Non-*élites* figure in this account as the 'masses', inert, apathetic and essentially incapable of affecting the issue. Thus, while *élite* theory is concerned with describing how a particular society operates at a fixed point in time, class theory is concerned with analysing the dynamic interaction of the contradictory elements of that society, in order to predict change. In the same way, while Shivji's analysis claims to tell us about class struggle in Tanzania, its focus, in fact, like that of *élite* theory, is one the way the ruling group maintains itself in power. As an analysis it thus has a static rather than dynamic quality. It can describe the features of this ruling *élite*, it can demonstrate the means by which it stays in power, as indeed it does. But it betrays its static character in being deficient in predictive capacity, beyond the broad observation that is that the *élite* will seek to maintain their position and will be challenged by the broad masses.

The defects of Shivji's analysis, it can be argued, are the result of an unsound application of post-colonial state theory. But it is also true that these defects spring from a development of certain themes that are basic to that theory. They expose therefore a tendency towards *élite* theory inherent in that style of analysis. It is a tendency that becomes the more marked the more the post-colonial state is singled out for special attention and given a distinct and important status in its own right. Murray, Meillassoux and Alavi, it is true, cannot be arraigned for using *élite* theory. They never treat the ruling stratum of the post-colonial state as a class in its own right. Moreover they insist that the peculiar nature of the post-colonial state is the result of a class struggle of international dimensions. But in focussing attention on the specific characteristics of the post-colonial state, in according it a key role with regard to the mediation of class, particularly where a 'relative autonomy' is claimed for it, they lay the basis for a movement away from class analysis, completed in the work of Shivji.

Despite the problems discussed, it is not suggested that we dis-

pense with the idea of the post-colonial state. Clearly in dealing with the post-colonial situation we are dealing with specific peculiarities, many of which are connected with the character of the political state and the nature of the ruling stratum of post-colonial society. In a nation such as India, to cite an obvious example, the role played by a very developed state apparatus and bureaucracy in the orchestration and mediation of class relationships is clearly significant and deserving of special attention. But the tendency towards an over-emphasis on the political and consequent emergence of élite theory must be guarded against, for there are signs that the road embarked upon by Shivji is already attracting other travellers. The approach of Bharat Patankar and Gail Omvedt in their article on "The Bourgeois State in Post-Colonial Social Formation"⁴⁵ places them in this category. In an attack on 'imperialist economism', they seek to assert the particular characteristics of the post-colonial state and its politically independent and therefore relatively autonomous role. While showing that special attributes attach to the post-colonial state, and, while firmly situating it within the processes of imperialist domination, nevertheless there is no justification for their assertion with respect to the political class of post-colonial society that "...we have a situation in most dominated social formations of the third world where there are bourgeois states where the capitalist mode of production is dominant, where the local (formerly 'national') bourgeoisie is the ruling class".⁴⁶

Care must therefore be taken in discussing the post-colonial state and the political class that occupies its positions of power. The discussion must be constantly set within the strict parameters of a class analysis that recognises the international dimension. Colin Leys, in a critique of the post-colonial state, has perhaps most succinctly summarized the necessary approach. As he rightly points out, "In order to understand the significance of any state for the class struggle, we must start from the class struggle, and not the state".⁴⁷ Such an approach would allow for a consideration of the specificities of the post-colonial state, while firmly anchoring such considerations to a rigorous class analysis.

One aspect of post-colonial state theory that must be treated with particular caution is the notion of 'relative autonomy'. It is this notion which, when severed from its necessary connection with the materialist basis of society, as occurred in Shivji's analysis, is the breeding ground for the undue emphasis on the political and the emergence of élite theory that has been criticized here. Murray Alavi and Shivji all appear to be in debt, in varying degrees, to the Althusserian school for their methodology. Some of the responsibility for the problems examined must rest therefore, with Althusser, for

the emphasis and determinative strength allowed to the political, within the philosophical framework of structural causality, is one that is open to criticism for clearing the way for pluralist interpretations. It is preferable to take as a benchmark the account given by Marx himself of the relative autonomy of the political state with respect to classes found in the Eighteenth Brumaire; an account that always locates the political state firmly within a concrete analysis of classes.

Analyses utilising the notion of the post-colonial state and its attendant political class can be useful therefore, but only if conducted within the strict parameters dictated by the class struggle. It is these parameters that, while observed in the case of Alavi, have been overstepped in the case of Shivji. We must, as Leys, insists, "start from the class struggle and not the state". The subtle relationships engendered by the inter-penetration of international and national forces in the dynamics of class are difficult to penetrate and to analyse. But it is precisely because class analysis can comprehend the mechanics of productive relationships that span national boundaries that makes it so invaluable a method of analysis. An ill-advised concentration on the post-colonial state is but a poor substitute.

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1. For example, Hamza Alavi, "The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh", *New Left Review* 74, July/August 1972; John S. Saul, "The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Tanzania" in *Socialist Register*, 1974; Michaela von Freyhold, "The Post-Colonial State and its Tanzanian Version", *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 8, Jan.-April, 1977; Bharat Patnagar and Gail Omvedt, "The Bourgeois State in Post-Colonial Social Formations" *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. XII, No. 53, Ec. 31, 1977.
 2. For example, Colin Leys, "The Over developed Post-Colonial State: A re-evaluation", *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 5, Jan-April, 1976; W. Ziemann and M. Lanzendorfer, "The State in Peripheral Societies" *Socialist Register* 1977.
 3. Issa Shivji, *The Silent Class Struggle*, Tanzanian Pub. House, Dar-es-Salaam, 1974, *Class Struggles in Tanzania*, Monthly Review Press, N.Y., 1976.
 4. Roger Murray, "Second Thoughts on Ghana", *New Left Review*, No. 42, March-April, 1967.
 5. *Ibid.*, p. 29.
 6. *Ibid.*
 7. *Ibid.*, p. 31.
 8. *Ibid.*
 9. Claude Meillassoux, "A Class Analysis of the Bureaucratic Process in Mali", *Journal of Development Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1970.
 10. *Ibid.*, p. 108.
 11. *Ibid.*, p. 107.
 12. *Ibid.*
 13. This interpretation of Meillassoux's position appears to be at odds with that of John Saul in his piece "The State in Post-Colonial Society", *Socialist*

- Register*, 1975, eds. J. Saville and R. Miliband, Merlin Press, London, at least where Saul asserts that Meillassoux has given a "vigorous scientific statement to the claim that the bureaucracy is a class with its own identity and interests." (355) As we have noted, Meillassoux claims that the bureaucracy in Mali was gaining some of characteristics of a social class, but stops short of declaring their status to be that of a class proper. As Saul himself admits a little later in his piece, "Meillassoux remains reluctant in the end to call this group a class outright". (356) Meillassoux's caution is to be applauded, for, while Saul presumably does not set the same store by the distinction involved, it is indeed crucial.
14. Hamza Alavi, op. cit.
 15. For criticism of this notion of the 'overdeveloped' state see: Colin Lays, op cit.
 16. Alavi, op. cit., p. 62.
 17. Ibid., p. 71.
 18. Ibid., p. 63.
 19. Ibid., p. 62.
 20. Ibid.
 21. Ibid., p. 72.
 22. Shivji, op. cit., pp. 13-16.
 23. As a group they centred, at least in the period before 1975-76, on *Maji-Maji*, the publication of the TANU. Youth Wing located at the University of Dar-es-Salaam. Some of the debates appear in J. Saul and L. Cliffe (ed.), *Socialism in Tanzania*, 2 vols. East African Publishing House, Nairobi, 1973.
 24. Op. cit., p. 33.
 25. Ibid., p. 32.
 26. Ibid., p. 38.
 27. Op. cit. p. 85.
 28. Shivji uses this term to refer to the Asian community, more specifically to the Asian commercial community.
 29. Op. cit., p. 13.
 30. Specifically he is clearly indebted to the debate on the transition conducted by Paul Sweezy and Charles Bettelheim, and his viewpoint owes something particularly to the latter.
 31. Op. cit., p. 7.
 32. Ibid., p. 12.
 33. Ibid., p. 63.
 34. Ibid., p. 33.
 35. Shivji is referring to the Arusha Declaration of 1967, which can be said to have inaugurated *Ujamaa* socialism in Tanzania, and to the nationalisation programme which followed it.
 36. Op. cit., p. 79.
 37. Reference here is to the Code adopted by the leaders of *TANU* in 1967. Under its provisions they agreed to divest themselves of any property productive of income. Thus, they agreed not to own more than one house, not to own shares etc. It was extended to all members of *TANU* in 1975.
 38. Op. cit., p. 95.
 39. Ibid., p. 96.
 40. Ibid., p. 84.
 41. Ibid.

42. Milovan Djilas, *The New Class*, (Thames and Hudson, London, 1957).
43. *Ibid.*, p. 44.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 35.
45. Patankar and Omvedt, *op. cit.*
46. *Ibid.*, p. 2174; my emphasis.
47. *Op. cit.*, p. 53.

JOSHUA DAVID KREINDLER

The years between 1919 and 1924 was a crucial time for the Zionist movement as efforts to implement the aims of the Balfour Declaration came into conflict with the beginnings of nationalistic expression by the Palestinian Arabs. Consequently, the strengthening of the relationship between the Zionist movement, the Jewish community, and Prime Minister Smuts of South Africa, were important for the Zionist movement's goal of a "Jewish National Home" in Palestine.

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in the furtherance of our claim to national reconstruction in Palestine.”³

Upon hearing that the mandate for Palestine had been awarded to Great Britain, and that the Balfour Declaration was included in the Peace Treaty at Versailles, the South African Zionist Federation cabled its thanks to the Prime Minister for his “Unfailing sympathy and powerful support.”⁴

In February 1921, Smuts attended the mid-year Imperial Conference in London. Before he left he received a deputation of Jewish members of Parliament and local Zionists who urged him to make sure that Zionist interests would be safeguarded. Apparently he kept his promise because after his return to South Africa, Chaim Weizmann cabled the South African Zionist Federation informing them that General Smuts had not only carried out his promise to the Federation, but had been of great service to the Zionist cause during the recent crisis.

During the years 1925-1933 when Smuts was not Prime Minister, he still was able to exert much influence on behalf of the cause. In an address to the South African Zionist Conference he reminisced about the history of the Balfour Declaration and the roles played by Weizmann and Sokolow in obtaining it: “I remember the travail and labor that was required to secure the formula of the National Home, which is far more than a formula. In the War Cabinet it was discussed....and there was a great struggle of ideas centering around this principle. I want to mention two names specifically concerned with the working out of this formula. One was Lord Milner. All praise is due to Lord Balfour and the formula is properly associated with him. There is another who worked very hard for the success of this movement. Today he is Secretary of State for the Colonies, Colonel Amery. I say it is fortunate that the Jewish People in our day, at so critical a stage in history, has been guided and led by two such great statesmenlike men (Weizmann and Sokolow). To the work of these two men, the triumph of the cause is due.”⁵ These words of praise, aside from showing the importance of Zionism, also indicate the knowledge Smuts had of the behind-the-scenes efforts to push the Declaration through, as well as his genuine sympathy with the movement. During the 1929 Palestinian Revolt, Smuts placed himself entirely at the service of Weizmann. Weizmann pointed out during this period that a Jewish National Home would be an important ally for the Empire and Jewish immigration to Palestine should be fostered. If, however, the sympathies of the Palestine Mandatory authorities were going to “drift” to the Arab side, it would be better if Great Britain gave up

the mandate. When Smuts met with Lord Passfield in December 1929 as a result of the meeting with Weizmann, he warned him not to continue "drifting" in dealing with the Jews because it would be, consequently, running against historic justice. Smuts told Weizmann that he had been offered the position of High Commissioner for Palestine and declined, but felt honor bound to help. On December 20, 1929, *The Times* printed a letter from Smuts, Balfour, and Lloyd George warning the Labor Government not to go against the Balfour Declaration.⁶ A few days later Smuts was on his way to America for a lecture tour on behalf of the League of Nations. At a luncheon in his honor tendered by the Zionist Organization of America on January 17, 1930, he told of the support that Zionism had, not only among the entire Jewish community of South Africa, but also within the Christian community of South Africa:

"I come from a little country where the Zionist movement is very strong. There may be doubts and misgivings or even a difference of opinion in other parts of the world over this great cause. In South Africa there is none. In South Africa all Jews are Zionists, and the Christians are pro-Zionists. And, therefore, in addressing me as you have done, you do not do it merely to a person, but you do it to a people, to a country which has not only in words but in deeds—through its contributions, and through its unwavering support of the Zionist cause—shown how wholeheartedly it supports that cause. It is a very remarkable fact which nobody knows, and therefore should be publicly stated, that next to the United States, the country which makes the greatest contributions to the cause of Zionism is South Africa.

I am here once more to bear evidence of the faith in me as a friend of that great cause. My friendship with the great cause for which you stand springs out of very deep sources. I admire your people for the contribution that you have made to the history of the world. Dr. Wise has spoken about an immortal people. I take off my hat to the smallest of peoples, which has made so great a contribution to the advancement of the world. It is a wonderful people. I have stood in Palestine at certain points and viewed that little land which is so small that those who sit here as citizens of the United States have no conception how small that country is. And yet, that small people, inhabiting a small homeland, made a contribution to the cause of humanity such as no other nation has been privileged to make. I know that we are doing justice and showing

the right sense of gratitude when we who are not of the Jewish faith and Jewish blood stand up for that great cause of that people, for what they have done for humanity....

It is not a small thing, not a hole in the corner. It was before the great history of the world, dealing with the great history of the world, that we made this promise, this Declaration which is called the Balfour Declaration: "His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people, and will use (these are the operative words) their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object."

The Balfour Declaration was laid down not in vague terms or aspirations, not merely as a gesture of good will, but as a definite constructive policy. "His Majesty's Government will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object." That is the promise. That is the policy; and it will stand. That was the first step. The next step was at Paris, when this solemn promise had to be pushed a stage further and had to become the law of the world, so to say; when other nations had to bind themselves to this solemn pledge....

At Paris the Mandate for Palestine was given to Great Britain. Under the Mandate the British Government is made responsible for placing the country, that is, Palestine, under such political administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish National Home and the development of self-governing institutions. Here you find not only the original promise made under the greatest stress to which the world was subjected, but solemn ratification of that promise and renewal by all Great Powers in the world taking part in the giving of the Mandate to Great Britain. Such policy must be carried out under this Mandate as will secure the establishment of the National Home.

In the days since August last, the question has been put whether there is any doubt, whether there is any misgiving, whether there is any weakening on this promise, on this pledge originally made by Great Britain, supported by President Wilson on behalf of the American Government, and finally ratified by the Great Powers in the Mandate. As far as I am concerned, as one of the original projectors of this Declaration, and in view of my knowledge of all that has happened since, this document, this promise, this pledge—the Balfour Declaration—will stand, and will be carried out both in the letter and in the spirit....

You will have to help more than ever with financial contributions in order to accelerate a reasonable pace of immigration to the National Home. Not only will your material assistance be necessary; there will remain the problem of statesmanship and of making peace with the Arabs. I do not despair. I think that with the wise guidance of the British Government and maintenance of law and order, and with the strong hand necessary in the East, I do not doubt that wisdom will be forthcoming and the initiative of the Jewish people will be forthcoming to help in the solution of the problems that have arisen with the Arabs.

There is a great responsibility on you. I do not want the Jewish people to adopt an attitude of faultfinding with the British Government. The British Government will play the game with you and it will carry out its pledge. On the Jewish people rests the responsibility to be wise and statesman like and to help in arriving at a settlement with the Arab people. I think it can be done with absolute consistency with the Balfour Declaration. You can have Palestine as a National Home without waving a red flag.

I hope that you will make your contribution, and with the British Government backing you up and carrying out in letter and spirit the pledge which it has given, and you helping from your side to the best of your ability to bring peace between two kindred peoples. I have no doubt that policy will win through and generations to come will see a new Palestine arise."^{6a}

Almost immediately after his speech he received a cable from Weizmann expressing his thanks for his words of encouragement in a critical time.

On October 21, 1930, the Passfield White Paper was published. This document offered as a remedy to the disorders in Palestine that Jewish immigration and land buying be stopped. At Weizmann's request, Smuts cabled the Prime Minister telling him that the British Government could not back down from its obligation for a Jewish National Home in Palestine. Prime Minister Macdonald reassured Smuts by saying that the prohibition of land buying by Jews did not mean that the Government was in any way shirking its responsibilities towards a Jewish National Home. Smuts also set up a meeting between Weizmann and Lloyd George, and, as a result of their meeting the Prime Minister wrote to Weizmann early in 1931, modifying the 1930 White Paper. The Seventeenth Zionist Congress which met in July 1931, did not appreciate Weizmann's conciliatory attitude towards the British Government, and, consequently, not only

demanding that MacDonald's letter to Weizmann be published as a second White Paper revoking the first one, but also insisted upon the creation of a Jewish National Home on both sides of the Jordan. Infuriated by their demands, Weizmann left the office of President of the Zionist Organization for the next four years, although he remained loyal to the Zionist cause and a staunch Anglophile.

In late 1931, Weizmann went to South Africa on a fund-raising tour. He was impressed by the united Zionist front which the Jews of South Africa displayed. During the next four years when Weizmann was out of office, his requests of Smuts were mainly of a personal nature. Smuts would help Zionist fund-raisers on their way to Palestine, and Smuts introduced (by way of a letter) M. Kentridge, a Labor member of the South African Parliament and an ardent supporter of the Zionist cause. Smuts advised Weizmann to discuss the developments in Palestine with Kentridge.

By 1935, both Weizmann and Smuts were back in positions of power. Weizmann was again President of the Zionist Organization and Smuts was a Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Justice. This simultaneousness of victory was Providential in that they were to meet two serious events and try to deal with them as best they could. The first event was the second Palestinian revolt in 1936; the second was the arrival in Palestine of the Royal Commission headed by Lord Peel. The Commission was entertaining the thought of partitioning Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish States. These events stimulated a considerable amount of correspondence and consultation between Weizmann and Smuts in which Weizmann asked Smuts to prevent the partition plan from being adopted as official policy. As the pressure on Weizmann and the Zionist Organization to accept partition grew, Smuts wrote Weizmann a "prophetic" letter saying that partition was inevitable; why not accept it on the condition that a certain amount of Jews be allowed into Palestine yearly and request that the Mandatory Authority remain not only to protect the Jewish State, but to protect British interests as well. Weizmann did not appreciate Smuts' suggestion and instructed Smuts that he do everything in his power to fight against partition.

When Great Britain entered World War II on September 3, 1939, the situation in Palestine was shifted in the minds of the policy makers to that of second place. The ongoing interest of Weizmann during the war, amid the sufferings of the Jewish people, was to implement the Balfour Declaration, although by this time the word "state" was used instead of "National Home". Weizmann, seeing that Great Britain was preoccupied with the war as well as with trying to find a compromise on the Palestine Question, wrote to

various officials about the possibility of using American Jewry, especially the intelligensia among them to exert pressure on Great Britain. Smuts approved of this tactic, but advised Weizmann that it could backlash on him.

In the middle of the war, Smuts broadcast a lengthy message to mark the twenty-fourth anniversary of the Balfour Declaration on November 2, 1941: "Whatever it was, the step was taken, the document signed. With the approval of the British, French, and American Governments. (Note: the Balfour Declaration was in fact not approved or disapproved by the American Government). It was at least a great gesture before History. And finally it was embodied in the Peace Treaty, and the promise to Abraham had at last become part of the International law of the world. The Balfour Declaration is thus not a mere accident, a mere eccentricity of the Great War, but in its large historic setting and its solemn legal form is one of the great acts of History."

In the remaining war years, the topics dominating the correspondence of Weizmann and Smuts were: the immigration restrictions imposed by the White Paper of 1939, the question of a Jewish Army, and Zionist terrorism against the British in Palestine. On October 14, 1943, Weizmann and Smuts met in London, their first meeting in eleven years, during which they spoke of the aforementioned topics. In 1944, with the end of the war in sight, Weizmann wrote to Smuts in October, asking him to oppose partition. As he had told Weizmann eight years previously, partition was now more than ever, inevitable. Weizmann was still convinced that if Great Britain would be firm in her demand for a Jewish State, the Arabs would acquiesce. Weizmann hinted in later memorandums that unless a Jewish State were formed, Jews would flood Great Britain and the United States.

On April 4, 1945, Weizmann again met Smuts in London where the latter was attending the Commonwealth Conference as a preliminary to the International San Francisco Conference. The two primary reasons for meeting Smuts were: 1—To ask him to use his influence to end the White Paper policy which stopped immigration to Palestine, and 2—To further Zionist interests at the Conference since the Jewish Agency had not been invited. Apparently, Smuts fulfilled his duty, because upon his return to London he received a cable from Weizmann congratulating him on the role he played at San Francisco. In spite of the stalemate on the Palestine Question (at the San Francisco Conference), Prime Minister Winston Churchill told Weizmann on July 9, that he would not discuss the Palestine Question until the Peace Conference would convene. At the same time, many of Weizmann's colleagues were pressuring him to resign

from office as head of the Zionist Organization because of his extreme Anglophilism, which his colleagues were afraid, might affect his activities on behalf of Zionism. Smuts cautioned Weizmann against resigning. His advice was well-timed because on July 26, the Churchill Government was defeated and the Labor Government came back to power. In mid-September, Smuts wrote to Weizmann telling him of his efforts to have the White Paper abrogated. Smuts submitted a lengthy memorandum to the Anglo-American Commission of Inquiry corroborating what Weizmann said, namely, that admitting 100,000 refugees would relieve the Jewish situation in Europe, and would stop terrorism once they arrived in Palestine as a result of which amicable relations with Great Britain would be reestablished. Weizmann testified before the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) during its sitting from June 16 to July 24, 1947, reading a letter by Smuts to him (Weizmann) as "one of the last surviving statesman who formulated the Balfour Declaration" which encouraged the Committee to recommend partition. After the UNSCOP delegation left and the Palestine Question was put to the United Nations. Smuts told the South African delegation in New York to cooperate with Weizmann as much as possible. On November 15, 1947, Weizmann cabled Smuts asking him to exert his influence at the United Nations, as well as on the (British) Foreign Office so that they would vote for partition. Smuts complied with both requests of Weizmann; on November 29, 1947, the partitioning of Palestine into Jewish and Arab States became the declared policy of the United Nations.

The year 1948 saw increased violence on the part of the Haganah, Irgun and Stern groups. Consequently, the United States suggested that since the United Nations could not enforce partition, Palestine should be placed under trusteeship. Weizmann asked and received from Smuts the help of the South African delegation in maintaining the United Nations partition resolution and getting Australia and New Zealand to join with it in support of this resolution. On May 15, 1948, the State of Israel was declared independent. Weizmann sent Smuts the following cable: "Now that Balfour Declaration has been consummated by establishment State of Israel I take opportunity of expressing to you as one of architects of Declaration and most constant supporter of Jewish cause my deepest appreciation and gratitude for manifold kindness which you have shown to Zionist movement and to me personally during intervening years STOP I understand that new state has approached you for recognition and I venture express hope it will be possible for you to crown your life long encouragement of our national aspirations by giving

speedy recognition STOP.”⁸ On May 24, 1948, in a cable to Foreign Minister Moshe Shertok, South Africa granted de facto recognition to the State of Israel.⁹ Two days later, the Smuts Government fell. Immediately after the Nationalist victory, Prime Minister Malan extended de jure recognition to Israel.

The new South African Government under Dr. Malan had a long record of anti-Semitism as well as racial discrimination, i.e. apartheid to its credit, the former being the reason for the internment of its leaders by the Smuts Government. Israel, to a great degree was created by the Western powers due to its feelings of guilt over Nazi crimes. In considering these facts, it would seem unlikely that both states (Israel and South Africa) would ever collaborate. However, due to the developments in the Middle East and Africa over the past thirty years both countries developed diplomatic, economic, and military relations, particularly after the June War.

Since Israel's admission to the United Nations, its representatives have made impassioned speeches against apartheid, as seen from this speech by Shlomo Hillel, Israel's Minister of Police:

“Amongst the people of Israel, this shameful tragedy of apartheid and discrimination has aroused the deepest indignation. Our position on apartheid, our support of all the resolutions passed here or anywhere else against apartheid, has not been only a matter of a government policy, but it was the instinctive reaction of our people for whom discrimination and persecution on racial grounds have been their lot for 2000 years, and who cannot possibly forget their horrible experience in our generation. I believe that for every Jew, and for that matter for every Israeli, the ugly face of discrimination is only too familiar, and it cannot but be regarded by all of us as the most horrible, shameful and dangerous expression of inhumanity. In this, we share with our African friends not only the same aims of eliminating apartheid, but we share with them the same feelings that come out of the same experience. These same sentiments might have aroused the words of the Premier of the Democratic Republic of Congo, when he greeted the Prime Minister of Israel in Kinshasa, as follows:

“The African people like Israel, because we are all victims of racial discrimination, and we have had to fight for our liberty.”

When Prime Minister Eshkol addressed a State dinner offered to him by the President of Liberia, His Excellency William Tubman, early this year, he expressed the feeling of the people of Israel when he said:

"...none have felt the lash of oppression down the ages of history, as have the Africans and the Jews."

As indeed was the expression of the feeling of the people of Israel in the message sent by the venerated philosopher and theologian, Martin Buber—and his appeal, with other Israeli writers and spiritual leaders, to the Government of South Africa:

"Yours is the supreme opportunity of proclaiming supremacy of sanity and understanding over ruthlessness...From the Land of Israel, we ask you to assert your faith in the nobility of man, whatever the colour of his skin. And if you 'Do Unto Others' in accordance with this faith, the future is yours, theirs and the world's."

It is our duty to continue to use this august rostrum to raise our voice against racism and apartheid, and to do whatever is possible and is in our ability to eliminate it. My delegation will support any resolution which aims at this purpose. We shall vote for such a resolution; we shall contribute to any programme of aid to the refugees from South Africa, as we have contributed last year to the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa. And let us hope that after all the day will come when—in the words of Martin Buber—"supremacy of sanity and understanding over ruthlessness" will prevail."¹⁰

With the passage of time and the strengthening of relations between Israel and South Africa, those speeches have become less condemnatory, such as this speech by Ambassador Chaim Herzog:

"We are asked to vote today on a malicious and irrelevant resolution designed to abort the expression of the universal consensus on apartheid that exists in this chamber. The concoction of lies and innuendos contained both in the resolution and in the special report of the Special Committee Against Apartheid on which the resolution is based, serve no purpose other than to assuage the consciences of the many states represented here which maintain close relations with South Africa. By singling out Israel for special condemnation and thereby diverting attention from the massive quantities of foreign trade, investment, tourism, gold purchases and oil supplies flowing to and from South Africa, the Special Committee has betrayed its mandate, sabotaged international efforts to combat apartheid and slighted both the General Assembly and the African world.

Just a few days ago, on December 4, The New York Times published detailed statistics on investments, sales, assets, loans and credits of major foreign corporations in South Africa.

Mr. President,

Israel's total investment in South Africa is an infinitesimal percentage of that of any one of the companies listed in that survey. Since the same statistics that were available to the New York Times, were available to the Special Committee Against Apartheid, we must assume that they have been deliberately withheld from this Assembly.

Israel's relations with South Africa are alleged, in resolution A/32/L. 23 to constitute "a hostile act against...the entire African continent."

I cannot help but refer the distinguished representatives to an article published but a few days ago, in the *Wall Street Journal* on December 9. It is a very detailed article describing the economic links between much of the continent of Africa and South Africa. Referring to this subject, a diplomat is quoted as saying that "hypocrisy is the main ingredient on this continent." I would add that the General Assembly shares this distinction as far as the use of the ingredient of hypocrisy is concerned. We are informed in that article that the South African Trade Organization estimates that South Africa's dealings with the rest of Africa total a billion dollars in exports and a half a billion dollars in imports annually.

Indeed I would draw the attention of the Chairman of the Committee to the statement by Professor Piet Nieuwenhuizen, chairman of the department of economics at Rand Afrikanse University in Johannesburg in which he describes the clandestine trade between Africa and his own country. Indeed, trade with South Africa is so extensive that it includes "almost every country on the continent," Professor Nieuwenhuizen says. "I walked into an automobile component manufacturing company's dispatch warehouse and the managing director showed me about 100 wooden boxes ready for dispatch to 64 different countries," he says. "There was hardly a country in Africa whose name wasn't included on the list."

That article emphasizes that South Africa's trade extends beyond the continent to socialist bloc countries that would like to keep such business connections a secret. The representatives of Byelorussia and Ukraine who have chosen to sponsor this resolution, will be interested to learn that according to the *Wall Street Journal* article, "they seemed to do their own shenanigans through Amsterdam and Antwerp."

Let us look at the facts, African trade with South Africa which includes the trade of many of the countries which are

co-sponsors of this resolution against Israel, amounts to one and a half billion dollars annually or 16% of South Africa's trade. Israel's trade with South Africa is 2/5 of 1% of South Africa's trade. Yet Israel is singled out for condemnation.

The investment of Europe in South Africa is 13½ billion dollars.

The investment of Asia in South Africa is 400 million dollars.

The investment of Africa in South Africa is 550 million dollars.

Israel's investment in South Africa is 1/8 of 1% of the investment of Asia. Yet Israel is to be condemned.

Israel's investment in South Africa is 1/10 of 1% of the investment of Africa. Yet Israel is to be condemned.

Israel's investment in South Africa is a tiny percentage of that of any single medium American corporation let alone the large ones. Yet Israel is to be condemned.

Mr. President,

This debate is an international disgrace. It is unworthy of any serious organization. By their craven submission to the dictates of those intransigent elements in the Arab world which oppose the process of peace-making today in the Middle East, the sponsors of this resolution have struck at the heart of the cause which they are supposed to be espousing. They have actively sponsored the case for apartheid because they have rendered the discussions here totally irrelevant by making them such a mockery.

We will not participate in this cynical exercise in international hypocrisy. Accordingly, because Israel has been singled out as the only country in the world for specific condemnation on its own in a special resolution, my delegation will not participate in any of the votes on this issue. Our position on apartheid has been clear and unequivocal. We do not need to be lectured to by those in this Assembly who preach a great deal and practice very little, if at all.

However, in order to identify with our opposition to Apartheid, we shall make one exception and vote for the resolution on International Anti-apartheid year (A/32/L.21). If there is a consensus, we shall support that consensus. But on all other resolutions we shall not participate in the vote and thereby express our abhorrence, our condemnation and our disgust at the farcical level to which this discussion on apartheid has been dragged down by allowing cynical hypocrisy and double stan-

dards to prevail.”¹¹

Ambassador Herzog’s speech not only seeks to defend trade with South Africa in general, but also to minimize Israel’s guilt with the ridiculous argument. “when in Rome, do as the Romans do.”

It is interesting to note how in a mere eleven years, Israel’s sense of morality takes on a chameleon-like quality, able to blend in with the scenery and the times.

Until 1960, the African countries were not a force to be reckoned with at the United Nations due to their colonial status. With the independence of the African countries came conflicting pressures on Israel, for, while wanting to win the friendship of Black African countries by voting against apartheid, they also had to consider how such a vote would affect the status of the South African Jewish Community, and, the reaction of the South African Government to such a vote. From 1960-1962, Israel supported resolutions calling for sanctions against South Africa as well as voted in favor of resolutions condemning apartheid. These actions by Israel against South Africa led to condemnation of Israel by South African officials. After the first Israeli vote against South Africa in 1961, South African Prime Minister Dr. Hendrich Verwoerd wrote a letter to a South African Jew which was “leaked” to the press: “They (the Jews) took Israel away from the Arabs after the Arabs had lived there for a thousand years. In that, I agree with them. Israel is an apartheid state. People are beginning to ask why, if Israel and its rabbis feel impelled to attack the policy of separate development, the policy of separate development in Israel is not wrong in their eyes as well...It may be said that they wish to differentiate in separate states because of religious and not racial differences, but if differentiation is wrong on one score, it is also wrong on another...We believed in the separate State of Israel, but now begin to wonder whether that support should be withdrawn, if, according to their own convictions, the idea of separate development is wrong.”¹² Eric Louw, the South African Foreign Minister told the Israeli delegation to the United Nations that if Israel would ever again vote against apartheid, South Africa would not allow money to be sent to Israel (by the South African Jewish Community) free of exchange controls, or would sever diplomatic relations. The threat of Eric Louw was fulfilled in 1962 when funds to Israel (raised by the South African Jewish Community) were frozen by the South African Government.

Following Israel’s vote against South Africa, Prime Minister Ben Gurion explained the background for the vote; “For 2000 years we knew what racial discrimination meant, and we cannot in the Knesset adopt an attitude of indifference to a regime that upholds

such discrimination in its most extreme form.¹³ "After 1960 we changed, because we did not want to alienate the new African countries. We knew that Jews there (i.e. South Africa) wouldn't suffer very much. The South African Government was very angry, but not against the Jews there—against Israel. If there would have been pogroms, if their lives were in danger, then we would have abstained, but we would not have voted in favor (of South Africa). Certainly not. A Jew can't be for discrimination."¹⁴ In the same Knesset debate, Yaacov Herzog observed that Israel had criticized South Africa because its national interest in friendship with the new African states was at stake.¹⁵ Dr. Haim Yakil, Director General of the Foreign Ministry 1960-1964, stated in 1966 that: "On no issue do I remember more discussion than on apartheid—among issues not directly concerning Israel's vital interests. Since 1951 this has been so. There was intense discussion among officials in the Foreign Office. The majority pressed for a strong line on principle; the minority stressed the welfare of South African Jews."¹⁶

It should be noted that during the years 1961-66, Israeli exports to South Africa averaged \$2-2.7 million, but its imports went from \$6.8 million in 1961 to \$3.4 million in 1966. Since exports went down so drastically it shows there was a deterioration of relations.

At this point in our discussion of the evolution of relations between Israel and South Africa, it is important to understand the staunch Zionist feelings and support of the South Africa Jewish community in order to better understand the "concern" of some members of the Israeli Government for that community.

Since many, if not most of the Jewish immigrants to South Africa were of Lithuanian origin they brought with them a staunch support of Hibbat Zion. This is not to say that there was no opposition, but rather, since it was only from a small segment of the Jewish Community, it was eventually overcome, and the Zionist creed became the unquestionable victor.

Before the first Zionist Congress in Basle (1897) there were several chapters of Hovevei Zion in South Africa. In 1898 in a Zionist Congress of their own the various Zionist factions united to form an umbrella organization, the South African Zionist Federation. The first all-South African Zionist Conference was held in 1905. Zionist activity greatly increased after the Balfour Declaration. The Zionist movement counteracted assimilation and unified the different communities in far-flung parts of the country. The South African Zionist Federation's activities was and still remains widely diversified; fund raising, promoting aliyah, tourism, youth work, adult education, and encouraging Jewish culture.

Although at the beginning of 1969, the number of South African Jews in Israel was over, 6,000, at least according to one source, most of them have gone back to South Africa. Some South African Jews who immigrated to Israel and achieved prominent positions in the Government are: Abba Eban, Michael Comay, Louis (Aryeh) Pincus, Arthur Lourie, and Jack Geri. In the 1948 Israeli War of Independence, thousands of South Africans volunteered. Of the 800 that were sent to Israel, one quarter remained there. Many Jews also volunteered their services for the 1956 and 1967 wars. As a result of the ongoing contact between the South African Jewish Community and Israel, Jewish identity in South Africa has been strengthened.¹⁷

Now it is relevant to analyse the correlation between the South African Jewish Community and Apartheid is relevant in order to understand this unique Jewish community's ability to blend into the "white" South African population, thereby guaranteeing themselves an established place in their country's society and continuing to serve as a conduit of funds to Israel.

The South African Jewish Community's views on Apartheid and/or lack of them depended upon (at first) the position of the ruling party towards Jews, and later, the position of this same party towards Israel.

During World War II, the National Party, was openly pro-Nazi. Yet, upon the independence of the State of Israel, Prime Minister Malan granted de jure recognition to the new State. This dramatic about-face could be attributed to the admiration of the Afrikaners for Israel in throwing off the British yoke (something which they themselves did) and wanting to gain the moral and financial backing of a very vocal and (economically) burgeoning community. As a result of the government's recognition of Israel, and the desire of the Jewish community to be as "white" in their views as they were in fact, Jewish Affairs, the official organ of the South African Board of Jewish Deputies from 1948 onwards never wrote a critical word about apartheid.

As relations between Israel and South Africa became stronger, the official resolutions and statements of the South African Jewish Board of Deputies regarding "racial problems" became more and more ambiguous as the following two statements will show:

"On South Africa's racial problems, the Board of Deputies' congress unanimously adopted a resolution stating:

Congress (of the South African Jewish Board of Deputies) recognizing that the fundamental racial problems of South Africa concern members of the Jewish community as vitally as they do all other sections of the population, urges every Jewish

citizen to make his individual contribution, in accordance with the teachings and precepts of Judaism, towards the promotion of understanding, goodwill and cooperation between the various races, peoples and groups in South Africa and towards the achievement of a peaceful and secure future for all the inhabitants of the country based on the principles of justice and the dignity of the individual. At the same time, the board deplored any attempts, from within or outside the Jewish community, to introduce Jewish issues into the political controversies of South Africa. It affirms that there is no collective Jewish attitude on political issues (and) emphasizes that, in common with other South Africans, Jewish citizens as individuals have the right and duty to hold and express views on such questions and to exercise their civic responsibilities through the political party of their free choice." ^{17a}

The following resolution was adopted in May 1976 by the South African Jewish Board of Deputies:

"Whilst recognizing that, in regard to the racial and political problems of the Republic, there is a diversity of outlook in the Jewish community as there is among our fellow South Africans, we share with all those who dwell in our country the great challenge and opportunity involved in establishing, on ethical foundations, a just, stable, and peaceful relationship between all races and groups in South Africa, which acknowledges the right of all to live in dignity and security, to maintain their group identity and distinctive culture, and to exercise the opportunity to advance in all spheres.

The Congress therefore calls upon every Jew to make his contribution to the promotion of these ends in accordance with the teachings and precepts of Judaism, in his personal attitudes and dealings and in the particular sphere of life and activity in which he is engaged." ^{17b}

This desire to be part of the Afrikaaner community was amplified by E. J. Horowitz, Chairman of the South African Board of Jewish Deputies, on July 8, 1951. "The South African Jewish Board of Deputies is a non-political body. It acts only in matters of concern to all Jews, and since individual Jews have diversified political opinions, the Board itself cannot adopt a party political attitude, and does not do so. The Board emphatically disapproves of attempts, no matter by whomsoever made, to persuade Jews as a group to vote for any one political party."^{17c} The National Party commented upon Horowitz's speech by saying: "The tone and tenor of Mr. Horowitz's

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statement are welcome...This is the only healthy position...In our opinion, anyone, Jew or non-Jew, who desires to force a united Jewish front on one side or other side in South African politics is a threat to race relations and to Jewry as a whole. The consolidation of Jewry against one of the big parties can only lead to the formation of a front against Jewry."^{17d} Considering that the National Party was "one of the big parties", the National Party's newspaper was appending a subtle warning to Horowitz's words, i.e., if you fight us, we will resume our anti-Semitic policies, consequently, the silence of South African Jewry on apartheid. In March 1960, South African police suppressed a demonstration in Sharpeville, killing 70 people. Not a single leading member of the Jewish Community spoke out against this terrible act. The "Board" again stressed that it was a non-political party.

In 1961, the President of Upper Volta visited Israel. At the conclusion of his visit the governments of both countries issued a joint statement: Therefore they (the Israeli and Upper Volta Governments) regard the apartheid policy of South Africa as disadvantageous to the interests of the non-white majority of that land."^{17e} The South African press asked if perhaps the time was ripe for them to examine Israel's internal and foreign policies, specifically its treatment of the Arab refugees, and its "racial" and political aloofness from the Arab world. South Africa was especially hurt in view of all the special privileges they had given to South African Jews to raise money for Israel (in tax-deductible form) and to serve in the Israeli Armed Forces while at the same time retaining their South African citizenship. Matters were further exacerbated when in October 1961, Israel voted with 66 other countries in condemning the speech of the South African delegate, Mr. Eric Louw. In a broadcast from South Africa to New York, Mr. Louw accused Israel of ingratitude especially in view of the fact that the South African Government had gone out of its way to foster good relations with Israel, and that Israel should have abstained from voting on that resolution. The three major Jewish/Zionist newspapers, the Zionist Record, the Jewish Herald and the South African Jewish Times were all vociferous in their condemnations of Israel's vote, not because it would have repercussions in the relations between the South African Government and the South African Jewish Community, but rather because it would rupture relations between South Africa and Israel. Many Jews who were still upset about Israel's vote at the United Nations, cancelled their contributions to the United Israel Appeal. Four months later the (non-Jewish) South African press revealed that the South African Government had rescinded the special concessions in the foreign

currency regulations which allowed South African Jewish organizations to transfer money and goods to Israel, however in 1967, if not beforehand, this law was repealed.

In conclusion, why should South African Jews more than any other ethnic group of the South African populace fight apartheid? The fact that many South African Jews have lost relatives to Nazism, an ideology just as dangerous as apartheid if not more so should make the South African Jewish Community sensitive to the oppression of a majority of the population. It is easily realized that a small white minority cannot forever dominate a growing, race conscious, black majority. "Siding with the powers of today is bound to mean alienating the makers of a very different tomorrow. Conversely, unpopularity with the bosses of the present might well be the price of becoming accepted and respected partners in the formation and running of a more just South African future."^{17f} Quite simply, if the blacks are the targets of oppression one day, it is more than likely that Jews will be the next victims. It is unfortunate that Jews in South Africa think that the National Party, by becoming so staunch an ally of Israel has become pro-Jewish. The most powerful gentiles in various governments have been the most virulent anti-Semites (Count Plehve in Russia who had spoken to and encouraged Herzl, Lord Balfour who at one time was against Eastern European Jews coming to England and Verwoerd during WW II was all in favor of exercising a quota on immigrants allowed into South Africa). The Jew is enjoined to "Love your neighbor as yourself" (Leviticus IXX, 18) and that eventually the Holy Temple "will become a house of prayer for all Nations" (Isiah LVI, 7) the Jews are not allowed to discriminate and yet, by being silent when it comes to speaking out against the oppression of its neighbors "the chosen people are choosing not to be chosen."^{17g}

Both Jews and non-Jews distinguished themselves in their aid to, and support of Israel before, during, and immediately after the June War. The South African Zionist Federation at one of its meetings in Johannesburg was reputed to have raised "tens of thousands of rand."¹⁸ Jewish doctors from Port Elizabeth flew to Israel, while their community raised two million rand. In a discussion in Parliament on June 5, 1967, members of all parties identified with Israel, and many leaders of the opposition United Party attended a special service on behalf of Israel in Cape Town's Great Synagogue."¹⁹ Students at the English-speaking University of Witwatersrand collected blood for the Magen David Adom (i.e. Israeli Red Cross). The Dutch Reformed Church (which is the national Church of South Africa) called upon its congregants to support Israel. Dave Marais,

member of Parliament and chairman of the Nationalist Football League, planned a game to raise funds for Israel. There were reports that the Afrikaaner fraternal organization, the Broederbond, had given money to the United Israel Appeal Fund; the Johannesburg Star reported that it had made a sizable contribution to assist Israel.²⁰ A spokesman for the Zionist Federation stated that several "well-known Afrikaans organizations are among the many non-Jewish bodies which have contributed to the United Israel Appeal Fund."²¹

The South African Government remained officially neutral during the June War, Foreign Minister Dr. Hilgard Muller stated after the war.²² The neutrality Dr. Muller spoke of was by no means absolute. During the war and immediately afterwards, the South African Blood Service loaned blood to Magen David Adom. The Government relaxed its restrictions on the transfer of money out of the country imposed upon Israel after the 1962 United Nations vote, to allow money to be sent for humanitarian purposes, while allowing all money donated by individuals to be sent without hinderance. At the United Nations, South Africa abstained from the votes in the General Assembly dealing with Israeli annexation of Arab Jerusalem which was even condemned by the United States; South Africa claimed that the issue was the responsibility of the Security Council. Perspective, the journal of the South African Foundation, a group of businessmen devoted to improving South Africa's image abroad, stated in its August 1967 issue: "The recent war in the Middle East aroused fevered interest and passionate concern in many parts of the world, but in so few a deep sense of personal involvement as in South Africa. Sympathy for Israel was not confined to the Jewish community, however. While South Africans generally identified themselves personally with the plight of the Israelis....All were aware of the analogy between the situation of Israel, surrounded by hostile neighbors, and the situation of South Africa...In the circumstances, it seemed only natural that white South Africans generally should view the Israelis as comrades in peril, and seek to assist and succor them accordingly."

During the Six Day War and the period immediately following, Israel had the financial and political support of the Anglican, Methodist and Presbyterian churches, who, in a joint statement, condemned the Arab States, and, as stated previously, the Dutch Reformed Church, as well as fraternal Afrikaaner organizations gave their moral and financial support as well. Chief Rabbi Abrahams felt that the support extended to Israel by South Africa was due to one important interest shared by both countries, namely, to fight against the spread of communism.

E.J. Horowitz, chairman of the (South Africa) Zionist Federation speaking at its 30th conference in September 1967, said that one of the results of the Six Day War had been the signs of a marked improvement in relations between both countries, though they still might have their differences on their mutual internal policies.

The positive reactions of the South African Government and people to Israel gave way to the idea of increased contacts between both countries.

In January 1968, Eliezer Shostak, a Knesset member of the Free Center Party, formed the Israel-South African Friendship League, whose purpose was to foster increased trade and general improvement of relations between both countries. The South African Foundation formed an "Israeli-South African Committee." Its most prominent (Israeli) members were: Colonel Ephraim Shurer, El Al's manager in South Africa and Dr. Shlomo Peor, a co-founder of the Rafi Party, living in South Africa since 1965. One of the first actions of this Committee was to arrange a meeting between P. W. Botha, South African Minister of Defence and Shimon Peres, Secretary General of the Israeli Labor Party. During Peres' stay in South Africa he said that Israeli-South African relations had undergone a slight improvement, the primary reason for this being South African support of Israel during the June War. "Although we still have different points of view, our relations are excellent.²³ Another activity by the South African Foundation Committee was to participate in a "Millionaires Conference" held in Jerusalem in the beginning of April to raise money from businessmen and to promote trade. David Suzman of Cape Town, was appointed chairman of the South African regional committee of the conference. A number of leading South African businessmen attended.

The newspaper *Die Burger*, official organ of the Nationalist Party in the Cape, wrote in an editorial on Israeli-South African relations: "Israel and South Africa have a common lot. Both are engaged in a struggle for existence, and both are in a constant clash with the decisive majorities in the United Nations. Both are reliable foci of strength within the region, which would, without them, fall into anti-Western anarchy. It is in South Africa's interest that Israel is successful in containing her enemies, who are among our own most vicious enemies; and Israel would have all the world against it if the navigation route around the Cape of Good Hope should be out of operation because South Africa's control is undermined. The anti-Western powers have driven Israel and South Africa into a community of interests, which had better be utilized than denied.²⁴"

One example of expanded commercial relations was the Israel

Fashion Week, held in Johannesburg and Cape Town in August 1968 and organized by the Israeli Export Institute headed by Ruth Kimmel. Another example was increased flights by El Al to South Africa. "Trade between Israel and South Africa has doubled since the end of the June War and air freight is playing an increasingly important part in this growth.²⁵ The Karmon Israeli Singers and Dancers and the comedian Shimon Dzigan visited South Africa in July and August. The Director of the foreign broadcasting branch of Kol Israel, Dr. Geoffrey Wigoder visited South Africa for six weeks.²⁶ Among the many leading Israelis who visited the country were Gideon Hausner, former attorney general and member of the Knesset for the Independent Liberal Party²⁷, and General Uzi Narkiss who came as a guest of the South African Zionist Federation.²⁸ During the year, trade between both countries rose greatly from the 1967 level. Exports to South Africa from Israel rose from \$4 million to \$ 5.7 million, an increase of over 40%, while imports from South Africa rose from \$ 3.4 million to \$ 5.2 million, an increase of over 50%. Despite an increase in the level of Israeli exports to Ethiopia during the year, the rise was sufficient to secure the position of South Africa as Israel's major trading partner in Africa.²⁹ The establishment of the Israeli-South African Trade Association was the primary factor for increased trade. Expansion of trade continued into the following year together with more visits by prominent Israelis to South Africa. At the beginning of the year, Michael Michael was named the new head of the Israeli diplomatic mission in South Africa. He had held the title of Charge d'Affaires and had held a number of posts in the Israeli Foreign Ministry. In a comment from Tel Aviv the day that the appointment was announced, the correspondent of *The Star* reported: "Israel will try in the future to maintain much closer and fuller contacts with South Africa. The pro-South Africa faction has, so it seems, won the day."³⁰

The former business manager of the South Africa Jewish Times, Harold Blumberg, was appointed to a post with Israeli Publications in Tel Aviv in January; he described his role as that of helping to expand trade through publications produced by the company. He was assisted by official Israeli sources, whose representatives in South Africa emphasized their desire for more trade. In May, Amitay Ben-Joseph addressed the Executives Association in Johannesburg, saying that South African businessmen could easily and quickly double their exports to Israel, and urging them to set up joint projects with Israeli businessmen.³¹ In May 1967 the World Federation of Diamond Bourses and the International Diamond Manufacturing Association Conference was held in Johannesburg, following the one held the

previous year in Israel. Given the importance of the Israeli diamond industry, becoming the largest foreign currency earner for the State, and given the world diamond market dominance by De Beers of South Africa, collaboration in this field grew steadily closer.

The Israeli-South African Trade Association announced in June that 17 South African businessmen were to attend the first meeting of the Economic Advisory Council set up in Israel. Their aim was to discuss ways and means to increase bilateral trade between Israel and South Africa.

The Israeli shipping company, ZIM, announced in early August that through its subsidiary, Gold Star Line, it would provide four ships for the South African-Japan route. It also stated that traffic on the Israel-South Africa route had shown a 50% increase since the June War, and that the Australian-Eilat run would be extended to include a call at Durban.³² The ZIM Far East director, Carmel Hacohen, who visited South Africa a week later came to study port conditions and inquire into the possibility of expanding South Africa-Israeli trade, for which he believed there was considerable scope because of the tremendous development in South Africa.³³

There was also an increase in the number of prominent Israelis who visited South Africa, among them former Prime Minister, David Ben Gurion, and former head of intelligence services, Chaim Herzog. Both came in May for the fund-raising appeal launched by the Zionist Federation. During his visit, Ben Gurion had discussions with Prime Minister Vorster, and was accompanied by Colonel Joseph Golan, former military attache in France. General Aharon Doron who had been commander of Tel Aviv's civil defence during the June War arrived in August as guest of the Zionist Federation.

In an editorial welcoming Ben Gurion, *Die Vaderland*, one of the most influential Nationalist papers stated: "Israel's survival is a fundamental part of our security. If our Jewish citizens would listen to what our important visitor has come to ask, help for the building of Israel, then their contribution is also a contribution to South Africa's security. Israeli control over the Suez Canal has meant that South Africa had gained a large material as well as strategic advantage."³⁴

Ben Gurion took the opportunity during his visit to deny a report earlier in the year that Israel had developed a nuclear weapon. Reporting on the Dimona nuclear project in Israel, which had initially been a joint Franco-Israeli project, the *Rand Daily Mail* wrote: "It is now virtually certain that Israel has, or is within weeks of possessing a nuclear bomb;"³⁵ drawing attention to the fact that Israel refused to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty, or to incorporate

its nuclear program into the International Atomic Energy Commission based in Vienna. This was followed in early May by reports from Montreal that Israel had assembled five small nuclear bombs. Dismissing the report as nonsense, Ben-Gurion refused to elaborate, but the report gave rise to speculation that South Africa and Israel might be collaborating in this field.

In November, Israel Aircraft Industries appointed a South African company, Placo, as distribution agents for their new Commodore 10 seat executive jet, which was due for delivery in August 1970.

Trade during 1969 showed a further rapid increase. Israeli exports to South Africa rose from \$ 5.7 million to \$ 8.2 million, while imports from South Africa rose from \$ 5.2 to \$ 5.8 million.³⁶ Israel's exports to South Africa thus reached the level of nearly a third of its exports to the rest of Africa (Israeli exports to South Africa: polished and cut diamonds, chemicals, medicaments, paints, foods and metal processing equipment).

The first report of trade in military hardware between Israel and South Africa was at the beginning of 1970; "The South African Government has begun to organize the export of tanks to Israel, marking a new stage in their cooperation. The South African tank is a 65-ton giant, armed with a heavy gun, and designed according to the model of the new British tank.³⁷" The following day the Jewish Telegraphic Agency (hereafter abbreviated JTA) reported; "The Israeli Foreign Ministry had no comment today on a charge that South Africa was shipping arms to Israel...The charge, which appeared, Sunday, stated that the South African Government was planning the export of giant 65-ton tanks to Israel.³⁸"

Not long after the JTA report, the Commander of the Woman's Army Corps in Israel, Colonel Stella Levy, visited South Africa. She was accompanied by Mrs. Tamar Eshel, in charge of foreign relations for the municipality of Jerusalem. They came for a three week visit to launch the 1970 Women's Biennial Zionist Campaign.³⁹

Allister Sparks, a commentator for the Rand Daily Mail, discussing the similarities between Israel and South Africa, wrote in March that; "They (the similarities) have broadened out beyond the Biblical and historical, in the contemporary world, they have become political too. There are obvious similarities between the position of modern Israel, embattled and fighting for survival in a corner of the Arab World, and that of white South Africa, at the southern tip of a black continent."⁴⁰

In July the South African Government controlled Industrial Development Corporation signed an agreement with David Golan,

managing director of the official Foreign Trade Bank of Israel, extending a guarantee line of credit for 10.7 million rand, to help augment the level of South African capital exports to Israel. In October, the Steel Pipes Industry Party, subsidiary of the African Gate Holdings, sold a spiral steel pipe mill for 250,000 rand to the Middle East Tube Company of Haifa, thus taking a share in the company.

Jewish Affairs, official organ of the South African Jewish Board of Deputies, had the following editorial, emphasizing the similarities between Israel and South Africa: "The argument that Israel and South Africa have a basic community of interests in the Middle East and further south has more than a grain of truth. There is nothing secret or sinister about it. The strong ties between the two countries, closer than ever since the 1967 war, are inseparable from their geographical and strategic position, from their anti-Communist outlook, and from all the realities of their national existence. In short, the destinies of the two countries, so different in many ways but so alike in the fundamental conditions of their survival, are interwoven in a much more meaningful sense than any enemy propagandist could conceive, or for that matter, would be happy to see. Israeli and South African interests converge not just on the eastern fringe of the African continent, but more positively in the heart of the continent itself. Both share an interest in the material and social development of those among the 20 million Africans who wish to seek their help and cooperation. It is on African soil that the paths of Israel and South Africa are certain to cross in the 70's, and, to an increasing extent, in the more distant future. It is not, and never has been a question of rivalry, but rather complimenting the other where they happen to meet."⁴¹ Such a clear analysis of identity of interest in the official journal of the South African Jewish Board of Deputies is an indicator of the extent to which the Jewish leadership felt identified with the Nationalist Government.

Besides the development of trade and the encouragement of South African capital in joint projects, the progress of cultural and sporting relations have begun to accelerate as well. Two Israeli musicians from the Israeli Philharmonic visited South Africa to play in Johannesburg in August, 1970. The Israeli Lawn Tennis Association declined to use its proxy vote at the Davis Cup meeting in London which was to discuss the participation of South Africa and Rhodesia, thereby disassociating themselves from those who were working for the implementation of the boycott of South Africa in sports.⁴²

In 1970, Israeli exports to South Africa amounted to \$ 10.7

million, while imports amounted to \$ 10.2 million. Exports increased to over 30% of the total figure for the rest, while the increase in imports from South Africa (up from \$ 5.8 million) meant that Israel imported from South Africa nearly half as much as it imported from the rest of the continent as a whole.⁴⁴

Increase in trade was matched by an increase in tourism between the two countries. The number of South African tourists to Israel increased by more than 11% according to Israel Zuriel, deputy director, Ministry of Tourism.⁴⁵

The most recent incident which potentially could have caused a break of relations, or at best, economic sanctions as in 1962 by South Africa against Israel, was the decision by Israel in the summer of 1971 to offer a contribution to the Organization of African Unity for use by liberation movements in Southern Africa. An examination of the relations between both countries during the year shows that this disagreement—which was resolved by the decision of the Israeli Government to withdraw the offer—did not affect the development of relations.⁴⁶

Trade continued to advance, with the South African government making two important decisions during the year in favor of Israel, as well as working to strengthen trade. In January 1971, the first delegation of the South African Trade Association, under the auspices of the Israeli Consulate, visited Israel. It was composed of representatives of some of South Africa's largest heavy engineering, construction, casting and foundry work companies. Standard Bank and Barclay's Bank International also participated in the mission, which sought to insure that the line of credit extended to Israel in 1970 was fully taken up, and that the campaign to strengthen trade would receive another increase.⁴⁷

At the beginning of May, the Israeli Consul General in Johannesburg, Itshak Unna, stated at an Israeli independence Day rally that relations between the two countries were stronger than ever. "We would not have been able to maintain this good relationship if we could not overcome our differences. On the contrary, a free and open discussion on matters on which we agree, as well as those on which we disagree, improves the atmosphere for a better understanding of each other's problem."⁴⁸

Almost simultaneously, the first permanent representative of an Israeli bank in South Africa was announced. The Japhet Bank, one of Israel's oldest and controlled by Bank Hapaolim, one of Israel's three largest banks, appointed a South African representative, Ephraim Freund, whose task was to promote trade contacts, especially in the field of base minerals, semi-manufactured and manu-

factured products, to promote South African exports by providing financing through associate companies abroad, to give information about investment possibilities in Israel, including the field of joint-capital projects, and to give exchange advice.⁴⁹

At the end of the month, the South African Government announced a further incentive to trade (with Israel). Controls on direct investment by South African companies in Israel were relaxed to the extent of 10 million rand, meaning that South African companies wishing to enter partnership in Israel or set up new enterprises, were free to do so. The ceiling of 10 million rand was generally expected to be raised once the investment generated the need for further participation. The South African Financial Gazette reported: "This move is seen as the forerunner of further relaxations designed to encourage the "export" of South African capital to Israel. The development follows closely several other moves which have highlighted the growing trade and economic ties between Israel and South Africa. The Financial Gazette understands that most of this credit (i.e. that granted in July 1970) has been subscribed and that demand for its facilities were particularly heavy after a South African trade mission, organized by the Israeli Consulate in South Africa, visited Israel's main centers earlier this year. The significance of the latest development is that the South African Government, for the first time, has given its official encouragement for further investment in Israel."⁵⁰ The journal also revealed that some private investment had already begun—the Desiree Clothing group of companies in Cape Town had established the Cecil knits textile venture in Israel, in collaboration with local interests, while African Gate had bought into a tube company in Haifa.⁵¹

The relaxation of controls was rapidly followed by a new line of credit being granted by the Industrial Development Corporation at the beginning of June. The second in a year, it was worth \$ 14.9 million. Again, the primary reason for the extension of credit was to increase exports.⁵²

The growing importance of the trade to Israel was revealed by the disclosure in July that from mid-1971, South Africa and Mozambique would be supplying two-thirds of Israel's monthly needs of sugar to be shipped to Eilat,⁵³ while Carmel Hacohen, of ZIM, revealed during a visit in October that the new direct route from South Africa to Japan was now being plied by Gold Star Line ships on a monthly schedule.⁵⁴ Likewise, the figures released by the deputy director general of the Israeli Ministry of Tourism, Israel Zuriel, indicated that the increase (of tourists) of the previous three years was being maintained. In South Africa to attend the conference of the

Association of South African Travel Agents in waziland and to spend two weeks in South Africa, Zuriel said that figures from January to June 1971 showed a 27% increase over the same period in 1970.⁵⁵

Increasing public knowledge of the growing relationship between Israel and South Africa and its importance, continued to be a source of embarrassment to the Israeli Government. In an article in the New York Times, C. L. Sulzberger wrote: "The basic truth remains that this country (South Africa), which had few friends abroad, regards Israel as one of them. For some time, Israel's policy of cultivating black African nations was resented. Now this has been forgotten in the belief that Israel's stand against Russia and Russian proxies at this continent's extreme north helps prepare a position for a similar stand, if need be, when the day for such comes to the extreme south."⁵⁶ He said that especially for South Africa, the relationship has psychological importance. Among foreign critics of South African policy, there are many Jewish voices, especially in the United States and Britain. South Africa feels, therefore, that if Israel is sympathetic, this will help its own international standing. He quoted South Africa's Prime Minister Vorster: "We view Israel's positions and problems with understanding and sympathy. Like us, they have to deal with terrorist infiltration across the border; and like us, they have enemies bent on their destruction."

What disturbed the Israeli Government most was the report of collaboration in the military field. Sulzberger said that South Africa was manufacturing the Israeli Uzi submachine gun under licence, granted by Belgium, and went on to repeat what he termed "wholly unconfirmable" rumors that the Israelis, having obtained blueprints of the French Mirage fighter, had made them available to South Africa. He also reported that he had been told officially that a South African mission flew to Israel during the June War to study use of weapons and the tactics of lightning strikes.

A Foreign Ministry press briefing in Jerusalem the following day denied the Sulzberger allegations about military ties, and claimed that the last links of even a vague nature, had been in 1955, when Belgium sold some Uzis to South Africa.⁵⁷ The Israeli embassy in Washington after consultation with Jerusalem, issued a statement saying that there was "absolutely no truth" in the Sulzberger report.⁵⁸

Attempts to develop arms trade, however much denied by the Israeli Government, were exposed by the Israeli offer in May to sell three airplanes to replace those of the South African Air Force which crashed into Table Mountain. While the South African Government did not take advantage of this offer, collaboration was 'confirmed' by

an incident in Durban involving a fire aboard a small Greek freighter. The ship, the *Antonious Ventorious*, had sailed from Eilat, via Mauritius, to Durban with a cargo of high explosives. The fire broke out after most of the cargo had been unloaded and led to publicity as to the nature of the cargo.⁵⁹

In early 1972, the expansion of links continued. It was marked by the decision of South Africa to open its first diplomatic representation in Tel Aviv, announced early in March. The former South African consul general in Angola and New York, Charles Finebaum, was sent to open the office together with E. A. Van Niekerk. Although the South African government refused to comment officially on the decision, it was welcomed by one Israeli official who said that, "it should have happened years ago. Israel must have considered the unfavorable reaction that is bound to come from the Afro-Asian and possibly the Scandinavian missions based in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem before agreeing to the establishment of the South African mission. By having accepted the South African request, Israel has shown that it values a close relation with South Africa."⁶⁰

A new South African trade mission was announced in April, when the Israeli trade consul in Johannesburg said that a mission from the city's chamber of commerce would visit Israel in November to consolidate the growing trade. The South African minister for water affairs and forestry, Stephanus Botha, visited Israel in June to study Israeli methods of water conservation, telling reporters on his arrival that he hoped to establish cooperation with Israel. The former Israeli ambassador to Denmark, Ester Herlitz, spent a month in South Africa in the early part of the year at the invitation of the Women's Zionist Council. She addressed a meeting of parliamentarians in Capetown. Raya Jaglon, president of WIZO, was also in South Africa during this period to assist with the fund-raising campaign of the Women's Biennial Zionist Campaign for Israel's Human Needs.⁶¹

An Israeli Women's Tennis team visited South Africa in March to participate in the international Federation Tennis Cup. It was the first time Israel had taken part in this event.⁶²

The pattern of growing collaboration continued throughout the year. One indication of it being the statement by the South African deputy commissioner of police General Danie Bester, in May, that following the establishment of diplomatic links, an extradition treaty was now a possibility.⁶³

Following the October War, Israel found itself being increasingly isolated, especially from the black African countries, as the following list giving respective dates when Israel was asked to leave

the following countries shows :

Benin, 10/6/73
 Botswana, 11/13/73
 Burundi, 5/16/73
 Cameroon, 10/15/73
 Central African Republic, 10/21/73
 Equatorial Guinea, 10/15/73
 Ethiopia, 10/23/73
 Gabon, 10/30/73
 Gambia, 10/26/73
 Ghana, 10/28/73
 Ivory Coast, 12/8/73
 Kenya, 12/1/73
 Liberia, 12/2/73
 Mali, 1/5/73
 Madagascar, 10/20/73
 Nigeria, 10/25/73
 Rwanda, 10/9/73
 Senegal, 10/28/73
 Sierra Leone, 10/30/73
 Tanzania, 10/18/73
 Togo, 9/21/73
 Upper Volta, 10/11/73
 Zaire, 10/4/73
 Zambia, 10/26/73

It is specially because of its isolation from other African countries that relations between Israel and South Africa increased so dramatically.

South African officials openly expressed their support for Israel during the October War. Mr. P.W. Botha, South African Minister of Defence and present Prime Minister, declared that "within our means and without declaring war" his government would provide assistance to Israel. Prime Minister Vorster stated that if Israel lost the war, its defeat would have important consequences for South Africa⁶⁶. To lend credibility to their words, South Africa immediately lifted exchange controls to allow free transfer of funds to Israel, and provided various forms of material assistance. After the war, South Africa became Israel's sole substantive supporter on the African continent and one of the few governments anywhere not calling for Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territory⁶⁶.

In the years since the October War, the two countries have further consolidated relations. They upgraded the level of their dip-

lomatic relations from the level of legations to that of embassies. Several joint projects were undertaken by corporations in both countries, and commercial and scientific ties were strengthened with the appropriate organizations and the exchange of high level visits. Political contacts were greatly intensified. Among the high-ranking Israeli officials who have visited South Africa since 1974 are: General Moshe Dayan, former Minister of Defence and former Foreign Minister, General Meir Amit, former head of the Israeli Intelligence Service, and General Chaim Herzog, former representative of Israel to the United Nations and now in private law practice in Tel Aviv. While such Israeli visitors had in the past usually been admitted to South Africa in connection with fund-raising and functions of the Jewish community, this limitation was dropped in 1974⁸⁷.

In researching the unique relationship between Israel and South Africa the following parallels, non-parallels, emotional and practical reasons explain why relations have been consolidated so well in the last decade.

Both Israel and South Africa feel that their lands are more than simply, places of residence, they are "promised lands." One needn't be an expert in Middle Eastern or African Affairs to be aware of the Biblical characteristics of both these countries and their peoples (particularly their newest settlers).

The Israelis claim that Palestine was promised to their patriarch, Abraham (of course Abraham is looked on as the father of both Arabs and Jews). Consequently, the modern term, "historic rights", for this particular people to a specific geographic area is a continuation of the religious and cultural attachment of Jews to Palestine over the centuries.

The Afrikaaners of South Africa have adopted and adapted the "historic rights" argument to their own national-religious beliefs. The Dutch ancestors of today's Afrikaaners, fleeing the unrest and religious persecution of 17th century Europe landed in South Africa in a miraculous way, just as Noah was "guided" to Mount Ararat. Providence had, in their opinion, given them a new lease on life, a new land. This religious bond to the land has grown stronger in the course of three centuries of struggle against various enemies, black and white.

Israel and South Africa, due to their individual struggles against the British, see themselves as nationalists rather than colonialists. In many present-day international forums, such as those of the Organization for African Unity and the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, Israel and South Africa are often accused of being vestiges of the colonial past. This is one accusation which raises the ire of leaders

of both countries. Israelis and South Africans have been taught by national ideologies to view themselves and their countries as the victims of the colonial powers. Both struggled against the British—the South Africans in the Boer War and the Zionists in the late 1930's and 1940's. Consequently, Israel and South Africa are at least as sensitive to outside meddling in their internal affairs as are other countries that lived under colonial rule.

Both Israel and South Africa view themselves as outposts of Western civilization (to guard against Asian and African barbarism). In spite of assertions of independence from European ties that are part of Israeli and South African national ideologies, there remains a strong sense of participation in the course of Western, i.e. European, civilization. Both use the parliamentary system of democracy, of constitutional government, and of freedom of religion. Yet because both are small nations that are geographically cut off from the North Atlantic world, there is a growing sense of isolation. A "siege mentality" or "Massada complex" has developed in both countries. In his book *The Jewish State*, Herzl said that a Jewish Palestine "should form a portion of the rampart of Europe against Asia, an outpost of civilization as opposed to barbarism."⁶⁸ The deepening antagonism of their neighbors has reinforced and intensified this sense of isolation.

In recent years many people in Israel and South Africa have come to feel that they have been abandoned by the West. Since its independence in 1948, Israel has had a fluctuating relationship with the West. The 1956 invasion of Egypt by Britain, France and Israel was reversed by President Eisenhower who forced a complete withdrawal. During the June War of 1967, the French government under Charles De Gaulle cut off further arms sales to Israel which was then heavily dependent on advanced French weaponry. In 1973, all of the NATO allies with the exception of Portugal, refused landing rights to American cargo planes carrying weapons to Israel. At the United Nations, there has been a serious erosion in the support given to Israel by Western states.

South Africa has suffered a similar decline—from being a respected member of the world community to the status of a pariah. Nearly sixty years ago, South Africa was given mandatory powers over the German colonies, South-West Africa, by the League of Nations. Today, South Africa is the object of universal condemnation by the United Nations. Unlike Israel, which continues to receive grants of military aid and also purchases additional sophisticated weaponry mainly from the United States, South Africa faces the prospect of a total arms embargo. If further international sanctions

are forthcoming, South Africa will probably suffer the loss of future foreign investment and may experience a damaging flight of internal capital to safer havens abroad. South Africa might have gone under economically much sooner but for its vast wealth in diamonds, gold and uranium.

In the field of military tactics and strategy, Israel has entered a number of contests with only partially modernized Arab armies but has, however, rightly gained a reputation as a strong military power in her theater. By contrast, South Africa has faced no serious external threat to her hold in the region, but the internal strife in recent times has reached a critical stage. Israel, by contrast, prior to the 1967 war, had purged its borders of an overwhelmingly large Arab population. As in the case of Kenya, Uganda and the Rhodesias, South Africa may ultimately find it impossible, even with a modern military to stand up to a black-white ratio of 20 to 1. Israel may also face a demographic monster if it does not settle the Palestine question. In both cases, military prowess does not seem to be solving the problem of survival.

Until recently, Israel's internal enemies, the Palestinian nationalists have had a "terrorist" image in much of the West partly because of the effectiveness of Israeli propaganda. Palestinian commandos generally have committed atrocities in public, while Israeli 'hit squads' have killed or maimed beyond the public eye. South Africa's internal enemies, the Black nationalist are viewed as "civil libertarians" and "freedom fighters" in the West because they have effective spokesmen in the United Nations and Western journalists.

Given this difference in public image, Israel enjoys considerably more latitude in dealing with internal security. A case of this Western intolerance was seen in 1973 when the Israeli Air Force shot down an unarmed civilian airliner that strayed over the Sinai Peninsula with a loss of 106 lives. Not only was Israel not condemned for this vicious attack, but it was even pitied because it is a nation that is in a constant state of war. However, when the South African government takes steps to deal with its internal enemies there is usually an outcry of major proportions. The closing of Black newspapers and the banning, arrest or killing of dissidents provoked a storm of protest. Yet the Israeli government has closed down Arab newspapers, arrested, deported and eliminated dissident Arabs for years without comparable international reaction of the proportion seen in South Africa.

South Africa has enjoyed a strong, viable economy while Israel's economy is weak and dependent. The difference in the strength of the two economies is largely a product of another non-parallel. South

Africa is rich in natural resources, Israel is not. South Africa is the world's largest producer of gold, diamonds, platinum and antimony, the second largest producer of chrome, vanadium and vermiculite. It is the third largest producer of uranium, manganese and asbestos. More than 90% of Africa's total coal production takes place inside South Africa and 80% of the continent's coal reserves are found inside South Africa's borders. Besides mining, the country's economy is well balanced with strong agricultural, manufacturing and commercial sectors. By comparison, the Israeli economy is negligible. One problem they share is that both are dependent on the exploitation of native laborers whose land they have colonized.

Israel has had the benefit of strong lobby groups in the West, because Jewish supporters and many Bible fundamentalist Christians have worked for Zionist ideology. Israel is bolstered by the pressure of strong Zionist organizations in Europe, the Americas and South Africa. The ability of these organizations to raise funds for Israel and to lobby on behalf of Israeli interests before their respective governments has proven invaluable to Israel time and time again. White South Africans, lacking the world-wide "family" support so useful to Israel, has encountered considerable difficulty in projecting a favorable image to the governments of many key countries: Rather, it is the Black South Africans who can call for the support of large Black populations in North and South America as well as in sub-Saharan Africa. The growing strength of the Black lobby in the United States is viewed as a growing threat to South Africa. To counter this, as noted above, South Africa has supported a number of public relations schemes in recent years. One may cite the "Time magazine" style journal, *The Point International*, whose initially appointed liberal editors were fired when they failed to remember that their financial support came from the South African establishment.

While the government of Israel continues to make statements at the United Nations criticizing apartheid, and from time to time makes seemingly "progressive" offers to the Organization of African Unity, it has become evident, especially in the years after the June War, that both countries are engaged in a process of strengthening their relationship. The role of the South African Jewish community, as sometime mediator between both countries as well as a major (financial) contributor to Israel, is widely known, but the Israeli diplomatic, commercial, cultural, scientific and military collaboration, which the Israeli government seeks to hide, keeps Israel to a large degree, in diplomatic isolation from Black Africa, and to a lesser degree also from the Arab World.⁶⁹

FOOTNOTES

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7. Radio Address by Prime Minister Smuts, November 2, 1941, cited in Stevens, p. 14.
8. Cable from Weizmann to Smuts, cited in Stevens, p. 102.
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13. *R.D.M.* November 28, 1961.
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- 17e. Ibid, p. 73.

- 17f. Ungar, Andre—"The Abdication of a Community" *Africa-South*, Vol. 3, (January-March) 1959, p. 35.
- 17g. Ibid, p. 38. For this chapter on the "South African Jewish Community and Apartheid" I have, aside from the above sources, consulted the following articles: Sachs, Bernard, "South Africa: Life on a Volcano: The Jewish Community in a Caste Society" *Commentary*, Vol. IX, (June 1950), pp. 530-537. Weisbord, R.G., "The Dilemma of South African Jewry", *Journal of Modern Studies*, Vol. 5, #2 (1967), pp. 233-241, *Jewish Currents*, January 1977, pp. 26-27, *Jewish Currents*, March 1977, p 47.
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Armed Struggle and Zimbabwean Independence

HARJINDER SINGH

On 21 December 1979, the three-party agreement reached in London marked the end of the seven-year-war and turned the Rhodesian colony into the sovereign State of Zimbabwe. All the parties accepted the terms of an independence constitution, of transitional arrangements for a general election and finally conditions relating to the ceasefire. Accordingly, elections were held in the last week of February 1980 and the landslide victory of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) enabled Mr. Robert Mugabe to form a government. His first statement that his victory was the victory of the Patriotic Front as a whole and that he was totally committed to peace prepared the ground for national reconciliation and allayed the fears of the white settlers. He invited Mr. Joshua Nkomo and two white settlers for their co-operation in a coalition government and this marked the beginning of a true multi-national state.

This agreement is, of course, the outcome of the various conferences which involved many people and countries. Initially, Britain made several attempts to find an acceptable solution to the Rhodesian problem, but with efflux of time more players joined the 'political football game'.¹ At one stage America was directly involved on the side of the British Government and prepared an Anglo-American plan for the settlement. But all these developments only succeeded in making the Rhodesian crisis more serious and complicated. Though the Rhodesian freedom-fighters never ceased to pin their hopes, on a negotiated settlement, soon they realised that Rhodesia did not fit in the typical decolonisation pattern and that the only route to majority rule lay in armed confrontation with the

illegal regime.² This new strategy changed the whole situation in Rhodesia.

The present tangle began in 1961 when Britain granted a new constitution to Rhodesia. This constitution introduced a new franchise system based on educational, property and income qualifications. It had two voting rolls—a high qualification, predominantly European, with 50 members for the Legislative Assembly and a lower qualification mainly African, with 15 members. The African leaders rejected this Constitution and boycotted the elections. The Rhodesian Front was able to win maximum seats and formed a government. But the formal colonial status remained and deprived Rhodesia of the freedom to pursue its own policies and Britain retained its right to interfere in the internal affairs of the colony. The Rhodesian Government was aware of these legal restrictions on its freedom. So it demanded independence. After several rounds of negotiations, the British Government finally agreed to grant independence on the basis of five principles: The principle of unimpeded progress to majority rule, already enshrined in the 1961 Constitution had to be maintained and guaranteed; guarantees against retrogressive amendments of the Constitution; immediate improvements in the political status of the African population; progress towards ending racial discrimination; and the British Government would need to be satisfied that any basis for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.³

The Ian Smith regime rejected these principles on the ground that the 1961 Constitution provided for, in the qualifications governing the franchise, an increasing number of Africans to be entitled to vote. It also 'wished' to see an end to racial discrimination by an 'evolutionary process', but refused to repeal the Act passed for the distribution of land. Following the refusal of the British Government to grant independence on the basis of the 1961 Constitution, Mr. Ian Smith declared independence unilaterally (UDI) on 11 November 1965.

The British Government's response to UDI was to declare it an illegal act against the Crown. It reacted with a series of economic and financial sanctions against Rhodesia.⁴ The economic sanctions announced by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom covered a total ban on the purchase of tobacco from Rhodesia. Plan to suspend the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement in relation to Rhodesia and to ban purchase of Rhodesian sugar were also announced. In addition to these measures, Rhodesia was suspended from the Commonwealth Preference Area and its goods denied preferential treatment in the British markets. The Ottawa Commonwealth Preference Agreement

of 1932 governing Britain's trading relations with Rhodesia was suspended. The exports of arms, including spares were also stopped.

Financial sanctions announced involved the cessation of all British aid, removal of Rhodesia from the sterling area and a ban on the export of British capital to Rhodesia. Rhodesia was denied access to the London Market and special exchange control regulations were introduced against Rhodesia. The Export Guarantee Department also ceased to give cover to exports to Rhodesia. Subsequently, another series of economic and financial sanctions against Rhodesia were announced culminating in 100 percent embargo on trade. The General Assembly also immediately condemned the declaration of independence and the Security Council in its turn, cautioned all States against the illegal minority regime. The Council then imposed sanctions which were soon made mandatory and in 1968 established a Committee to supervise their implementation.⁵ These measures aimed at putting a complete halt to the exportation and importation of all goods and financial capital from and to Rhodesia.⁶

The British Government also made it clear that it was not prepared to resort to arms to crush the rebellion. Apparently, the only door left open was negotiation. Just after UDI, the British Prime Minister Mr. Wilson invited Ian Smith for a round table constitutional conference in December 1966 in the Mediterranean off the Coast of Britain's colony of Gibraltar on the British Warship HMS "Tiger". The Tiger talks produced a document containing proposals for an independence constitution in accordance with five principles and a return to legality. But this was rejected by the Smith regime because the procedure for a return to legality included the establishment of a defence and security council in Salisbury in which a representative of the British Government would serve, and of a judicial tribunal to review political detentions.⁷ In 1968, the two leaders met again to devise a formula for a settlement. The meeting continued for three days but nothing came out of it.

The African nationalists on their part were opposed to this type of solution because they were never made a party to negotiations. On the other hand, they said that "Wilson's announcement that he would resume negotiations with the Rhodesian rebels was another 'down-right betrayal' of the four million Africans of Zimbabwe....It was a disgraceful contradiction on the part of Mr. Wilson, who, only the previous day, had said he would not negotiate with an illegal regime, only to come out on the following day with an open statement of defacto recognition of the very regime he himself had called rebellious and treacherous."⁸ President Kaunda of Zambia said that at the last conference of the Prime Ministers, "Britain told Zambia that the

rebellion would be over in a matter of weeks. Now they are telling us there may be a solution by autumn."⁹ He condemned Britain's handling of the Rhodesian situation because its policy had been "shifty and evasive". By holding talks with Rhodesia, it had given defacto recognition to Smith's regime. African leaders rejected both the talks as they were against two basic principles that is, the principle of non-racialism and the principle of right to self-determination.

The Rhodesian crisis became more serious in 1969 when the Smith regime prepared a new constitution to implement the policy of segregation. This constitution introduced the elements of complete segregation of the electorate with Europeans, Asians and coloured on one voters' roll, and the Africans, with wider franchise on a separate roll. It abolished the common franchise and cross voting between the upper and lower rolls. Further, all land was equally divided between the European and African population. As such, this constitution allocated maximum power in European hands and helped to "perpetuate European political and economic dominance at the expense of African interests."¹⁰ Moreover, the Africans were given 16 out of 66 seats in the Assembly on the basis of income qualification. This position was to remain until African income tax contribution exceeded 26.5% of the total income tax paid in Rhodesia. At that time the number of African income tax payers was very small and they paid only 0.5% of the total income tax. It meant that African income tax contribution would have to rise at least 53 times before more seats could be allocated to the Africans. The property and education qualifications also put the franchise beyond the reach of a sizeable section of adult Africans because the new qualifications were slightly above the previous ones.

The British Government of course, declared that it could not be a party to that kind of a constitution. But the real opposition came from African nationalists who said that the apartheid-style constitution was a last desperate attempt by the "settlers and their overlords in White hall to escape the inescapable destruction by the new politically conscious masses of Zimbabwe..... By this action Smith has sounded the death-knell to the British Government's hope of creating a multi-racial puppet government controlled and directed from London".¹¹

Having proclaimed Rhodesia a Republic, Britain together with the United States vetoed a resolution in the United Nations Security Council to impose tougher sanctions. But at the same time, the Conservative Government also decided to reopen talks with the Smith regime. In spite of severe criticism from the African leaders, the British and Rhodesian officials met and reached an agreement in 1971

on proposals designed to bring to an end the constitutional disputes between the two countries. Among other features, the proposals provided for the continuation of the nation-wide State of Emergency, no significant change in the present system of land distribution and the continuation of political trials and detentions without charges. For African advancement, the main features of this agreement were: to give more representation to Africans, to change the franchise conditions, to review the question of racial discrimination; and to get the approval of the Rhodesian people. This was to be done by a Commission with Lord Pearce as its Chairman.

This agreement created a lot of controversy among the African leaders because they were not consulted. A settlement between a white man and another white man was no solution to the Rhodesian problems because "the British Government and the Rhodesian regime were two faces representing a single coin."¹² President Kaunda said that the British Government was guilty of an act of injustice. Britain had given moral recognition to oppression and had supported Rhodesia's move along the road to apartheid. The British Government would now move fast to strengthen Rhodesia militarily and, hence, frustrate the struggle of the people of that country. The Pearce Commission, after visiting Rhodesia, also submitted its report indicating that the people of Rhodesia as a whole did not regard the proposals acceptable as a basis for independence.

Britain took note of this report and realised the importance of African involvement for any future settlement of Rhodesian problem. The Smith regime also changed its attitude and decided to start negotiations with the Africans leaders on the basis of 1971 Agreement. The first official meeting between the President of the African National Council and Mr. Ian Smith took place in July, 1973 and continued for about one year. But they could not evolve any formula acceptable to both. It was in 1974 that the Lusaka agreement was signed after prolonged discussions between the leaders of South Africa, Rhodesia, Botswana, Zambia, Tanzania and others. The agreement led to the release of political detainees, a ceasefire and the allowance of normal political activities as the basis for a negotiated settlement. But the terms of the agreement were never met as the ceasefire was recognised by neither side. At this stage, African leaders of the various parties decided to join the African National Congress.

Efforts towards working out a political solution of the Rhodesian problem were intensified in 1975, when an agreement was signed in Pretoria between Zambia, Rhodesia and South Africa to hold a formal meeting between the Rhodesian Government and the ANC. This would give chance to both the parties to express their views and

evolve a formula for political settlement. The meeting was held, but it was complete failure because the ANC maintained that it had neither been a participant in the negotiation which led to the Pretoria Agreement nor a signatory to that document. So all the negotiations must take place outside Rhodesia or the illegal regime would have to grant immunity to the African leaders while they were in Rhodesia to attend the negotiation session. The Ian Smith government did not agree to this proposal and finally the meeting broke down.

In spite of various efforts made by three parties namely African leaders the Rhodesian government and the British Government, no acceptable formula could be evolved for the Rhodesian problem. On the other hand, these talks made the situation more complicated. The reason for this was that the British Government was never serious in solving the Rhodesian dispute. She had not only neglected her responsibilities in Rhodesia, but had conspired against the aspirations of the African people. She had deliberately pursued a policy geared to entrench settler power.¹³ Economic and financial sanctions were of course, announced against Rhodesia. But these were never implemented seriously. In fact those sanctions led to reorientation of the Rhodesian economy and made it self-sufficient in some fields, during the first ten years since UDI.

Between 1965 and 1975 the average real rate of growth in Gross Domestic Products was 7 per cent per annum. This growth rate was twice the estimated rate of population increase and so the real GDP per capita rose substantially from \$ 163 to \$ 221 or 35% over the period under consideration.¹⁴ The figures for 1971 and 1972 show 10 and 11 per cent increase respectively in the GDP and this growth rate had outstripped most of the African countries. The GDP in 1975 was about three times more than its 1966 level.

The agricultural sector had been severely affected by sanctions. The reason for this was the fall in production and export of tobacco—traditionally the major crop in terms of the number of the farmers devoted to its production as well as the single principal export and foreign exchange earner. In 1965 the production of this crop was 246 million lbs. but it decreased to 146 million lbs. in 1973. In order to counteract the loss, various measures such as subsidies to farmers diversifying into less profitable crops, allocation of sufficient funds to meet the annual losses of Tobacco Corporation which generally buys all the tobacco from the producers at the support price for the resale to buyers at a considerable loss were undertaken. As a result of all these measures the tobacco industry began to recover from the impact of sanctions and in 1974, the total production of this crop was 165 million lbs. as against 146 million lbs. in 1973. In the budget of 1973-

74 for the first time there was no provision to offset the losses on the stockpiles. Consequently, the agricultural sector could survive the impact of sanctions largely by a policy of diversification into new products.

The structural changes show that in 1965, the manufacturing sector had surpassed the agricultural sector as the leading contributor to GDP. In that year the former represented 18 per cent of GDP and the latter 17 per cent. By 1974 manufacturing sector stood at 24 per cent and agriculture at 18 per cent. This means that the manufacturing sector grew fastest between 1965 and 1974 rising 142 per cent in real terms.¹⁵ Gross output in 1974 was about 21 per cent higher than 1973. The number of factories increased from 1023 in 1965 to 1300 in 1974. The main increase was in textiles and non-metallic. As far as the mining sector is concerned, its contribution to the GDP was of course less than 7%. It was the second most important source of foreign exchange earnings and represented the largest concentration of foreign investment in Rhodesia. Despite sanctions, the output of the mining sector increased from a value index of 102.2 in 1965 to 169.5 in 1975.¹⁶ Exports had continued though usually at less than world prices.

European immigration had always been an important factor for determining its prosperity. The population estimates show that the natural rate of growth of European population was only 0.9 per cent as against 3.6 per cent of African population. But the European immigration had always been higher than birth rate. Final immigration figures for 1975 show that the territory had a net gain of 1925 European immigrants.¹⁷ The Smith regime also launched an international recruitment drive for nationals of other countries to join its army. Sanctions could not even discourage this type of movement of foreigners.

The main objective of these sanctions was to prevent all forms of trade between Rhodesia and the world. The analysis of foreign trade statistics shows that while sanctions might have some disturbing effect on the economy, foreign trade had not come to halt.¹⁸ Although its imports fell from R\$ 245 million in 1965 to R\$ 211 millions in 1968, they progressively picked up to R\$ 249 million in 1970 to beat even the pre-UDI level. Similarly, there was initially a sharp fall in exports from R\$ 322 million to R\$ 273 million during the same period. But the territory was able to maintain a favourable balance in her visible trade. Even if we add invisible trade and capital inflow, Rhodesia showed a surplus of R\$ 3 million in 1970. During the period from 1971 to 1975 Rhodesia had favourable balance of trade for all the years. By taking into account the invisible and capital

inflow, the balance of payment which showed a deficit of R\$ 26 million in 1971 moved to a surplus of R\$ 1 million in 1972. But due to high invisible items, the balance of payment again moved to a deficit of about R\$ 27 million in 1975.

The foregoing analysis shows that sanctions could not bring down the illegal regime. So much so, that by 1974, they could point to a minor economic miracle. The growth rate of the economy and its various sectors was far more impressive than that of most African countries. This was made possible by a number of western countries which assisted the illegal regime in the evasion of sanction. It is no secret that major western traders with Rhodesia had continued to carry on their trade. In the United States, Union Carbide had continued to violate the UN sanctions regarding Rhodesian chrome. From Britain, oil had continued to flow into Rhodesia. France had continued to supply this regime with French helicopters. Rhodesian tobacco and minerals had found their way to various countries.

Why the western countries could not be forced to implement sanctions against Rhodesia. This was mostly due to the fact that until 1975, the nationalist movements were not under one umbrella. The liberation movements involved in the struggle against the illegal regime were the Zimbabwe African Notional Union, Zimbabwe African peoples' Union and the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe. The first two were formed in 1963 to wage an intensive political campaign to liberate the territory. The third Front was formed in 1971. In its new phase, ZANU had concentrated its activities in the north-east of the territory and the operation of ZAPU had been centered in the area along the Zambia border. The leaders of these Unions wanted to work out a solution of Rhodesian problem through negotiation with Mr. Ian Smith and the British Government and hesitated to resort to arms. Consequently, they could not create conditions which forced the western countries for the implementation of sanctions and finally for the settlement of Rhodesian problem.

The defeat of the constitutional struggle of African leaders led to a gradual reassessment of the enemy and the strategy to be adopted for solving the Rhodesian problem. They realised that they would never gain their freedom without taking up arms. But this strategy required a single national army and political unity of liberation movements. Relations between ZAPU and ZANU had never been very good. Over the years fruitless attempts were made to achieve unity. It was in 1976 that ZAPU and ZANU agreed to form a new Patriotic Front which had committed itself to a unifying fighting Force and pledged to harmonise its political orientations and programmes as well.¹⁹

Just after its formation, the Front carried out its attacks and evaded the security forces with unprecedented success. This strategy disrupted the whole economy. An independent study conducted on Rhodesia observed that "with its limited gross national product, the illegal regime can afford only a small defence force and that the problems of obsolescence and the acquisition of spare parts have been accentuated by sanctions. Although the security forces, backed by paramilitary support from South Africa, have uptill now managed to function in the face of shortages of manpower, equipment and facilities, this situation cannot continue indefinitely. If the guerrillas are able to expand their numbers significantly, it is doubtful whether white minority rule could be sustained."

At the end of 1974, there were said to be 400 partisans inside Rhodesia and 5,500 outside. By 1977, South African intelligence sources estimated the guerrilla strength at about 15,000 men.²⁰ They had inflicted heavy blows on the Smith Regime and carried the war right to the door-step of Salisbury. The war of liberation had driven the minority regime from most parts of the country, with the countryside falling rapidly into the control of the Patriotic Front. At that time, its forces had full control over 90 per cent of the country.²¹ By 1978, the forces of the Front were present and operated within every rural district in the country.

As a result of this, there had been a massive increase in defence and defence-related expenditure of the illegal regime since the guerrilla war. It was less than R\$ 150 million in 1978. It was estimated that the Ministry of Defence Expenditure would rise to R\$ 160 million in 1978-79. The Police Expenditure would be R\$ 72.7 million. The estimated expenditure for the Ministry of Combined Operation would be R\$ 0.3 million. At the same time, the Ministry of External Affairs would spend R\$ 2.5 million on civil defence. This brings the total estimated expenditure on defence, law and order and other related activities to about R\$ 246 in 1978-79. Introducing the 1979-80 budget to the House of Assembly on 26 July 1979, the Minister of Finance said, "the immediate aim of the Government was to ensure the military superiority of the armed forces. To this end the budget was 'unashamedly a war budget.'"²² The cost of war had arisen four fold in the past five years to R\$ 1.1 million a day.²³ The current expenditure of defence was about 37 per cent of the total budget.

On top of this, the war affected the supply of skilled manpower with white males facing military call-up for upto 6 months of every year. Increasing insecurity had accelerated European immigration at the rate of some one thousand a month and as a result of this

Rhodesia had a net loss of a record 13,707 on European migration in 1978—factor of major concern to the regime.²⁴

After 1974 the economy was no longer able to withstand the pressures of war. The real Gross Domestic Product fell successively for five years. In 1979 the decrease in the rate of growth of GDP was the sharpest. As a result of this, the GDP per capita had fallen to \$ 165, just a fraction the 1965 figure.²⁵ It was mostly due to the guerilla offensive which had been directed at almost all the sectors. Commercial farming, virtually, all of it run by whites, accounted for half of the country's export earnings. The farmers' pivotal position had made them a prime target for the guerrillas and consequently it was estimated that some 2,000 of the 6200 white-owned farms had been abandoned.²⁶ At least 600,000 cattle were estimated to have just died in one year. "Political and military factors have already affected farming sector to an extent where national self-sufficiency in maize and beef is coming to an end."²⁷ The production and export of tobacco had also gone down. The production of tobacco which was 95,000 tons in 1975 decreased to 56,000 tons in 1978.

The manufacturing sector which had reached its highest point of production in 1974 was subsequently, hit by a combination of adverse condition like shortages of foreign exchange to pay for vital imports, transport problems and a general loss of confidence on account of the war. The production fell for three successive years. There was a marginal 1.3 per cent decline in manufacturing production in 1975 but in 1976 the fall in production 6.6 per cent. According to official figures released in 1978, the fall in manufacturing production was 6 per cent in 1977. The output was running at its lowest level since 1971.²⁸ The value of mining output had of course gone up. The real value and volume of mining production doubled during the UDI period reaching a high in 1976. But in 1977, a 5 per cent decrease in volume was recorded. In 1978 the volume of mining dropped by an additional 7 per cent but the value of production rose to a new high of R\$ 250 million.²⁹ This was due to the rise in the price of mineral products on the world market. Although the country's mining potential is considerable, there was virtually no prospecting or exploitation taking place because of war. It was decided to close the Sham-rock copper mine in north-east Rhodesia because there had been "terrorist incidents" in the area. The search for new minerals had also to be virtually abandoned.

A brief analysis of the national account reveals that while on an average merchandise trade was positive, invisible trade was increasingly negative and the current account deficit was made good by capital imports. A closer examination of invisibles indicates that "net

services moved progressively into a deficit position, starting at—\$ 51 million in 1965 and reaching over—\$ 150 million in 1977. This substantial increase in cost was primarily due to the effect of sanctions and war which made it more and more expensive for land-locked Rhodesia to trade with the outer world”.³⁰ As a result of this, the balance of payment slipped into deficit in 1977 after recording surplus of \$ 17 million in 1976.

Under these circumstances, it was realised that “unless a political settlement ends the guerrilla war, the lifting of sanctions in itself will not transform the economy. So long as the war continues and escalates, the main benefits of sanctions-lifting cannot be reaped.”³¹ In the coming years, “the volume of Rhodesian exports will be held back by the combination of last year season’s severe drought, the transport bottleneck (which is intensified by guerrilla attack on the main railway link to South Africa at Beit Bridge), and the shortage of skilled man power due to call-up and the emigration of 1,000 whites a month. The capacity for increased production simply does not exist.”³² Export prices would, of course, improve and Rhodesia would be saved the costs of evading economic sanctions in trading. The result could be an improvement in the balance of payments. But it would fall well short of economic recovery.

After the formation of the Patriotic front, the United States decided to intervene. In a statement of policy on Africa Henry Kissinger called for common action to achieve the goals of national independence, economic development and social justice. He also confirmed that the British stand that independence must be preceded by majority rule to be achieved within two years had the support of the American Government. The Smith regime accepted the proposal for majority rule within two years, but suggested holding a conference to fix the structure and function of a transitional government. Accordingly, a Conference in Geneva was called in September 1976. For this conference, Mr. Kissinger prepared a plan for Rhodesian settlement which included agreement by the Smith regime to majority rule within two years; an immediate meeting between the regime and African leaders to organise an interim government; a Council of State and Council of Ministers consisting of both black and white members but organised in such a way as to leave the whites with an effective veto; the of Defence and Law and Order Ministries were to remain under the control of the whites during the interim period and sanctions to be lifted and all acts of war to cease upon the establishment of the government.

The African leaders whose approval had not been sought, rejected the proposal. The Presidents of five frontline states stated

that to accept Kissinger's plan would be tantamount to legalising the colonialist and racist structures of power. The final breakdown of the Conference came when Mr. Richard, Chairman of the Conference, visited Africa and the two key African leaders refused to meet him on the plea that discussions with him would be a futile exercise. For them an interim period of two years for majority rule was too long. They also made it clear that there should be no direct American participation in any conference.

The British Government then decided to send a mission of American and British officials for consultation and finally evolving an acceptable solution. The mission met African leaders and the South African Government and on the basis of its discussions, announced the Anglo-American plan in September 1977 embodying the surrender of power by the illegal regime and a return to legality; and orderly and peaceful transition to independence during 1978: free and impartial elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage; the establishment by the British Government of a transitional administration, with the task of conducting the elections for an independent government: the presence of a UN force, during the transitional period: an Independence Constitution providing for a democratically elected government, the abolition of discrimination, the protection of human rights and the independence of judiciary. The plan also called for immediate resignation of the Smith Government and the acceptance of a resident British Commissioner who would look after the transitional administration. During this period, the Rhodesian armed Forces and the guerilla forces would be disbanded and a new army organised by the elected government.

This was also made clear by the British Government that the new Anglo-American Plan would be the last chance for negotiation. But in spite of this the plan was rejected by both the Smith Government and the Patriotic Front leaders. Mr. Smith stipulated that the security forces must remain intact until, indeed after, a Black-led government comes in. The African leaders insisted that "any movement from war to independence must be superimposed by those forces fighting for change i.e. the replacement of the security forces by guerrillas to protect the property and to conduct the elections. The gap was very wide and the British efforts could not bridge it.

Mr. Ian Smith had always given the impression that left to himself he would be able to find a solution acceptable to the moderate black leaders who stayed inside the country and enjoyed the support of the majority of African population. Unable to win the war against the guerrillas, Smith invited the African leaders for constitutional negotiations. African nationalists, living in Rhodesia, reacted favour-

ably to the call for a constitutional conference based on one-man one vote formulae. The Patriotic Front leaders denounced this plan of internal settlement and intimated that they would fight any black government installed as a result of the negotiations. They said that they were not fighting against the white man. They were fighting basically against an evil system. This fight would continue no matter who would head that evil system.³³

After almost twelve weeks of talks with the moderate black leaders, Mr. Ian Smith signed an agreement on March 1978. Following this agreement, a transitional government was established in Rhodesia consisting of Mr. Ian Smith as Prime Minister and three other moderate African leaders—Bishop A. Muzorewa, the Rev. N. Sithole and Chief J. Chirau as members of the Executive Council. The Prime functions of this transitional government were to release the detainees; to review sentences for offence of a political character, the removal of discrimination, the creation of a climate conducive to the holding of free and democratic elections, and drafting of the new constitution in terms of this agreement. The Legislative Assembly consisted of 100 members. Out of these 72 seats were reserved for blacks elected by voters. The remaining 28 seats were kept for whites.

Behind the facade of a "transfer of power" to African majority by means of this settlement lay the fact that real power continued to remain in the hands of the whites for at least a decade to come. This agreement was sharply criticised by the Patriotic Front leaders on the ground that it did not amount to a settlement. The agreement, instead of ending the war as proclaimed, would worsen it and prolong the agony of the people. They made clear that it was a basic principle of human relation that if "you want peace you must speak to your enemies and not to your friends,"³⁴ and peace was impossible if the settlement did not involve the Patriotic Front. The Presidents of Tanzania, Mozambique, Botswana, Zambia and leaders of the Patriotic Front met in Dar-es-Salam between March 25 and 26 1978 to review the situation in Zimbabwe and observed that right from the outset the illegal minority and racist regime in the British colony of Southern Rhodesia had opposed the Anglo-American proposals. The Patriotic Front and the frontline states wholly and unreservedly condemned this agreement.

This internal settlement also failed to achieve its objective of winning British and American recognition for the lifting of sanctions. But the British Government, of course, announced that his government together with the United States would try to bring all the parties together with a view to widening the areas of agreement. To make any progress, it was necessary to involve the parties to the Salisbury

talks as well as the leaders of the Patriotic Front. The United States also favoured a new attempt to achieve a settlement based on the principles of the Anglo-American plan. On the other hand, Mr. Smith proved wrong in his assumption that the black members of the transitional government would be able to stop war. In fact, the war had escalated since the agreement was signed.³⁵ These leaders did not have the support of the African population in Rhodesia. This is indicated by the fact that several political rallies involving three African members of the transitional government had been called off due to lack of attendance. Moreover, Mr. Smith also frankly disclosed that the internal settlement was not working and made an appeal to the British Government to resolve the Rhodesian problem. This appeal dominated talks between officials of Britain and the USA in London and they were in total agreement about dealing with Mr. Smith and getting him to a round table conference.

To begin with, Mr. Smith was granted a visa to visit the United States with the hope that this visit would contribute to the process of achieving a settlement of Rhodesian conflict. African countries at the UN condemned the American decision to grant a visa as the decision was in violation of the UN Charter. In this meeting Mr. Smith agreed with the USA and Britain on the frame work of a plan for an all party conference to determine the future of Rhodesia. They agreed at this meeting on five basic points, viz., provisions for holding free and fair election; agreement for ceasefire; agreement for transitional administration to guide Rhodesian independence and black majority rule, and the formation of armed forces to serve the independent government. With these five points it was decided to call an all party conference, though no date was set for this purpose.

But the African leaders did not support this all party conference. During his visit to Southern Africa, Mr. Cladwyn Hughes, British official, was told by the leaders that they would not attend this conference unless Mr. Smith accepted major provisions of the Anglo-American plan for Rhodesia. These included the presence of a peace keeping force, the dismantling of the present interim administration; and handover of power to the new transitional government and UN supervised elections. To attend an all party conference without these preconditions being fulfilled would be to attend on Smith's conditions. The transitional government on the other hand also reacted sharply and declared that it regarded the March 3 internal settlement not only as the basis for any discussions but also as the sole centre piece of any agreement that would emerge thereof.³⁶ These developments forced Mr. Hughes to inform the British government that a conference called now would end in failure.

With little hope of holding an all party conference the transitional government set in motion its new political programmes. A draft constitution for a black majority rule in Rhodesia was published which contained one major surprise. Rhodesia became Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. Rhodesian white electorate also gave an overwhelming endorsement for the black-led government proposed therein. Mr. Smith also declared that Britain and the USA were morally bound to recognise the black-dominated government to be chosen through universal suffrage on 20 April 1979. The elections were held and Bishop Muzorewa's United African National Council captured 51 of the 72 seats reserved for Africans. The country had for the first time an African Prime Minister with a Cabinet and Assembly predominantly African.

But the General Election had proved nothing and solved nothing. Rhodesia continued to go on its disastrous course as before. In fact the situation created some serious problems for the new government because it was given more responsibility with less power. The Cabinet and the Assembly were of course dominated by Africans but the real power remained with the whites because of the constitutional structures which Mr. Smith had got endorsed first by the moderate African leaders, then by the white electorate and now by the African voters. The constitution guaranteed the whites a good number of ministerial posts in the Cabinet and gave veto powers to the representative of the white population. The provisions of the constitution also made it clear that there was no possibility of blacks being found eligible for higher posts such as High Court Judge and senior personnel of defence and security services for a long time to come.

The fairness and the legitimacy of the general elections had also been challenged by the African militants. The elections had taken place against a background of mounting disorder which had led to 90% of the Rhodesians being placed under Martial Law. There were no electoral rolls. The external parties were banned and the media censored. Most of the leaders of the Patriotic Front were in jail. The implication is that the electorate had nowhere been free from military pressure and to grant recognition to Rhodesia on the basis of this general election was out of question. The international support for this type of agreement also eroded when it became clear that no settlement would bring peace without the inclusion of the Patriotic Front.

The last and the most determined effort to get a settlement for the Rhodesian problem followed the Commonwealth Heads of the State meeting in Lusaka in July 1979 where a combination of white and black Commonwealth leaders persuaded the British Government not to recognise the internal settlement and at the same time to try a

new negotiated settlement with all the major parties. In this conference an eleven point proposal for a new independent constitution for Rhodesia was outlined. Britain would assume its legal responsibility as colonial power in Rhodesia and draw up a new constitution which would be the basis for Zimbabwean independence.

The constitutional conference opened in London in September 1979. This time there was continuing war in Rhodesia—a war which took on an average daily toll of about one hundred human lives. So the Patriotic Front leaders, who had the support of local African people and the frontline states made it clear that the conference should not be taken as just a constitutional conference. It should also discuss other related matters. But the British Government was interested first to seek agreement on independence constitution. If that could be achieved, it could be necessary to decide the agreement to give effect to that agreement. The British Government at that time was convinced that as long as there was no agreement on the constitution, which was the first item on the agenda, it was pointless to discuss the second item, i.e. the pre-independence arrangements. It viewed the two states as separate. But the Patriotic Front leaders did not view these two stages separate because in the independent constitution, contained many aspects which could have a direct bearing on the pre-independence arrangements. These included guaranteed white representation in the Assembly and its veto right and their representation in the army, police and the judiciary. The latter was very important because the African Leaders wanted complete elimination of white control over the levers of power for the interim period. This British Government assured that it would not proceed unilaterally if there was agreement on the first but not on the second.

After prolonged discussions, a draft constitution was prepared which provides for a multi-party Westminster-style democratic structure, with a Prime Minister whose powers are limited by constitutional checks and balances.³⁷

Regarding pre-independence arrangements, the core of the British plan resolves round the appointment of a British governor for the interim period between ceasefire and new elections in Rhodesia.

Discussions on the modality of ceasefire, the last item of the negotiation for settlement, proved to be tougher than was expected. Instead of an immediate ceasefire, effective within seven days of the signing of the settlement as the British Government suggested, the Patriotic Front leaders had demanded a progressive ceasefire. Another dispute was regarding the location of respective forces. The British Government suggested that the guerrilla units be collected at certain specified points leaving the rest of the country under the armed forces

of the ruling Government. But the Patriotic Front leaders did not accept this proposal. Moreover, they also had wanted complete withdrawal of South African forces, the grounding of Rhodesian combat aircraft, and equality in the disposition of Rhodesian and Patriotic Front forces. The British Government, on the request of the Commonwealth Secretary—General who mediated and helped the two parties to change their inflexible position, gave categorical assurance that there would be no external involvement in Rhodesia under the British Governor.

This assurance evidently satisfied the Patriotic Front because they felt that the British proposals for a ceasefire would enable them to prepare the details of implementation. Following this accord Lord Soames, the new British Governor, flew to Salisbury. This was necessary before final negotiations on the ceasefire were completed because the arrangements for a ceasefire would require the British authority in Rhodesia. On 21 December 1979 the three parties signed an accord thereby ending the seven year-war and turning the colony into the sovereign State of Zimbabwe.

With the agreement signed, the tussle for power of the Patriotic Front leaders with the moderate leaders was transferred from the battlefield to the ballot box. The ban on the parties had been lifted. International economic sanctions had been terminated. Mr. Robert Mugabe and Mr. Joshua Nkomo deserve credit for their forward-looking decision to end the war and move towards democratic government. The British Government also played a very positive role. The British Governor received extraordinary response to the ceasefire programmes.

Both the wings of the Patriotic Front—ZANU and ZAPU—fought the election with the possibility of a coalition after the elections based on their respective electoral strength. Elections were held in the last week of February 1980. The victory of Mr. Mugabe and his Zimbabwe African National Union ended an era in Rhodesia's turbulent history giving power to the man whose party won 57 seats out of 80 allotted for Africans. (20 seats were reserved for the whites). The British Governor lost no time in inviting him to form a government. At that time, Mr. Mugabe proved to be a perfect politician. In his broadcast after the victory, he declared that his would not be a "racist" regime. After giving Home Ministry to Mr. Joshua Nkomo, he called for national reconciliation. He offered the two most important portfolios of Commerce and Industry to a white moderate, Mr. David Smith and Agriculture to Mr. Denis Norman. Finally, on 17 April 1980, the world witnessed the rise of another new nation-state under the name of Zimbabwe.

With the emergence of Zimbabwean State, the danger to its independence is not fully removed. The source of danger is South Africa. South Africa's premier has already threatened that Zimbabwe "will have to face the full force of the Republic's strength," if its territory is used to undermine the racist regime in the South. The threat posed in this case is not only of military aggression but also political blackmail and economic strangulation. Under these circumstances the only guarantee of success against hostile forces is the preservation of unity between Mr. Mugabe and Mr. Nkomo unity that brought victory through armed struggle and London Talks.

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3. The labour Government added one more principle namely, "it would be necessary to ensure that regardless of race, there was no oppression of majority or of minority by majority."
4. United Nations General Assembly, Draft Report on the Special Committee on the situation with regard to the implementation of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and people—Chapter III, Southern Rhodesia, A/AC. 109 L. 327 September 13, 1966, p. 49.
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6. Howard Simson, op. cit., 23.
7. Eric Lloyd William, "Perspectives on Rhodesia" *Optima*, Johannesburg Vol. 25, No. 1, 1975 p. 21.
8. *Africa Research Bulletin*, Political, Social and Cultural Series, Exeter, England, May 16, 1966, p 515.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 540.
10. *The Guardian*, London, May 24, 1969.
11. *The Standard*, Tanzania, May 28, 1969.
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14. Herry V. Moyana, "British complicity Policy on Rhodesia—1923 to 1970" *Pan African Journal*, Nairobi Vol. VIII, No. 1 Spring 1975, p. 45.
15. Howard Simson op. cit., p. 23.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 24.
17. *The Economist Intelligence Unit*, Quarterly Economic Review of Rhodesia and Malawi, op. cit. p. 10.
18. *Ibid.*, 6.
19. Olav Stokke and Carl Widstrand, *Southern Africa, The UN—OAU Conference*, OSLO, 9—14 April, 1973, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Papers and Documents Vol. II Uppsala, p. 163.
20. African National Congress, "Origions of the Zimbabwe People's Struggle *Sechaba*, London. 1st Quarter, 1978, p. 55.

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22. *African Research Bulletin*, Economic Financial and Technical Series, Exeter, England, March 31, 1978, p. 4598.
23. *Financial Mail*, Johannesburg, July 27, 1979.
24. *The Economist Intelligence Unit*, Quarterly Economic Review of Rhodesia and Malawi, Annual Supplement, London, 1969. p. 8.
25. Howard Simson op. cit. p. 23.
26. *African Research Bulletin*, September 30, 1979, p. 5230.
27. *The Guardian*, London, July 7, 1979.
28. *The Financial Times*, London, February 27, 1978.
29. Howard Simson, op. cit. p. 34.
30. Ibid., p. 40.
31. *Economist*, London, May 26, 1977.
32. Ibid.
33. *African Research Bulletin*, Political, Social and Cultural Series Exeter, England, September 15, 1977, p. 4540.
34. Ibid., 4540.
35. *The Guardian*, London, November 29, 1977.
36. *The Guardian*, London, March 4, 1978.
37. Report of the Rhodesian Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, Quoted from "The Current Situation in Zimbabwe," *Issue A Quarterly Journal of Opinion*, (USA, Vol IX I and 2) Spring Summer, 1979 p. 64.

AGREEMENT
BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA
AND
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KENYA
ON
ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL CORPORATION

THE Government of the Republic of India (hereinafter referred to as the Government of India) and the Government of the Republic of Kenya (hereinafter referred to as the Government of Kenya);

HAVING regard to close and friendly relations existing between the two countries; and

INSPIRED by an equal desire to facilitate mutual cooperation in the economic and technical fields;

HAVE agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

THE Government of India and the Government of Kenya shall cooperate in economic and technical fields, through specific programmes mutually agreed upon.

ARTICLE II

THE two Governments shall, in accordance with their applicable laws, endeavour to promote:

1. Exchange of information regarding research in the economic, technical and other fields of mutual interest, including carrying out of feasibility studies;
2. Exchange of visits of personnel with a view to achieving greater cooperation in the economic and technical fields.

ARTICLE III

FOR the purpose of implementing the provisions of this Agreement, the Government of India and the Government of Kenya shall cooperate to the largest possible extent in the recruitment of personnel in their respective countries to perform mutually agreed tasks. The recruitment of such personnel shall be governed by such terms and conditions as shall be agreed between the two governments.

ARTICLE IV

IN the performance of their assignments all personnel recruited pursuant to this Agreement shall be under the administrative control of the host Government. They shall comply with the laws and regulations of the host country subject, however, to the terms and conditions, concerning their assignment, as agreed upon.

ARTICLE V

1. THE host Government shall bear responsibility in respect of claims resulting from the execution of projects assisted by the other party under the terms of this Agreement.
2. THE host Government shall indemnify personnel recruited under this Agreement against any and all liabilities, suits, actions, demands damages, costs or fees on account of death, injuries to persons or property, or any other issues resulting from or connected with any act performed or omission made in the execution of any project within the terms of this Agreement, unless it is agreed between the parties that the same has been occasioned by gross negligence or wilful misconduct on the part of such personnel.
3. IN the event of the host Government meeting any claim on behalf of any personnel in accordance with Article V Paragraph 2, such Government shall be entitled to exercise and enforce the benefit of any right of set-off, counter claim indemnity, contribution or guarantee to which such personnel become entitled.
4. THE two Governments shall place at the disposal of each other any information or render any assistance required for the handling of any case under Article V Paragraph 2 or for the fulfilment of the purpose of Article V Paragraph 3.

ARTICLE VI

1. THE Government of India nominates the Ministry of External Affairs, and the Government of Kenya nominates the Office of the Vice President and Ministry of Finance as the coordinating agencies for the purposes of this Agreement.
2. THE Government of India nominates Ministry of External Affairs, and the Government of Kenya nominates the Office of the President (the National Council for Science and technology) as the agencies responsible for coordinating matters related to science and technology within the terms of this Agreement.
3. THESE agencies shall hold periodic consultations on questions relating to the successful realisation of the approved programmes of cooperation in the economic and technical fields and their officials may meet as mutually convenient for the purpose.

ARTICLE VIII

1. THIS Agreement shall come into force upon signature and shall remain in force for a period of five years. Thereafter, it may be renewed from time to time by mutual agreement for a further period of five years through a written notice of intention to renew the Agreement at least six months prior to the date of the expiry of the Agreement.
2. THIS Agreement may be amended from time to time by an exchange of letters between the contracting parties and such amendments shall form an integral part of this Agreement.
3. THIS Agreement may be terminated by either party by giving a written notice of six months prior to the date of the intended termination.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorised there to by their respective Governments have signed this Agreement.

DONE in duplicate at New Delhi this Twenty Fourth Day of February One Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty One in the Hindi and English languages, both texts being equally authentic, except in cases of inconsistency where the English text shall prevail.

Sd/—

Hon. P.V. Narasimha Rao
Minister of External Affairs

For the Government of the
Republic of India

Sd/—

Hon. Nicholas K. Biwott, M.P.
(Minister of State)
Office of the President
For the Government of the
Republic of Kenya

TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA
AND
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KENYA

The Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the Republic of Kenya (referred to in this Agreement as 'the Contracting Parties') desirous of strengthening and developing trade relations between the two countries on the basis of equality and mutual benefit, have agreed as follows:—

ARTICLE 1

1.1 The Contracting Parties shall accord each other the most-favoured-nation treatment in all matters with respect to the trade relations between the two countries.

1.2 The Contracting Parties shall issue import and export licences in regard to their mutual trade as long as such licences are or shall be required in accordance with the laws and regulations of either Contracting Party.

1.3 The licences referred to in Articles 1.2 above shall be granted on terms no less favourable than those granted to any other third country.

1.4 The provisions of the preceding paragraphs of this Article shall, however, not apply to advantages and preferences which:—

- (i) One of the Contracting Parties has granted or may grant to neighbouring countries in order to facilitate frontier traffic;
- (ii) result from a customs union, a free trade area, or any other international trade agreement and arrangement to which either Contracting Party may be or become a Party;
- (iii) either Contracting Party has accorded or may accord to any country as existing on the date of the conclusion of the present Agreement or those granted in replacement of such preferences or advantages that existed prior to either Contracting Party's accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT);
- (iv) either Contracting Party has accorded under any scheme for expansion of trade and economic cooperation among the

developing countries and to which either Contracting Party is or may become a party.

ARTICLE 2

2.1 The Contracting Parties shall support and facilitate within the scope of their laws and regulations, the widest possible trade between the two countries.

2.2 The Contracting Parties shall use their best endeavours to encourage direct trade and to increase the volume of trade taking into account the mutuality of benefit accruing to the two countries.

2.3 The Contracting Parties shall endeavour to promote co-operation and increased trade between the state trading organisations of the two countries.

ARTICLE 3

3.1 For the purpose of this Agreement, goods originating in India shall be regarded as Indian products, and goods originating in Kenya shall be regarded as Kenyan products.

3.2 The country of origin shall be deemed to be the country where a product was produced or manufactured or in the case of non-processed agricultural goods, the country where the products were actually produced. The Contracting Parties reserve the right to subject the importation of any goods to the submission of a certificate of origin by an organisation authorised in this respect by the Government of the country of origin.

ARTICLE 4

4.1 On the part of the Republic of India, the commercial contract on the deliveries of goods and providing services within the scope of this Agreement shall be concluded by juridical and natural persons of the Republic of India.

4.2 On the part of the Republic of Kenya, the commercial contract on delivery of goods and providing services within the scope of this Agreement shall be concluded by persons and trading enterprises of the Republic of Kenya.

ARTICLE 5

5.1 The juridical and natural persons of the Republic of India and the persons and trading enterprises of the Republic of Kenya shall enjoy the most-favoured-nation treatment in respect of personal protection and protection of property when carrying out commercial activities in the territory of the other Contracting Party. The said per-

sons shall also have the right of access to the courts, tribunals and administrative authorities of the other Contracting Party in connection with the enjoyment of the aforesaid treatment to the same extent as foreigners enjoy similar rights under the laws and regulations of such other Contracting Party.

ARTICLE 6

6.1 In order to facilitate the development of trade between the two countries, the Contracting Parties shall, under the laws and regulations in force in their respective countries, encourage participation in trade fairs and exhibitions organised in the territory of the other Contracting Party and shall provide each other assistance and cooperation in connection with the organisation of such fairs and exhibitions.

ARTICLE 7

7.1 Each Contracting Party, shall, subject to its internal laws and regulations and subject to such conditions as may be prescribed, exempt the following goods from customs duty leviable thereon in its territory:

(a) goods meant for any fair, exhibition, demonstration seminar, congress and conference in the territory of the other Contracting Party and not intended for sale:—

- (1) advertisement and publicity materials such as posters, booklets, catalogues, books and pamphlets and advertising and demonstration materials (which is demonstrably publicity material for the goods displayed) such as sound recording, films and lantern slides as well as apparatus for use therewith;
- (2) goods necessary for the purpose of demonstrating machinery or apparatus to be displayed;
- (3) equipment including interpretation apparatus and sound recording apparatus; and
- (4) construction and decoration materials and electrical fittings for the temporary stands or exhibitors;

(b) tools and instruments relevant to their assignment in other country imported by technicians and experts as part of their personal baggage;

(c) articles meant to be re-exported after repairs; and

(d) containers of durable nature.

ARTICLE 8

8.1 The Contracting Parties shall accord the most-favoured-nation

treatment to each other's merchant vessels sailing under their flags in respect of all matters relating to navigation, access to ports open to foreign trade and use of port and harbour facilities. However, any concessions accorded to ships engaged in the coastal trade of either Contracting Party shall not be available under this Article to the other Contracting Party.

ARTICLE 9

9.1 All payments resulting from contracts and transactions concluded within the scope of this Agreement shall be effected in accordance with the foreign exchange regulations in force in the respective countries in any convertible currency.

ARTICLE 10

10.1 In order to facilitate the implementation of this Agreement, a Joint Committee which shall consist of representatives designated by the respective Governments will be established. The Committee will meet once a year or as often as may be mutually agreed, alternately in Nairobi and New Delhi.

10.2 Within the purview of this Agreement, the Committee will :—

- (a) review the implementation of the provisions of this Agreement;
- (b) examine measures for the solution of problems which arise or may arise in the implementation of this Agreement or in the course of development of trade between the two countries; and
- (c) consider proposals made by either Contracting Party within the framework of this Agreement aimed at further expansion and diversification of trade between the two countries.

ARTICLE 11

11.1 This Agreement may be amended from time to time by the exchange of letters resulting from close consultations between the two Contracting Parties and such amendments shall become constituent parts of the Agreement.

ARTICLE 12

12.1 This Agreement is subject to ratification in accordance with the respective constitutional procedures in the two countries. It shall enter into force on the date of exchange of instruments of ratification.

12.2 The Contracting Parties agree that the provisions of this Agreement shall come into force provisionally from the date of signature.

12.3 This Agreement shall remain in force for a period of two years following the date of coming into force of the Agreement. If either of the Contracting Parties does not give notice in writing six months

before its expiry, the validity of this Agreement shall automatically extend each time thereafter for a similar period of two years.

12.4 After the termination of this Agreement, the provisions of this Agreement shall continue to apply to the contracts concluded under this Agreement but not fully executed as on the date of the termination of the Agreement.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the duly authorised representatives of the two Contracting Parties have signed this Agreement and affixed their seals thereto.

DONE at New Delhi this 24th Day of February in the year one thousand nine hundred and eighty-one, in two originals each in English and Hindi languages, both texts being equally authentic but with the understanding that in case of inconsistency, the English text will prevail.

For the Government of
the Republic of India.

Sd/—

(PRANAB MUKHERJEE)
Minister of Commerce.

For the Government of
the Republic of Kenya.

Sd/—

(DR. MUNYUA WAIYAKI)
Minister of Industry.

CULTURAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA AND THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF KENYA

The Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the Republic of Kenya (hereinafter referred to as the 'Contracting Parties').

INSPIRED BY a common desire to establish and develop closer cultural relations, and

DESIROUS OF promoting and developing in every possible manner the relations and understanding between India and Kenya in the realms of art, appreciation of cultural heritage, education (including academic activity, research and training in the fields of education, science and technology), sports, public health and mass media of information and education (including films, T.V., radio and press).

HAVE AGREED to conclude the following Agreement.

ARTICLE I

The Contracting Parties shall facilitate and encourage cooperation in the fields of art, appreciation of cultural heritage, education, sports, public health and mass media of information and education in order to contribute towards a better knowledge of their respective cultures and activities in these fields.

ARTICLE II

The Contracting Parties shall encourage and facilitate:

- (a) reciprocal visits of professors and experts for delivering lectures, study tours and for conducting special courses;
- (b) reciprocal visits of representatives of educational, literary, scientific, technical, artistic, sports and journalists' associations and organisations and participation in congresses, conferences, symposia and seminars;
- (c) exchange of materials in the fields of culture, science, education, sports, translation and exchange of books, periodicals and other educational, scientific, technical, cultural, sports publications, and wherever possible, exchange of art specimens; and
- (d) reciprocal facilities in regard to visits by archaeologists of the one country to the other to enable them to gain expe-

rience of excavation as well as preservation and display of archaeological finds, and for training purposes, and also in regard to exchange of specimens or casts.

ARTICLE III

Each Contracting Party shall endeavour to consider favourably the requests by the other Party for organising, in its recognised institutions, specific courses of study for the nationals of the other Party in the fields referred to in the Preamble.

ARTICLE IV

Each Contracting Party shall use its best endeavours to provide facilities and scholarships to students and scientific personnel of the other country seeking to study in its recognised institutions of higher education and research.

ARTICLE V

Each Contracting Party undertakes to examine the conditions under which the diplomas, certificates and university degrees awarded in the other country can be recognised for purposes of study in its own educational and other institutions.

ARTICLE VI

Each Contracting Party shall endeavour to present different facets of the life and culture of the other Party through the media of radio, television and press. With this end in view, the two Parties shall exchange suitable materials and programmes.

ARTICLE VII

The Contracting Parties shall facilitate and promote:

- (a) exchange of artists, and dance and music ensembles;
- (b) exchange of art and other exhibitions;
- (c) exchange of films, documentaries, radio and television programme recordings and recordings on discs and tapes; and
- (d) exchange of experts in the field of cinematography and participation in each other's international film festivals.

ARTICLE VIII

The Contracting Parties shall encourage visits of sports teams between the two countries and shall facilitate, subject to the national

laws and regulations in force, their stay and movement in their respective territories.

ARTICLE IX

The Contracting Parties shall, to the extent possible, ensure that text-books prescribed for their educational institutions, particularly those relating to History and Geography, do not contain any error or misrepresentation of facts about each other's country.

ARTICLE X

Each Contracting Party shall welcome the establishment in its territory of cultural institutes or friendship associations devoted to educational and cultural pursuits by the other Contracting Party, or the Contracting Parties jointly. Such institutes and associations shall be established in accordance with the laws, regulations and general policy of the host country it being understood that prior clearance of the host Government would be obtained before any such institute or association is established under this Article.

ARTICLE XI

For the fulfilment of the objectives of the present Agreement a joint Committee consisting of an equal number of representatives designated by each of the Contracting Parties shall be established. The Committee shall meet as often as may be mutually agreed upon but at least once in three years alternately in Nairobi and New Delhi. The Committee will be responsible for reviewing the implementation of the provisions of the present Agreement, advising the respective Governments in formulating Exchange programmes covering areas of interest to either Party in the fields envisaged in the present Agreement, and making recommendations for the better implementation of the Agreement.

ARTICLE XII

The present Agreement is subject to ratification in accordance with the respective constitutional procedures in the two countries. It shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of Instruments of Ratification.

The present Agreement shall remain in force for a period of five years and shall automatically be extended thereafter for further periods of five years unless either Contracting Party gives to the other six months' notice in advance in writing of its intention to terminate the Agreement.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the duly authorised representatives of the Contracting Parties have signed the present Agreement and affixed their seals thereto.

DONE at New Delhi this day Twenty fourth of February 1981 in four originals, two each in Hindi and English languages, all the texts being equally authentic except that in case of inconsistency the English text shall prevail.

FOR THE GOVT. OF
THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA

FOR THE GOVT. OF
THE REPUBLIC OF KENYA

Book Reviews

PATTERNS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN RURAL KENYA*

Kenya, having common borders with countries of diverse political systems and economic interests, occupies a place of special importance not only in the history of modern Africa but in modern international political and economic relations as well. Apart from having a considerable outlet to the Indian Ocean, it shares common boundaries with countries like Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania and Somalia.

Kenya is the typical example of agro-economy which is experiencing rapid economic growth (6.2 per cent per annum in real terms) alongwith a very high rate of population growth (3.6 per cent per annum). Consequently the benefit of economic growth is not reflected in the standard of

living as enjoyed by the people. As far as resources are concerned potentialities of land in terms of rainfall (since rainfall is the only source of water for cultivation) is concentrated around Lake Victoria and coastal districts. 75 per cent of the population is concentrated only in 15 per cent of the land areas. As a result districts with high potentialities of land have very high density of population.

The economic and social history of colonial Kenya is no exception to that of other under-developed countries. The White settlers had driven the natives away from the fertile land to less fertile hinterlands in the process turning quite a sizeable number into landless wage labours. The

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- * (1) *Economic and Social Transformation in Rural Kenya*. John Carlsen, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, 1980. pp. 230.
(2) *Marketing Cooperatives and Peasants in Kenya*. Tarbon Bager. Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, 1980. pp. 116.

economic repression by the settlers did not prove to be beneficial for themselves in the long run. It was the prolonged frustration of the tribe (Kikuyu) alienated from the land, who through their determined struggle won freedom in 1963.

But in the book *Economic and Social Transformation in Rural Kenya* a different reason is adduced e.g., the expansion of primitive accumulation and the extension of the market created an economic elite aware of their rights, who provided leadership in the freedom struggle.

Doubtless that by superimposing feudal plantation system of production on the self-sustained tribes the process of primitive accumulation was attempted to be thwarted. Restrictions were imposed both on land purchase by the natives and their entry into trade and commerce thus denying them any other alternative earning opportunity than working in the whites' lands at subsistence wage rate. This was favoured by the Metropolitan Government also. But the policy of extracting maximum labour with minimum wages proved to be self-defeating. Cash crops like coffee and pyrethrum catered to the needs of the metropolitan market in London. During depression in the 30's the plantation economy could not satisfy the Metropolitan Government by their performance. On the other hand, the natives in spite of

adverse circumstances started proving their worth in economic fields. Hence with the initiative, of the Metropolitan Government economic reforms were introduced allowing the natives to cultivate cash crops. This generated some surplus in the hands of the natives which were invested to strengthen their economic and social position. Consequently they started entering into trade and tourism. Also the surplus was invested to educate the children in the native schools and boycott schools run by European missionaries.

Thus even before independence the capitalist mode of production made a beginning. Internal market in manufactured goods especially consumer goods expanded which made it profitable for multinationals to invest in Kenya, though in a limited way.

Post-independent pattern of economic development has not undergone much change. Agriculture remained the priority sector and the main source of employment; its contribution to foreign trade and national income are still the highest. It is all the more interesting to note that in Kenya high rate of agricultural development has been brought about only through better utilization of land and land reforms. Technology of production and the mode of production remained the same. Lands acquired from the white settlers were distribut-

ed to the landless peasants in small holdings to cultivate cash crops. In these farms production was carried out with labour intensive techniques. In order to eliminate diseconomies of marketing in the small farms, the nationalist government provided infrastructure through marketing cooperatives combined with credit cooperatives. This incentive worked well with the small and middle farmers. Production increased to such an extent that there was tremendous increase in marketable surplus, 50 per cent of which was contributed by the small and middle farmers. The increase in marketable surplus was not the result of coercive methods because during this period both self-consumption of foodgrains and illegal trade in foodgrains with neighbouring countries also increased significantly. Farmers indulged in private trading as well though they preferred cooperative societies which fetched them better price. Increase in the volume of production was brought about by introducing cash crops like coffee, pyrethrum and tea in place of low productive food crops; even among food crops inferior varieties of crops gave way to more productive and the high-yield varieties. For example, in place of sorghum and millet production of maize expanded; vegetable crops, livestock and dairy production also increased tremendously during this period.

Another peculiarity observed

in Kenyan agriculture was that the sector could not bring about any technological change to increase the stock of capital and productivity of labour in spite of large amount of marketable surplus generated during this period. Only at a later part technological change in a limited form—for instance, change from shifting cultivation to multiple cropping, use of tractor and wage labour in a few areas—can be noticed. The following factors are responsible for the non-accumulating character of Kenyan agriculture. First, production was mainly carried out by family labour especially the female labour opportunity cost of which was very low. Hence there was no incentive and it was not profitable to substitute labour with machinery. On the other hand, savings in agriculture have been invested in government financial agencies and banks, trade and tourism in search of higher profits. Secondly the government took away a part of surplus in the form of taxation. Finally through cooperative movements the government procurement price has been kept low; thus the terms of trade between agriculture and industry was unfavourable to the former.

Though the growth of agriculture could not induce self-sustained industrialization in Kenya, it created enough linkage effects for the small-scale enterprises to develop providing alternative earning opportunities for the far-

mers. Non-agricultural rural activities developed mostly to supplement agricultural income and were synchronized with the off-season of agriculture. An average rural household received 30 to 43 per cent income in 1974-75 from non-farm activities. But mostly non-farm activities were being carried out in family system and wage system operated only in a limited form. Participation of females as wage labour in non-farm work was nil. Non-farm activities developed mainly on the basis of resource endowments, demand linkage effects and opportunity for trade and commerce. Regional specialization on the basis of comparative advantages started developing.

Extensive empirical surveys on rural activities, both farm and non-farm, have been carried out for four sub-divisions of four selected districts, namely, Kisumu, Kisii, Taita Hills and Kwale districts for the year 1974-75. All the selected sub-locations belong to the high potential agricultural region in terms of annual rainfall. The economic trends of these sub-locations conform well with the general trend of the economy. Mwogeto sub-division of Kisii has highest agricultural income having the lowest number of non-agricultural employment, specialises in the production of cash crops like coffee and generates the highest amount of agricultural marketable surplus. Kombura sub-division of Kisumu

has the largest number of non-agricultural activities, earns lowest agricultural income, but uses proportionately more purchased inputs and receives the highest remittance from non-agricultural sector. Though non-farm activities did not develop much in Werugha and Kikoneni sub-divisions of Taita Hills and Kwale, special types of products are produced in cottage industries. As regards agriculture these two areas come in the middle rank. Marketable surplus varies proportionately between areas with volume of agricultural production. Purchased agricultural inputs like wage labour and tractor is used in a limited manner in all areas.

About rural non-farm activities the interesting observation made by the author is that though they have potential viability, they as yet cannot generate full-time alternative occupations for the agriculturists. They only provide security against bad harvest. Small-scale production is non-competitive with large-scale production but competition among the small enterprises for the small market is severe. The survey methods used here are praiseworthy. Samples are chosen on the basis of official surveys. For collecting data both the questionnaire and the field survey methods have been used.

The second book analyses marketing cooperatives of Kenyan agriculture. Here out of seven

chapters only two have been devoted to empirical analysis while in all other chapters textbook method has been followed in defining various forms of cooperatives and their way of functioning in developed and underdeveloped economies. Kisii, where marketing cooperatives have been made compulsory for the peasants producing cash crops, is taken as a case study. Before studying the functioning of marketing cooperatives the author has undertaken a general survey on the agricultural production of this area. In Mwogeto, the sub-location of Kisii district, agriculture is prosperous; coffee, pyrethrum and tea are produced in small-scale in the family system of production. Land market has still not developed; rather tenancy plays an important role. Land is utilized intensively in the sense that multiple cropping is practised. Among food crops maize, millets and sweet potatoes are produced. Crops which are labour-intensive are preferred for cultivation. 30 per cent of land is used as grazing area and animal husbandry yields as much income as the production of food crops. Land is fragmented and sizes of land holdings vary between 0.1 ha and 22.2 ha. Monetization has taken place for all size group of the farms. Inequality of income is moderate in this area. Peasants supplement their incomes with wage income. Finally, the pre-

capitalist mode of production is still prevalent in Mwogeto sub-location having family system of cultivation and using insignificant amount of purchased inputs.

In this pre-capitalist mode of production marketing cooperatives which essentially encourage commodity production has been superimposed by the government with twin purpose in mind: to cater to the needs of export market which the uneducated peasants operating in the small holdings will not be able to do and secondly to get information about the problems concerning production. It is true that marketing cooperatives, by removing the diseconomies of small-scale marketing and the middlemen, is now the only alternative for small farmers producing cash crops; but bureaucracy with its sluggishness and corruption is impeding the efficient functioning of cooperatives. The concept of membership democracy could not be introduced in the set-up where peasants are not aware of their rights and duties. They often look upon the cooperatives as the property of the government or that of the office-bearers. Diversification of functions of cooperative societies are not called for. Most of the time investment in non-agricultural activities does not yield profit but becomes a burden on the peasants. Administrative and other overhead costs are found to be high which reduces considerably the incomes

of the peasants.

On the other hand, parastatal system recently developed in case of tea proved to be more efficient. Functionally, marketing cooperatives and parastatal systems serve the same purpose, but organisationally there is no participation of the members in the administration and no membership democracy in a parastatal system. Though the differences in an administrative structure do not mean much to the uneducated peasants it can keep away politics and nepotism thereby paving the way for efficient functioning.

Though both the studies depict optimistic picture of Kenyan agriculture, severe crop failure as experienced at the fag-end of the 70's proved contrary. Traditional agriculture with the help of better utilization of land alone and no technological development cannot generate long-term growth effect. So long as

cultivation is dependent on the vagaries of weather, rainfall can create serious economic hazards like crop failure and famine. If agriculture has to absorb the population when natural rate of growth is so high, labour productivity is bound to be depressed. It is too much to expect that small and middle farmers, being guided by short-term profit motives will take initiative in investing in research and development, where return is uncertain and the gestation period long. There is neither any initiative on the part of the government to build infrastructure for technological change nor has it invested in research and development of agriculture. As long as the technological change in Kenyan agriculture is left to the initiative of private farmers the face of rural Kenya is not going to change.

ARATI BASU

Peking Leadership : Treachery and Betrayal—H.D. Malviya. New Literature, Delhi Rs 25 Pp. 178+viii

At a time when the Afghan crisis is looming in the minds of foreign policy makers and the Soviets are being projected as the bogeymen of the international system, it may be worthwhile to see the possible threat posed by the other communist giant. China too has over the past couple of decades been following a policy of interference in the affairs of third world states and has to an

extent succeeded in its ventures. Therefore a balanced view of the actions of both powers is necessary in any study of super power behaviour in the Third World.

Shri Malviya has attempted in his book to present the other side of the picture by analysing both the domestic and foreign policies of China and pointing out the vast difference between Peking's rhetoric and its actual

actions. For instance while talking about anti-hegemonism on the one hand, on the other China claims about 10.5 million square kilometers of its various neighbours territories. Similarly while preaching non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations the Chinese have an unenviable record of aiding insurgencies in the Third World. Such support has not been restricted to insurgencies in hostile nations. Even friendly governments like those of Nigeria and Indonesia were to see the Chinese aid separationist forces and stir up political instability in their territories.

To the author all Chinese foreign policy actions may be attributed to two basic factors. The first is the inherent sense of racial superiority in the Chinese which has led them to believe over the centuries that their country is the middle kingdom to which the rest of the barbarian world has to pay homage. This perception has continued upto modern times. The second is the weakness of China's military-industrial base.

Despite its position as one of the nuclear powers of the world the standard of China's armed forces and the quality of its weaponry is poor. Being forced to use obsolete weapons the Chinese armed forces are at a potential disadvantage against any determined opponent who is well stocked with modern

weaponry. The whole Vietnam fiasco is an example point. China is thus in a fix: while the psychology of its people calls for the assertion of superiority in term of global leadership or hegemony its military-industrial base precludes it from achieving this goal. Hence, the author points out, the Chinese have been trying to exaggerate the Soviet threat to the international system and, "Peking thus hopes to achieve on this basis an understanding with imperialism as a factor for compensating China's as yet inadequate military-industrial might".

Mr. Malviya's thesis is correct to the extent that the Chinese are playing off the West against the Soviet Union to achieve their own ends. Chinese foreign policy despite the change in its ideological content is still based on certain ancient themes grounded in real politics. Thus just as friendly relations with the Soviet Union had been one element in safeguarding China against the US, now improved relations with the US becomes an obvious component of a policy designed to shield China from the USSR.

Though at times his analysis is a little superficial, yet it gives a good introductory assessment of China's foreign policy with particular reference to Africa. The Introduction written by Shri T.N. Kaul is also stimulating.

AMIT GUPTA

The Workers of Namibia : Gillian and Suzanne Cronje. International Defence and aid Fund for southern Africa London, 1979, Pp 135 price £ 1.50

The supply of cheap labour is the very basis of South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia. Without this labour force the economy of Namibia will simply not move. So the African Government will do naturally everything in its power to control the economic set-up for its own advantage as well as uninterrupted flow of cheap labour.

The workers of Namibia brings to light the glaring injustice perpetuated by the racist Government of South Africa and the inhuman conditions of the Namibian Workers.

The authorities have deprived the indigenous African population from their traditional grazing grounds. They have discouraged the development of alternative sources of livelihood within the homelands. The State retains exclusive rights of ownership and exploitation over all minerals, precious stones, oil and other natural resources, so that such funds bring little or no economic advantage to the indigenous population.

Contract labour is important to Namibia's booming industries. Contract workers provide the main labour power for the mines, they are also central to the manufacturing and fishing industry. Since 1972 the contract labour has been officially handled

by the labour bureaux. A migrant labour must undergo through these bureaux and is obliged to accept the jobs that they offer him.

The Namibian black labourers are permitted to remain in the white areas only as long as their services are required by the apartheid economy. Their position is temporary and insecure. The surplus workers are repatriated to the bantustan. The Native (Urban Areas) Proclamation of 1951 made it illegal for a black person to remain in urban areas for more than 72 hours without a permit.

In an interview in 1977 farm worker at Windhoek pointed out that many contract workers died at the farm because of illness and no medical help. The families are not informed of the death because the employer is not going to trouble himself to find out where the family is.

It has been estimated that out of the total African Labour Force in Namibia only 500 workers (i.e. about 1% country's adult black population) have secondary education while 52,500 have completed primary education. Over 300,000 adult black Namibians (i.e., about 2/3 of country's adult population) have negligible or no education. In contrast virtually all white workers have completed

secondary education. The information published by South Africa for 1975 reveals that there were only 16 black people in the whole of Namibia occupying managerial, executive and administrative posts compared to 2,164 whites.

According to statistical data published by South African Government, one third of Ovambo migrant workers are unemployed in the mines—Tsumeb corporation Ltd. controlled by United States interests. The mining industries offer some of the highest wages available to black workers in Namibia. The black workers at the Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation Ltd (RTZ), Consolidated Diamond Mine (CDM), and Rossing mines are multinational operating in Namibia, provide very poor facilities of accommodation to the black workers and are separated from their families. The compounds are segregated. On an ethnic basis whereas white workers each have their own houses and live with their families. The coloured share four men in a room, African workers share 16 to 20 men in a room. Expensive and poor quality food for black workers is another grievance.

The book proves that though the South African Government claims that they are trying to eliminate racial discrimination in Namibia, in actuality no concrete steps have been taken. There cannot be any genuine independence for Namibia without a radical change in the economic set up of the black labour force.

This book is probably the fullest and certainly the most up-to-date systematic documentation of how the Namibian black workers suffer under the white minority rule. The authors have successfully described the economic exploitation as experienced by the black workers. They have given the most detailed description of Namibian workers and their struggle for freedom. The authors have done extensive work on the subject, the survey material and data collection is most up-to-date and very useful for those working on Namibia's economy. Recent maps of the regions and interviews provide a clear picture of the situation in Namibia. A number of rare photographs add to the value of the book.

JENNIFER SATYANANDAM

SOBHUZA II Ngwenyama and King of Swaziland: the story of an hereditary ruler and his country: Hilda Kuper; Duckword, London 1978 Pp 363+XI £ 15.00

Swaziland, the last directly administered British Colony in

Africa, is one of the smallest States in Africa. With an area of

17,363 square kilometres, it is surrounded by South Africa on the north, west and south and separated from the Indian Ocean on the east by Mozambique coastal plain.

Today it is ruled by the octogenarian King Sobhuza II who ascended the throne of the Swazi in 1921. This factor alone gives the Swazi people a polity of unique continuity which is no where to be found in Africa. Swaziland attained independence in 1968 and it is only due to the king himself that his country—sandwiched between the apartheid regime of South Africa on the one hand and the Marxist—Socialist republic of Mozambique on the other—remains, albeit precariously, a sovereign state.

The present book under review portrays very vividly the life-story of this amazing personality, i.e. Sobhuza II. Hilda Kuper, the distinguished anthropologist, first came to Swaziland in 1934 along with Professor Bronislaw Malinowski and it was a definite case of 'love at first sight'. That love for Swaziland, its people and culture has grown on successive visits. In 1970, she had become a Swazi citizen by *khontha* (the offer of traditional allegiance) and though she resides and works in America, "I remain a Swazi citizen, travelling on only a Swaziland passport." (P. 14).

Writing a biography is always a difficult task—either it tends to

be over critical or disproportionately biased. That is why the value of a biographical work lies in its balance of assessment. Hilda Kuper is adequately qualified for the task. Not only does she have enormous insight into the Swazi culture, but also a firm control over her intellectual balance. Another unique feature is that though this book has been authored by Hilda Kuper she was assisted in her task by an Editorial Committee consisting of the Minister of Justice, the Private Secretary to the King (who is also a scholar of repute) and Swaziland's first ambassador to the United States.

Consequently we have not merely the biography of the King. The author has analysed with remarkable success the personality of Sobhuza II against the backdrop of socio-political setting which in its turn is influencing the King and is being influenced, to some extent, by him what we get in effect is, apart from an illuminating biography of the King, a standard work on Swazi political history, which can favourably be compared with her earlier work on *The Swazi: A South African Kingdom* (1963). Because of her personal familiarity, the author could give an assessment of the situation leading to the abolition of the Constitution and experiment launched by the King — fact which is prone to be discussed as an act of high-handed authoritarianism by a

tribal King. In the end we tend to agree with the author that African monarchy is not necessarily tantamount to African despotism and that an anointed monarch is no less representative of the wish of the majority than an elected President.

ANUP RANJAN BASU



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